Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08ADDISABABA855
2008-03-31 12:32:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Addis Ababa
Cable title:
ETHIOPIAN MFA OFFICIAL ON POLICY TOWARDS SOMALIA,
how-toVZCZCXRO8940 PP RUEHROV DE RUEHDS #0855/01 0911232 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 311232Z MAR 08 FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0080 INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY 3439 RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 000855
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR AF AND AF/E , AND INR/AA
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER
CJTF-HOA AND USCENTCOM FOR POLAD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/19/2018
TAGS: PREL MOPS KPKO SO ET
SUBJECT: ETHIOPIAN MFA OFFICIAL ON POLICY TOWARDS SOMALIA,
SAYS PARTIAL MILITARY DRAWDOWN COMPLETE
REF: 08 ADDIS ABABA 718
Classified By: Amb. Donald Yamamoto. Reason: 1.4 (B) and (D).
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 000855
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR AF AND AF/E , AND INR/AA
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER
CJTF-HOA AND USCENTCOM FOR POLAD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/19/2018
TAGS: PREL MOPS KPKO SO ET
SUBJECT: ETHIOPIAN MFA OFFICIAL ON POLICY TOWARDS SOMALIA,
SAYS PARTIAL MILITARY DRAWDOWN COMPLETE
REF: 08 ADDIS ABABA 718
Classified By: Amb. Donald Yamamoto. Reason: 1.4 (B) and (D).
1. (S/NF) Ethiopian MFA Chief of the Minister's Cabinet
Abdeta Dribssa (strictly protect) candidly told Emboffs on
March 13 that the international community must realize that
Ethiopia has genuine security interests in Somalia. He noted
that Ethiopia had already drawn down its forces in Somalia to
approximately 2,500 troops and had hid the drawdown from the
insurgents. Abdeta reiterated the government's request for
$17 million to train 10,000 Transitional Federal Government
(TFG) police. He observed that the African Union Mission in
Somalia (AMISOM) peacekeeping force was unable to bring peace
to Somalia. He explained that TFG President Yusuf was
attempting to undermine the efforts of Prime Minister Nur
"Adde" to reconcile with the opposition and noted that Yusuf
was only interested in advancing his own agenda. Abdeta also
remarked that Ethiopia would keep Somaliland and Puntland
from major warfare, but noted that Ethiopia could not mediate
between the two governments regarding their land dispute.
-------------- --------------
"ETHIOPIA HAS ONLY REALPOLITIK INTERESTS IN SOMALIA"
-------------- --------------
2. (S/NF) Abdeta opened by saying that Ethiopia desires a
peaceful Somalia and does not have any sinister motives, but
only to live in peace with its neighbors. He cautioned,
however, that people needed to be realistic and understand
that Ethiopia has real national security interests at stake
in Somalia, and therefore, Ethiopia must remain involved. He
added that the problems in Somalia, particularly in the south
from Mogadishu to the Kenyan border, were more complex than
the Somalis can address by themselves and if the
international community wanted less Ethiopian involvement,
the international community must step up and take a more
active role.
3. (S/NF) When queried whether the Ethiopian government
might become so fed up with the TFG that Ethiopia would throw
up its hands and walk away, Abdeta responded only "if
Ethiopia moved to Madagascar or Somalia moved to Madagascar."
He emphasized that the two countries' fates were intertwined
and Ethiopia could never afford to wash its hands of Somalia
completely.
--------------
"WE HAVE ALREADY DRAWNDOWN IN SOMALIA"
--------------
4. (S/NF) In response to a query about a possible Ethiopian
military drawdown from Somalia in June, Abdeta shook his head
and stated that Ethiopia had already drawn down its forces in
Somalia to approximately 2,500 troops. He explained that
Ethiopia had hidden the drawdown to avoid alerting the
insurgents. He added that most of the remaining Ethiopian
troops were stationed around Mogadishu and Baidoa and that
the ENDF was relying more heavily on Ethiopian trained TFG
forces to provide security. He also said that the deployment
to Somalia was costing the Ethiopian government about $1
million dollars a day, but that no one had dared to add up
the total cost for the operation since December 2006.
