(C) DEFENSE OFFICIALS IMPOSE LAST-MINUTE

S E C R E T ADDIS ABABA 000087 SIPDIS C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - PARAGRAPH MARKINGS NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/09/2018 TAGS: PARM MARR PREL KN ET SUBJECT: (C) DEFENSE OFFICIALS IMPOSE LAST-MINUTE IMPEDIMENTS ON ARMS INQUIRY ON NORTH KOREA REF: A. 07 ADDIS 3528 ¶B. 06 ADDIS 3223 ¶C. STATE 124866 Classified By: Ambassador Donald Yamamoto for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (S/NF) Despite Prime Minister Meles' apparent receptivity to discussing Ethiopia's arms supply relationship with North Korea (Ref A) as well as discussion with the Secretary during her visit, Ethiopia's Chief of Defense Staff (CHOD),General Samora Yonus, adamantly opposes U.S. scrutiny of Ethiopian munitions factories connected with North Korea or any other country, and dismissed U.S. concerns over North Korea-Ethiopia ties arguing that these are productive and not in violation of international agreements. General Samora was emphatic in stressing that North Korean arms are inexpensive and North Korean help with arms manufacturing will allow Ethiopia to meet its obligations in UN peacekeeping missions and its strategic interests in Somalia. The General criticized the Ambassador personally for delays in the provision of U.S. support for operations in Somalia and urged support for their UNPKO deployments. ¶2. (S) Over the past month, Ambassador has pursued a visit to the North Korean-supported arms and munitions factory in Ambo. While the Ambo visit would have provided unprecedented first-hand observation of the largest North Korean-supported arms factory in country, it would have primarily provided a frank and direct dialogue between our two countries on the scope, nature and future of the Ethiopian-North Korean arms relationship and its effect on U.S.-Ethiopian ties. While the cancellation of the visit and the military's new-found tough stance on this issue highlights the opportunity lost to raise this issue in depth, the Ambassador will personally pursue this issue in depth with the Foreign and Prime Ministers in coming weeks. End Summary. THE AMMO IN AMBO IS NOT TO BE SEEN -------------- ¶3. (S) In response to sustained general expressions of concern about the Ethiopia-North Korea arms relationship with senior Ethiopian Government (GoE) officials, the Ministry of National Defense in November agreed to take an Embassy team and a Washington-based USG expert to see the North Korean-supported arms and munitions factory in Ambo. Just days before the December 18 planned visit, State Minister for Defense Sultan Mohammed -- Post's principle defense interlocutor on the North Korean arms relationship -- unexpectedly resigned his position. Despite a Diplomatic Note to Post in mid-December noting that the visit would be postponed, upon pursuit of rescheduling the visit, the Ethiopian military's (ENDF) international relations officer Gen. Hassan informed Acting DATT on December 28 that the visit was canceled. Gen. Hassan stated that whatever relationship with North Korea existed in Ambo was technical and minimal, and therefore not worth all this attention and U.S. concern. He added that at a practical level, Ethiopia simply needed to keep this factory running to the degree possible to assure the ENDF supply of small arms munitions, but that the quantities produced were minimal and did not even suffice to ensure a proper supply for the ENDF. ¶4. (S/NF) In following up on the visit's cancellation, Ambassador called on Defense Minister (DefMin) Kuma Demeksa and Chief of Defense Staff (CHOD) Gen. Samora Yonus on January 3 and 4 respectively. Ambassador expressed his understanding of Ethiopia's orientation toward North Korea as a low price source for arms and munitions in light of inexpensive imports and the on-going production at North Korean-supported factories in Ethiopia, but noted the parameters of UNSC resolution 1718. Ambassador noted that the U.S. interest in the relationship stems from the U.S. desire to assist Ethiopia to maintain necessary and affordable access to military materiel while avoiding sanctions and coming into compliance with its United Nations obligations. In response to the Ambassador's request to reschedule the Ambo factory visit, DefMin noted that "we know that the United States is helping us and that we have work to do" but immediately asked what support the Ambassador could promise following the visit. The Ambassador replied that while the visit would show the GoE's commitment to moving toward complying with UNSCR 1718, it would also allow the USG to provide advice on alternate sourcing and factory refurbishment options. DefMin noted that there would be no problem with the visit if Ethiopia were to get technology or financial assistance from it, but otherwise advised the