RECONCILING THE OROMO LIBERATION FRONT AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 003188

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/05/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL EAID ET
SUBJECT: RECONCILING THE OROMO LIBERATION FRONT AND
ETHIOPIAN GOVERNMENT

REF: A. ADDIS 3159

B. ADDIS 2487

Classified By: Ambassador Donald Yamamoto for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (SBU) Recognizing that the outlawed Oromo Liberation Front
(OLF) is widely supported -- at least in principle -- among
Ethiopia's largest ethnic group, Embassy Addis Ababa has long
held that reconciliation between the Ethiopian Government
(GoE) and OLF is critical to the long-term political
stability of Ethiopia. Holding a similar view, two separate
groups of Ethiopian "elders" have worked in recent months to
bring the OLF -- formerly a partner of the ruling Ethiopian
People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) until the
lack of power sharing by the EPRDF led it to advocate armed
struggle against the GoE in 1992 -- back into the fold of
legal political parties within Ethiopia. While the GoE's
persistent harassment of legal Oromo opposition parties in
Ethiopia and its recent crackdown on Oromos (Ref. A) has
certainly not sent the necessary gesture of goodwill to the
OLF in exile, the moderation of some OLF elders in the
diaspora combined with the Prime Minister's approval of both
"elders" processes suggest that there may be an emergent
opening for reconciliation and a positive role the USG could
play. End Summary.

THE DUELING ELDERS
--------------


2. (SBU) Coming off of the success of brokering the pardon of
the opposition leaders arrested in November 2005, Professor
Ephraim Isaac and Pastor Daniel Gebreselassie (Elders 1),
approached the Embassy to support their efforts to broker
various reconciliation efforts, including the GoE and the
OLF. While the Elders 1 group was critical in the opposition
pardon, they, and Prof. Ephraim in particular, were often
seen as partisan through the process, exerting significant
pressure on the opposition leaders to admit their guilt while
not press the GoE to stand down or temper its position
against them. Since then, Prof. Ephraim (himself an Oromo)
and his colleagues have unilaterally reached out to various
OLF elders including former Chairman Leencho Lata and
grandson of the last king of Jimma, Ababiya Abajobir, and
Dima Negewo, around reconciling with the GoE. The Elders 1
group met these three in Amsterdam September 19-21 along with
the Ethiopian Ambassador to the Netherlands. One week later,
Ababiya returned to Ethiopia after years in exile. Prof.
Ephraim informed Ambassador and Pol/Econ Chief on November 4
that Prime Minister Meles continues to support his group's
efforts to reach out to the OLF, and suggested that Ababiya's
unharassed return reflects only the first step in a looming
wave of former OLF leaders' returns to Ethiopia.


3. (SBU) While the Elders 1 process was afoot, a second team
of Oromo elders (Elders 2) approached the Embassy with a new
proposal. Ambassador Berhanu Dinka, Head of the Mekane Yesus
Church Rev. Itaffa Gobana, and Oxfam America Director Aberra
Tola offered a new option (Ref. B). The Elders 2 group
reported in late September that a group of Oromo community
leaders from within Ethiopia approached the three, previously
rather apolitical prominent Oromos soliciting that they
attempt to reconcile the GoE and OLF. Amb. Dinka reported
that based on approval by Prime Minister Meles for his team
to approach the OLF, the Elders 2 succeeded in January 2008
in getting an initial written commitment (the Amsterdam
Agreement) from OLF Chairman Dawud Ibsa that the OLF would
"accept, in principle," the Ethiopian constitution. When
taken to the Prime Minister in the spring, Meles expressed
skepticism about the statement and requested that the Elders
2 reconfirm that the OLF Executive Committee agreed to it.
Despite outreach to, and receiving the support of, a broad
variety of prominent Oromos in the diaspora around this
effort, OLF Executive Committee members based in Asmara
rejected the statement.