--------------
"WE NEED MONEY TO TRAIN TFG FORCES"
--------------
5. (S/NF) Abdeta acknowledged that the United States was
playing a positive role in Somalia and noted that Washington
understood that Ethiopia's role in Somalia was also positive.
He then queried whether any progress had been made regarding
Ethiopia's request for $17 million to pay for the training of
10,000 TFG police. Abdetta emphasized that this was a small
amount of money compared to what the African Union or United
Nations would charge for the same services. He made it clear
that the training of these additional forces was an integral
part of Ethiopia's plan to be able to leave Somalia without
ADDIS ABAB 00000855 002 OF 003
creating a security vacuum.
6. (S/NF) Abdeta added that the TFG security forces
Ethiopia had already trained had performed so well that the
Somali people had nicknamed them "copies" to note they were
as disciplined as the Ethiopian troops. He said the
Ethiopian trained TFG forces did not loot and performed well
under fire.
--------------
"AMISOM WILL NOT BRING PEACE"
--------------
7. (S/NF) Commenting that we should be honest about AMISOM,
Abdeta said that the Foreign Minister cannot say publicly
that AMISOM cannot build peace in Somalia, but we all know it
is true they cannot do it. He said only the Somalis with the
direct support of the international community can do that.
Abdetta asked, "what does AMISOM actually do?" and noted that
people do not openly acknowledge that Ethiopian forces are
protecting the peacekeepers rather than the peacekeepers
bringing peace to Somalia.
-------------- --------------
"YUSUF IS TRYING TO UNDERMINE THE PRIME MINISTER"
-------------- --------------
8. (S/NF) Openly critical of Yusuf, Abdeta characterized
Yusuf "as an old man who spends too much time thinking about
the future," and said Yusuf was actively trying to undermine
Prime Minister Adde to ensure the PM does not appear more
capable than himself. Abdetta stated that Yusuf was planning
to run for President in 2009 and that he was obsessed with
security and believed that the insurgents should be crushed.
He noted that Yusuf did not see the PM as a threat
himself--Yusuf did not believe the PM was capable of
independent thought--rather the people around the PM were the
problem. Abdeta added that Yusuf wanted to use the Ethiopian
military to impose Yusuf's will rather than explore political
compromise.
9. (S/NF) Abdeta went on to say that he personally believed
that the PM's heart was in the right place and that the PM
wanted to find a political solution. He said that the
Ethiopian government viewed the PM positively and that the PM
did not have "grand ambitions" like that of Yusuf. Abdetta
was particularly concerned that Yusuf, in alliance with
Libyan President Qaddafi, might be conspiring to have the PM
impeached.
10. (S/NF) Abdeta opined that the TFG was not capable of
standing without external support, but that no government in
Somalia under the present circumstances could be. He
suggested that the Islamic Courts would have fallen on its
own had the international community not made mistakes in
2006. He criticized Islamic nations for giving them large
amounts of cash and the United States for giving the Islamic
Courts reason to fight in Mogadishu.
-------------- --------------
"WE WILL KEEP SOMALILAND AND PUNTLAND FROM FIGHTING"
-------------- --------------
11. (S/NF) The Ethiopian government would keep Somaliland
and Puntland from major fighting, but Ethiopia could not
mediate between the two, Abdeta said. He drew two
interlocking circles on a piece of paper and pointed out that
Sanag and Sool, the disputed regions represented in the
overlapping lines, were claimed by both Somaliland and
Puntland and asked, "how can Ethiopia tell them what belongs
to whom?" He explained that Puntland had miscalculated by
mistreating Dulbahante clansmen who had defected from
Somaliland and when those Dulbahante switched back to
Somaliland, it allowed Somaliland to extend its control
eastward. He added that the Somaliland government lacks
capacity not policy and that Somlaliland officials had to be
careful not to antagonize those parts of its population
sympathetic to the TFG opposition because Somaliland.
