(S) ETHIOPIA: EMBASSY ADDIS ABABA EAC CONVENES

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 000463 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/E KNIGHT, DS/IP/AF, AND CA/OCS/ACS DONLON AND BRANSON E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/21/2028 TAGS: ASEC PREL PTER CASC ET SUBJECT: (S) ETHIOPIA: EMBASSY ADDIS ABABA EAC CONVENES REF: A. ADDIS ABABA 430 ¶B. ASMARA 86 ¶C. STATE 17322 ¶D. 07 ADDIS ABABA 3183 Classified By: Ambassador Donald Yamamoto. Reasons 1.4(b) and (d). EAC Meets: No New Action -------------- ¶1. (S) On February 21 the Ambassador convened the Embassy Emergency Action Committee (EAC) to review the Embassy's security posture in light of developments in the Ethiopia-Eritrea border dispute (Refs A, B and C). The EAC reviewed tripwires but did not take any new action (REF D). DCM, RSO, CONS, ORA, DAO, POL/ECON, MGT, GSO, MED and CLO attended. Factors That May Impact Security Posture -------------- ¶2. (S) The Ambassador noted that three future developments may impact post's security posture: (i) the outcome of United Nations (UN) deliberations on current friction between Eritrea and the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia-Eritrea (UNMEE); (ii) Eritrea's reaction to the UN's stance and to the UN's efforts to ensure UNMEE personnel and equipment depart Eritrea expeditiously; and (iii) Ethiopia's reaction if it perceives the UN response to Eritrean bullying to be weak. The Ambassador noted that UNMEE's departure from the Temporary Security Zone (TSZ) serves to heighten tensions on the border and increases the likelihood of small-scale skirmishes between Eritrean and Ethiopian forces. In the event of war, Ethiopia may face an increased threat of terrorist attacks internally. Current Security Posture -------------- ¶3. (S) All travel outside Addis Ababa is subject to RSO approval. Travel by Mission personnel to the area along the Ethiopia-Eritrea border is generally restricted. Previous consular messages advise non-offical American citizens regarding the same. The East Africa Warning already advises American citizens regarding the elevated treat of terrorism throughout the region. The EAC agreed to continue to monitor closely and meet regularly to discuss developments in the border dispute. The EAC also agreed to review F-77s, warden systems, travel warnings, and post medical supplies. Tripwires -------------- ¶4. (S) The EAC did not revise previously identified tripwires (REF D) that could evidence an increase in the possibility of conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea. It should be noted that in late 2007 the Ethiopian military did increase its troop and artillery presence on the border with Eritrea. Current tripwires are: --Activation or increased preparedness at Ethiopian military and civilian hospitals near the border; --Contracting of commercial buses for troop deployments toward the border; --GoE restrictions on foreigners' and journalists' travel to, and along, the border areas; --Suspension of SMS and other mobile telecommunications services; --The movement of wheeled and tracked personnel carriers and other military conveyances closer to areas where troops are currently deployed; --The GoE holding a national blood drive (as was done in the lead-up to the 1998-2000 war); --The movement of artillery closer to the border; ADDIS ABAB 00000463 002 OF 002 --The deployment of fuel reserves closer to the border; --Another assassination attempt in Eritrea against a prominent Eritrean Government official; and --Prime Minister Meles directly informing Ambassador or the AF Front Office of Ethiopia's intention to take action. As before, the EAC notes that the unpredictable behavior of Eritrean President Isaias stands out as a wild card which may circumvent many of these tripwires. YAMAMOTO