4. (SBU) Amb. Dinka presented us with a proposal in late
September that he claimed had been endorsed by prominent
figures at the Oromo Studies Association meeting in July, the
community leaders in Ethiopia who initially approached his

ADDIS ABAB 00003188 002 OF 003


group, and several key OLF-related individuals. The proposal
was to convene a conference of major Oromo elders and
community leaders in Ethiopia to produce a declaration
insisting that the OLF pursue reconciliation with the GoE.
Amb. Dinka argued that such a consensus declaration could
persuade Asmara-based OLF hard-liners -- hardened either by
principle or due to pressure exerted on them by Eritrean
President Isaias not to engage the GoE -- either to agree to
engage the GoE or risk losing the support of the in-country
Oromo community.


5. (SBU) When queried on the duplication of "elders"
activities with Prof. Ephraim's group, Ambassador Dinka
argued that Prof. Ephraim had lost the confidence of the
Oromos for his partisan interventions on the GoE's behalf in
the opposition pardon effort. Additionally, as an Oromo
elder himself and having had a brother killed by GoE forces
for alleged ties to the OLF, Prof. Ephraim, Amb. Dinka
argued, is particularly not a credible advocate among Oromos
because he has never once advocated to the GoE for the pardon
or release of the thousands of Oromos detained in Ethiopia.
Amb. Dinka further dismissed Elders 1's reconciliation
efforts with the OLF noting that OLF Chairman Dawud Ibsa
himself had written a letter to Prof. Ephraim arguing that
the OLF leadership would not engage with him. In response to
our skepticism about the receptivity of the EPRDF's Oromo
sub-party the Oromo People's Democratic Organization (OPDO),
Amb. Dinka argued that he and his group had discussed the
issue with OPDO leaders including Addis Mayor Kuma Demeksa,
Trade Minister Girma Birru, and Oromiya Regional President
Abadula. While admitting that Abadula was initially opposed
to such outreach, he later came around, and Kuma and Girma
both supported the initiative. Amb. Dinka speculated that
the OPDO support may reflect a desire for the OPDO to gain
credibility within Ethiopia and shed the public perception of
the party as an Oromo puppet of the Tigrayan leadership.
Bringing the OLF back to Ethiopia, and possibly pursuing a
future alliance with the EPRDF could offer a chance to
aspiring OPDO leaders to later join the OLF, gain legitimacy,
and pursue higher office. While we were skeptical that much
of an opening genuinely existed among either the OLFQr the
GoE, the proposed approach was novel, low cost, and offered a
slight opportunity potentially to help stabilize Ethiopia's
increasingly fragile political climate. As such, the
Ambassador confirmed with the Prime Minister the latter's
support for this effort and we funded the conference.

CONVENING ETHIOPIA'S OROMOS
--------------


6. (SBU) On October 30 and 31, the Elders 2 convened ten
apolitical elders and community leaders from Addis Ababa and
each zone of Oromiya to discuss how to bring the OLF back
into the fold of legal political parties in Ethiopia. In a
November 1 declaration, the 160 elders "strongly demanded
that the OLF leadership heed the genuine desire of the Oromo
people and enter into negotiations with the GoE" on the basis
of the Amsterdam Agreement. On November 3, 30 of the
assembled elders met with Prime Minister Meles to report on
the conference and express concerns about the recent
crack-down on Oromos in Ethiopia. Meles reportedly informed
the group that he has two roles which he must balance: 1)
maintaining law and order in the face of credible threats,
and 2) promoting political reconciliation. As such, Meles
affirmed that the GoE would continue to crack-down on anyone
overtly supporting the OLF through actions, but would
otherwise press for leniency toward those who simply support
the OLF politically or in principle.