ADDIS ABAB 00000855 003 OF 003
--------------
COMMENT
--------------
12. (S/NF) Abdeta side-stepped the issue of when and under
what conditions Ethiopia might pull most of its remaining
forces out of Somalia, but indications from other government
officials (reftel) are that the government is increasingly
unwilling to sustain the financial and human costs of
attempting to maintain security in Somalia. Although Abdeta
made it clear that Ethiopia would always have an interest in
Somali affairs, he did not commit to unending support for the
TFG and it is clear that Ethiopian frustration with the TFG
is increasing. Post encourages the Department to consider
seriously how the United States can contribute toward
security sector training for TFG police and defense forces.
END COMMENT.
MALAC
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR AF AND AF/E , AND INR/AA
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER
CJTF-HOA AND USCENTCOM FOR POLAD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/19/2018
TAGS: PREL MOPS KPKO SO ET
SUBJECT: ETHIOPIAN MFA OFFICIAL ON POLICY TOWARDS SOMALIA,
SAYS PARTIAL MILITARY DRAWDOWN COMPLETE
REF: 08 ADDIS ABABA 718
Classified By: Amb. Donald Yamamoto. Reason: 1.4 (B) and (D).
1. (S/NF) Ethiopian MFA Chief of the Minister's Cabinet
Abdeta Dribssa (strictly protect) candidly told Emboffs on
March 13 that the international community must realize that
Ethiopia has genuine security interests in Somalia. He noted
that Ethiopia had already drawn down its forces in Somalia to
approximately 2,500 troops and had hid the drawdown from the
insurgents. Abdeta reiterated the government's request for
$17 million to train 10,000 Transitional Federal Government
(TFG) police. He observed that the African Union Mission in
Somalia (AMISOM) peacekeeping force was unable to bring peace
to Somalia. He explained that TFG President Yusuf was
attempting to undermine the efforts of Prime Minister Nur
"Adde" to reconcile with the opposition and noted that Yusuf
was only interested in advancing his own agenda. Abdeta also
remarked that Ethiopia would keep Somaliland and Puntland
from major warfare, but noted that Ethiopia could not mediate
between the two governments regarding their land dispute.
-------------- --------------
"ETHIOPIA HAS ONLY REALPOLITIK INTERESTS IN SOMALIA"
-------------- --------------
2. (S/NF) Abdeta opened by saying that Ethiopia desires a
peaceful Somalia and does not have any sinister motives, but
only to live in peace with its neighbors. He cautioned,
however, that people needed to be realistic and understand
that Ethiopia has real national security interests at stake
in Somalia, and therefore, Ethiopia must remain involved. He
added that the problems in Somalia, particularly in the south
from Mogadishu to the Kenyan border, were more complex than
the Somalis can address by themselves and if the
international community wanted less Ethiopian involvement,
the international community must step up and take a more
active role.
3. (S/NF) When queried whether the Ethiopian government
might become so fed up with the TFG that Ethiopia would throw
up its hands and walk away, Abdeta responded only "if
Ethiopia moved to Madagascar or Somalia moved to Madagascar."
He emphasized that the two countries' fates were intertwined
and Ethiopia could never afford to wash its hands of Somalia
completely.
--------------
"WE HAVE ALREADY DRAWNDOWN IN SOMALIA"
--------------
4. (S/NF) In response to a query about a possible Ethiopian
military drawdown from Somalia in June, Abdeta shook his head
and stated that Ethiopia had already drawn down its forces in
Somalia to approximately 2,500 troops. He explained that
Ethiopia had hidden the drawdown to avoid alerting the
insurgents. He added that most of the remaining Ethiopian
troops were stationed around Mogadishu and Baidoa and that
the ENDF was relying more heavily on Ethiopian trained TFG
forces to provide security. He also said that the deployment
to Somalia was costing the Ethiopian government about $1
million dollars a day, but that no one had dared to add up
the total cost for the operation since December 2006.
--------------
"WE NEED MONEY TO TRAIN TFG FORCES"
--------------
5. (S/NF) Abdeta acknowledged that the United States was
playing a positive role in Somalia and noted that Washington
understood that Ethiopia's role in Somalia was also positive.