Ambassador to raise the issue with the CHOD. Gen. Samora aggressively cut off the Ambassador during his presentation and said that he would only allow Post to "inspect" that Ambo facility if he received a written directive from the Prime Minister. Samora noted that the ENDF "is working with North Korea, and will continue to do so, because they are cheap." Samora admitted that the ENDF has been relying on North Korean arms and is dependent on them, even for maintenance. They continue the established relationship with North Korea, however, because they are helping to build Ethiopia's capacity, which will reduce Ethiopia's dependence on North Korean supplies and technical assistance. ¶5. (S) As evidence of Ethiopia's focus on developing national capacity to replace dependence on outside sourcing, Gen. Samora noted that the "North Koreans have now finished their work and are leaving" the Gafat factory near Debre Zeit, noting that the ENDF can now produce AK-47s fully themselves. Now, Chinese workers are in Debre Zeit to overhaul tanks, he continued, which also boosts Ethiopian capacity. Samora claimed that Ethiopia has not purchased arms for import form North Korea since a shipment was lost in a ship fire in the Spring (see Ref B for initial reporting). Now we are only buying skills from the North Korea, and will continue to do so, Samora repeated, because it is cheap. THE WAY FORWARD -------------- ¶6. (C) While pursuit of the site visit to the Ambo factory offered an attractive forum for a robust discussion and first-hand observation of a manifestation of the Ethiopia-North Korea arms relationship, its cancellation is evidence of the diversion that the offer of a factory visit really represented from Post's pursuit of this issue. Post is now developing a non-paper on this issue -- which it will clear with ISN -- for the Ambassador to present privately to senior GoE interlocutors in discussions on this issue in coming weeks. The non-paper will lay out Ethiopia's obligations under UNSC resolution 1718, the Administration's reporting requirements under the INKSNA legislation, and the possible implications of Ethiopia's current relationship with North Korea. The non-paper will go on to note the USG's willingness to assist Ethiopia in finding potential alternate sources for its North Korean arms imports and to advise on refitting the existing North Korean-supported arms and munitions factories in Ethiopia. In discussing the matter with Foreign Minister Seyoum and Prime Minister Meles, the Ambassador will explicitly pursue details included in Ref C on the scope and nature of current imports of arms, munitions, and related materiel from North Korea, the extent and nature of North Korean technical assistance in support of arms and related production in Ethiopia, the uses and possible export of materiel produced in Ethiopia with North Korean assistance, and Ethiopia's plan to diversify fully away from dependence on North Korean supplies and assisted production. Post will continue, however, to pursue the possibility of a visit to the Ambo facility as well as the factory in Debre Zeit. COMMENT -------------- ¶7. (S/NF) The Ambassador and Post assess that the arguments posed by Prime Minister Meles in Ref A and to the Secretary on Dec. 5 -- that Ethiopia maintains its current arms sourcing and production assistance relationship with North Korea because it is cheap and due to the sunk costs invested in the North Korean-supported Ethiopian factories -- are genuine. Further, Gen. Samora's argument of the ENDF's continued reliance on North Korea as a means to establish and develop Ethiopian capacity to operate the existing arms and munitions factories in country is fully consistent with similar local capacity arguments Samora has invoked on unrelated, less-sensitive matters. Gen. Samora's self-contradictory comments about the North Korean relationship -- alternating between "we will continue to source from North Korea" and "we haven't sourced from North Korea in the past year" as well as "the North Koreans have left" and "some of the North Koreans may still be around" -- suggest his fundamental unwillingness to be forthcoming with us on this relationship. In light of Gen. Samora's hawkish, yet near-peer, standing vis-a-vis Prime Minister Meles within the Central Committee of Ethiopia's ruling TPLF party and Prime Minister Meles' dependence on Samora for support within the Central Committee, it would be unlikely that Meles would reverse Samora's decision. Still, Ambassador and Post believe that the GoE political leaders, including the Foreign and Prime Ministers, will provide a more complete and forthcoming disclosure of the nature, scope, and future of the Ethiopia-North Korea arms sourcing relationship. Ambassador and Post will pursue those discussions in the coming weeks. YAMAMOTO