7. (SBU) On November 14, Amb. Dinka and his two colleagues
briefed the press on their conference and the details of the
Oromo leaders' declaration. On November 15, the OLF
Executive Committee issued a press release noting that it had
previously informed the Elders that it would not sign on to
the Amsterdam Agreement as the OLF retains its position that
"the OLF is committed to dialogue without precondition in the
presence of a third party." Despite this statement, the
Elders 2 group is not surprised by, and plans to reach out to
the Asmara-based OLF leadership directly to assess whether
the statement accurately reflects the OLF's actual position,
or more the position that they must take while living in
Asmara under the influence and pressure of Isaias.

ADDIS ABAB 00003188 003 OF 003



IS THE GOE RECEPTIVE?
--------------


8. (SBU) As reported in Ref. A, the Elders 2 conference of
Oromo leaders coincided with a significant crack-down on
Oromos in Ethiopia, re-igniting the question of the GoE's
sincerity in reconciling with the OLF. Fundamentally, both
Prof. Ephraim and Amb. Dinka have acknowledged to us in the
past few months that the GoE is not willing to change its own
tactics domestically with regard to the Oromo community or
legal Oromo political parties in Ethiopia as a confidence
building gesture. Instead, both elders have argued, the GoE
expects the OLF to unilaterally abandon its professed
strategy of armed struggle without any prior indications of
the GoE's willingness to reconcile beyond the word of the
Prime Minister passed through intermediaries.


9. (C) In response to our inquiries, Amb. Dinka speculated
that the recent GoE crack-down on Oromos results from a
resurgence of concern from the OPDO that the Tigrayan
People's Liberation Front (TPLF) at the core of the EPRDF may
abandon the OPDO for the OLF as it's Oromo partner should the
OLF return to the domestic political scene. Despite this
crack-down, both Prof. Ephraim and Amb. Dinka emphasized that
they believe that the Prime Minister's receptivity to
reconciliation with the OLF remains intact, and that he may
be placating the OPDO, and hard-liners within the TPLF, with
the current crack-down to cover his own strategy of returning
the OLF to Ethiopian politics.

FINAL COMMENT AND NOTE
--------------


10. (C) The GoE's harassment, arrests, and crack-down on
Oromos and Oromo political parties, sends a clear message, in
our assessment, that the GoE is not sincerely committed to
meeting the OLF even part way in breaching the GoE-OLF
divide. Just as the GoE's unrelenting assault on the
domestic Oromo community impedes reconciliation, so to does
the OLF's unwillingness to accept, even in principle, the
Ethiopian constitution as a basic precondition to talks. The
Elders 2 initiative provided a novel approach and a narrow
window of opportunity, which we recognized before deciding to
support their proposed conference. Despite the minuscule
chance of the conference producing a break-through, having a
consensus document endorsed by prominent elders and community
leaders from throughout Oromiya calling on the OLF to pursue
reconciliation with the GoE is a useful step.


11. (C) Embassy Addis Ababa fundamentally believes that GoE
reconciliation with the OLF is critical to Ethiopia's
long-term stability. If the USG chooses to support or
facilitate GoE-OLF reconciliation -- as we did from 2004 to
2006 -- we must be prepared to exert pressure on both parties
to offer confidence building gestures toward the other
including a GoE pardon of alleged OLF prisoners and easing in
the harassment of Oromos in Ethiopia as well as a unilateral
declaration by the OLF to cease, at least temporarily, its
commitment to armed struggle. Should the USG seek to pursue
such efforts, it may be useful for AF and/or INR/AA to reach
out to OLF leaders in the U.S. and Europe, as well as for
Embassy Asmara to reach out to OLF Chairman Dawud Ibsa and
members of the OLF Executive Committee separately, to explore
the relative merits of the two "elders" initiatives,
perceptions on the opening for reconciliation, and press for
a commitment to re-attempt reconciliation. With the Elders 2
declaration, the Oromo people in Ethiopia have clearly stated
that they are no longer looking for conflict, but for a
peaceful approach to reverse Oromo marginalization. If the
OLF can show themselves to be politicians and statesmen, the
world would certainly be more sympathetic to their cause.
End Comment.
YAMAMOTO