REDIRECTING THE BILATERAL MILITARY DIALOGUE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 000094 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/05/2017 TAGS: MARR PREL EAID ET SUBJECT: REDIRECTING THE BILATERAL MILITARY DIALOGUE REF: A. 07 ADDIS 1535 ¶B. ADDIS 89 ¶C. ADDIS 87 Classified By: Ambassador Donald Yamamoto for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Ethiopian Government (GoE) officials, and particularly the Ethiopian military's (ENDF) Chief of Defense Staff Gen. Samora Yonus, have increasingly complained in recent years of "broken promises" for military assistance by the United States. The USG's refusal to provide the final two of four C-130 aircraft promised to Ethiopia in 1997, as well as the long delayed delivery of C-130 spare parts and suspension of HUMVEE deliveries in the 2005 post-election violence, raised tensions in the relationship. The U.S. has, in the past year, made good on many prior commitments and has not made any new commitments without being able to meet them, i.e. kevlar body armor and night vision goggles for ENDF troops deployed to UN Darfur operations. Post believes strongly that the United States must now redefine the debate away from "broken promises" and what we need to do to help the ENDF, to a more balanced and equal relationship which puts stress on the ENDF's responsibilities and obligations to its people and to bilateral relations. End Summary. BROKEN PROMISES MET -------------- ¶2. (C) While only two of the four C-130s promised were delivered to Ethiopia -- with the understanding that the remaining two C-130s could be delivered once the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea over the border was resolved -- the Ethiopians have been long resigned to the fact that the remaining C-130s are no longer available. In the past year, with the support of CJTF-HOA, CENTCOM, DoD and the State Department, the U.S. has been highly successful in meeting past promises without making new ones, unless such promises can be met. The promise of deliveries of kevlar body armor and night vision goggles will be met prior to the departure of ENDF troops to UN Darfur operations in the spring. ¶3. (C) The case of the C-130s certainly is viewed as a broken promise by hawks within the GoE and ENDF, the broader perception of "broken promises" is more a function of the ENDF's selective memory fed by logistical delays stemming from USG bureaucratic hurdles and the ENDF's slow and piecemeal provision of information. Despite the challenge of how the C-130 arrangement is viewed, the U.S. has been an extremely responsive and reliable partner to the GoE providing quality military goods and services, particularly in comparison to shoddy Chinese goods which often breakdown, goods which meet only partial ENDF needs by the Israelis, and cheap but poor quality assistance and materiel from North Korea that appear to violate Ethiopia's UN obligations. It is the belief of the Ambassador and of Post that General Samora's biases (which favor China and Israel and takes a very critical view of the U.S. and Europe) have severely tested, and can potentially strain and even harm, bilateral relations. While the vast majority of other ENDF officers and NCOs favor the U.S. and do not share this view, General Samora has replaced senior officers with whom the U.S. has had close ties, with those who owe their positions to him and will remain closely allied to the General. As such, they will share his biases and views, irregardless if they believe them or not. ¶4. (C) Samora has advocated U.S. broken promises while neglecting his own failings. The U.S. suspended deliveries of the final two, of four, C-130s as a result of the Eritrea-Ethiopia border war in 1998. While the understanding was that after the conflict as part of the peace process the remaining two C-130 planes would be delivered. Unfortunately, tensions remain and the two C-130s could not be held and were sent to Latin America. The GoE declined to request the U.S. to use FMF assistance to purchase spare parts, seeking U.S. assistance for radios, HUMVEES, and other equipment instead. The USG notified the GoE in 2001 of the termination of its C-130 maintenance assistance in response to Ethiopia's non-payment of the contract. ¶5. (C) Gen. Samora's recent lament over delayed equipment for Ethiopia's Darfur contingent (Ref B) ignores the fact that it ADDIS ABAB 00000094 002 OF 002 was the USG that approached the ENDF offering assistance and that delays, at least in part, stem from the ENDF's incessant trickle of amended equipment requests. In fact, the ENDF did not request any equipment for Darfur operations until the end of November. The requested kevlar body armor, night vision goggles, and tents will be delivered by March before ENDF troops deploy to Darfur. This would be record time for any USG delivery. (If we should not get this equipment prior to their departure, it would only help Samora's rhetoric of lack of U.S. assistance.) Similarly, despite Samora's recent complaint that the USG has not supported Ethiopia's training of Somali troops, he failed to note that it is only the ENDF's three-month delay in providing vetting information for the ENDF trainers that has blocked the provision of U.S. assistance. COMMENT -------------- ¶6. (C) The GoE, specifically General Samora, remains intent on invoking the claim of "broken promises" and lack of U.S. financial support for operations fully supported by the U.S., such as UN peacekeeping deployments, to secure additional military assistance from the United States. The U.S. needs to redefine the debate away from "broken promises" and what we need to do to help the ENDF, to a more balanced and equal relationship which puts stress on the ENDF's responsibilities and obligations to its people and to bilateral relations. An honest and frank dialogue on the bilateral military partnership, forcing Samora and the GoE to recognize its own failings and flaws will rectify miscommunications between our two countries and produce a more sound basis for further military assistance and cooperation. We need to push Samora and the GOE on 1) the consequences of their counter-insurgency operations which has impacted significantly on the devastating humanitarian issues in the Ogaden as well as human rights problems. We have provided General Petraeus' manual on counter-insurgency to General Samora. 2) We need to be able to re-deploy USG civil affairs teams into the Ogaden to pursue humanitarian assistance programs which will help our counter-terrorism objectives. 3) We need to push the ENDF and GoE to begin shifting away from its arms relationship with North Korea which is apparently in violation of UNSC resolutions (see Ref C). 4) We need to sincerely question the ENDF's motives behind the forced closure of two U.S. training bases (Bilate and Hurso) supported by the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) aimed at providing training ENDF troops in counterterrorism-oriented skills and in which CJTF-HOA invested over $3 million in constructing the camps, and note that the GoE too has broken promises when it comes to agreements on military cooperation. While the U.S.-Ethiopia bilateral military relationship remains, and should remain, robust to pursue our national security objectives, U.S. officials must redirect the nature of this dialogue to pursue a more balanced bilateral dialogue. YAMAMOTO