USAU: AU PLANS LAST-MINUTE MEASURES TO SAVE AMISOM

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 003258 NOFORN SIPDIS STATE FOR AF/FO, AF/E, AND AF/RSA FOR WHALDEMAN E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2018 TAGS: MOPS PREL UNSC AU SUBJECT: USAU: AU PLANS LAST-MINUTE MEASURES TO SAVE AMISOM Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN A. SIMON, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (S/NF) Summary: At a December 1 meeting with the USAU Ambassador at AU headquarters, AU Peace and Security Commissioner Ramtane Lamamra outlined a series of steps that the AU intends to take by mid-December to encourage Ethiopian forces to remain in Somalia, despite recent public statements to the contrary. Those steps include the AU speaking directly to Prime Minister Meles, securing financial assistance to keep the Ethiopian forces in Somalia as a bridging force until AMISOM is reinforced, and getting the international community to provide diplomatic cover for the Ethiopian forces to stay. Lamamra agreed with the US that withdrawing AMISOM and Ethiopian forces would be disastrous, but cautioned that discrete planning for this eventuality should begin nonetheless. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) The USAU Ambassador and his team met with AU Peace and Security Commissioner Lamamra on December 1 to follow up on a November 25 phone call during which Lamamra outlined for Ambassador his short-term plan for AMISOM - deploying the third Burundian battalion quickly, getting UN support for further reinforcement of AMISOM, and urging the Ethiopians to remain in Somalia until AMISOM reaches a sufficient force level to fend for itself. In the intervening days, Ethiopian Foreign Minister Seyoum had sent a letter to the AU and UN announcing Ethiopia's plan to withdraw completely by the end of the year. ¶3. (C/NF) Lamamra began by reporting that he and UN Special Representative for Somalia Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah were scheduled to meet with GOE State Minister for Foreign Affairs Tekeda the evening of December 2 to seek to reverse the decision. He hoped political progress in creating a government of national unity along with an AU commitment to secure international consensus, financing, and a reinforcement plan by December 15 would delay the Ethiopian withdrawal. ¶4. (S/NF) Despite the approaching deadline for the Ethiopian forces' withdrawal, Lamamra said that it was still possible to persuade Ethiopia to stay in Somalia longer "if we pay for their people." He added that this could occur if the Ethiopians would be "under AMISOM on an ad hoc basis," which would also give the Ethiopians political cover for staying. Such an arrangement was still "subject to their concurrence," he told the Ambassador. Lamamra added that EU High Representative for the Common and Foreign Security Policy had called Prime Minister Meles to suggest that the Ethiopian forces stay in Somalia longer. ¶5. (C/NF) The Ambassador conveyed to Lamamra the US desire that the AU talk to PM Meles directly, and assured him that the US would remain in close consultation with the GOE over Somalia, including through A/S Frazer personally. In addition, he said the USG and the AU share the same view on the importance of AMISOM and eventually a stabilization force. The Ambassador requested that the AU keep the USG apprised of its discussions with PM Meles as well as conversations it has with Presidents Museveni and Nkurunziza about their willingness to stay in Somalia. He also told Lamamra that AU Chairperson Ping can also speak directly with A/S Frazer, if need be. ¶6. (S/NF) Lamamra made clear that the AU is prepared to do what is necessary to maintain the AMISOM mission. The withdrawal option would be "a disaster" politically, he said. If AMISOM were to withdraw from Somalia at this time, it would "give a green light for destabilizing many countries," he warned. "We need to walk the extra mile." Lamamra said he would be traveling to Kampala on December 5 to secure a clear commitment that Ugandan forces will stay in Somalia. The AU may also dispatch AU special envoy to Somalia, Nicolas Bwakira, to Bujumbura to get a similar commitment from the Burundians. Lamamra noted the AU force generation efforts that are underway, but indicated that securing a commitment for Ethiopian forces to stay in Somalia until other TCCs could deploy troops would be indispensable. He said it was important that as Ethiopian forces begin pulling out of Somalia they are replaced on a one-for-one basis by contingents from other troop contributing countries. (Comment: Given the robust firepower and mobility of Ethiopian troops, one-for-one substitution may not be enough. End Comment.) Lamamra suggested it would be helpful to swap ADDIS ABAB 00003258 002 OF 002 the first ENDF battalion before the end of December. ¶7. (C/NF) Ambassador noted the importance of obtaining a UNSC resolution authorizing rehatting AMISOM, and to do so, the African members of the UNSC must strongly advocate accordingly. Lamamra said he would be in New York on December 9-14 to lobby for a resolution, including with Ould-Abdallah, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, and the UNSYG. But he did not think a resolution authorizing a straight UN PKO would succeed because, in the eyes of the UN DPKO, the situation on the ground in Somalia does not yet lend itself to peacekeeping. Instead, the AU intends to lobby the UNSC for an international mandate making AMISOM the foundation of a multinational stabilization force and establishing a trust fund to finance the operation. This would open the door for non-African countries, such as Bangladesh, to participate in Somalia. He also said that the AU would seek funds from the Arab League, specifically mentioning Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE. Regarding prospective troop contributing countries, Lamamra noted that the Sudanese Foreign Minister Deng Alor had expressed support, but that Khartoum was not yet convinced. ¶8. (C/NF) Lamamra reported that AU Council Chairperson Ping had directed discrete evacuation planning for AMISOM, but emphasized that any public pronouncement might dissuade prospective troop contributing countries and become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Nonetheless, it would be irresponsible of the AU not to consider this possibility; therefore, the AU is quietly reaching out to the USG, NATO, France, and Algeria to begin contingency planning. The AU, Lamamra said, does not have the capacity to extract its forces, noting not only the dearth of air and sea lift assets, but also the technical ability to plan and execute an emergency evacuation. -------------- Comment: -------------- ¶9. (C/NF) The plan outlined by Lamamra involves a series of complicated steps with many players in a very short timeframe. The looming holidays increase pressure to assemble all the pieces together quickly. Success of this approach will be extraordinarily difficult, but given the alternative, it is an approach worthy of support. As of this writing, the AU Deputy Chairperson had called an emergency meeting of the Peace and Security Department and Peace and Security Council Secretariat to discuss the way forward in Somalia. We will report on the outcome septel. YAMAMOTO