He then queried whether any progress had been made regarding
Ethiopia's request for $17 million to pay for the training of
10,000 TFG police. Abdetta emphasized that this was a small
amount of money compared to what the African Union or United
Nations would charge for the same services. He made it clear
that the training of these additional forces was an integral
part of Ethiopia's plan to be able to leave Somalia without
ADDIS ABAB 00000855 002 OF 003
creating a security vacuum.
6. (S/NF) Abdeta added that the TFG security forces
Ethiopia had already trained had performed so well that the
Somali people had nicknamed them "copies" to note they were
as disciplined as the Ethiopian troops. He said the
Ethiopian trained TFG forces did not loot and performed well
under fire.
--------------
"AMISOM WILL NOT BRING PEACE"
--------------
7. (S/NF) Commenting that we should be honest about AMISOM,
Abdeta said that the Foreign Minister cannot say publicly
that AMISOM cannot build peace in Somalia, but we all know it
is true they cannot do it. He said only the Somalis with the
direct support of the international community can do that.
Abdetta asked, "what does AMISOM actually do?" and noted that
people do not openly acknowledge that Ethiopian forces are
protecting the peacekeepers rather than the peacekeepers
bringing peace to Somalia.
-------------- --------------
"YUSUF IS TRYING TO UNDERMINE THE PRIME MINISTER"
-------------- --------------
8. (S/NF) Openly critical of Yusuf, Abdeta characterized
Yusuf "as an old man who spends too much time thinking about
the future," and said Yusuf was actively trying to undermine
Prime Minister Adde to ensure the PM does not appear more
capable than himself. Abdetta stated that Yusuf was planning
to run for President in 2009 and that he was obsessed with
security and believed that the insurgents should be crushed.
He noted that Yusuf did not see the PM as a threat
himself--Yusuf did not believe the PM was capable of
independent thought--rather the people around the PM were the
problem. Abdeta added that Yusuf wanted to use the Ethiopian
military to impose Yusuf's will rather than explore political
compromise.
9. (S/NF) Abdeta went on to say that he personally believed
that the PM's heart was in the right place and that the PM
wanted to find a political solution. He said that the
Ethiopian government viewed the PM positively and that the PM
did not have "grand ambitions" like that of Yusuf. Abdetta
was particularly concerned that Yusuf, in alliance with
Libyan President Qaddafi, might be conspiring to have the PM
impeached.
10. (S/NF) Abdeta opined that the TFG was not capable of
standing without external support, but that no government in
Somalia under the present circumstances could be. He
suggested that the Islamic Courts would have fallen on its
own had the international community not made mistakes in
2006. He criticized Islamic nations for giving them large
amounts of cash and the United States for giving the Islamic
Courts reason to fight in Mogadishu.
-------------- --------------
"WE WILL KEEP SOMALILAND AND PUNTLAND FROM FIGHTING"
-------------- --------------
11. (S/NF) The Ethiopian government would keep Somaliland
and Puntland from major fighting, but Ethiopia could not
mediate between the two, Abdeta said. He drew two
interlocking circles on a piece of paper and pointed out that
Sanag and Sool, the disputed regions represented in the
overlapping lines, were claimed by both Somaliland and
Puntland and asked, "how can Ethiopia tell them what belongs
to whom?" He explained that Puntland had miscalculated by
mistreating Dulbahante clansmen who had defected from
Somaliland and when those Dulbahante switched back to
Somaliland, it allowed Somaliland to extend its control
eastward. He added that the Somaliland government lacks
capacity not policy and that Somlaliland officials had to be
careful not to antagonize those parts of its population
sympathetic to the TFG opposition because Somaliland.
ADDIS ABAB 00000855 003 OF 003
--------------
COMMENT
--------------
12. (S/NF) Abdeta side-stepped the issue of when and under
what conditions Ethiopia might pull most of its remaining
forces out of Somalia, but indications from other government
officials (reftel) are that the government is increasingly
unwilling to sustain the financial and human costs of
attempting to maintain security in Somalia. Although Abdeta
made it clear that Ethiopia would always have an interest in
Somali affairs, he did not commit to unending support for the
TFG and it is clear that Ethiopian frustration with the TFG
is increasing. Post encourages the Department to consider
seriously how the United States can contribute toward
security sector training for TFG police and defense forces.
END COMMENT.
MALAC