ETHIOPIA: TFG PRESIDENT MUST GO, ALL OPTIONS ON

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 002848 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/15/2010 TAGS: PREL MOPS KPKO SO ET SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA: TFG PRESIDENT MUST GO, ALL OPTIONS ON THE TABLE REF: ADDIS ABABA 2750 Classified By: Amb. Donald Yamamoto. Reason: 1.4 (B) and (D). ¶1. (S/NF) Summary. Ethiopian State Minister for Foreign Affairs Dr. Tekeda Alemu told the Ambassador and PolOff on October 14 that Transitional Federal Government (TFG) President Abdullahi Yusuf must be replaced in order to produce political progress in Somalia. Tekeda said all options were on the table regarding the planned October 27-29 Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) summit in Nairobi, including changing the president, prime minister, and speaker; extending the TFG's mandate by two or three years; changing the size and composition of the parliament; altering the TFG Charter; and forming a unity government with the opposition Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS)/Djibouti faction. He stated that some form of unity government was essential for political progress, and that introducing ARS/Djibouti head Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed as TFG prime minister would increase Hawiye clan support for the government. Tekeda noted that much consultation had to be done between now and the summit, but that the Kenyan and Ugandan governments needed more convincing that radical changes were needed within the TFG. Tekeda said Ethiopia would withdraw from Mogadishu, it was only a question of when and under what circumstances. He did not believe that Eritrean President Isaias' possible attendance at the summit would prevent the meeting from being effective. Tekeda also explained that Ethiopia was originally opposed to holding the summit in Nairobi, and had wanted IGAD to go to Baidoa. In a separate meeting on October 14, TFG Ambassador Abdi Karin Farah told the Ambassador that he had helped set up the meetings between Tekeda and Sheikh Sharif and confirmed that Ethiopia was in the process of gaining support for its plans within the TFG parliament. End Summary. Tekeda: "Yusuf Must Go" -------------- ¶2. (S/NF) Tekeda opened by making it clear in no uncertain terms that President Yusuf must be replaced if there was to be any chance for political progress in Somalia, advancing beyond his position on October 3 that Yusuf might be allowed to remain if he became a ceremonial figurehead (Reftel). Tekeda said that with only 10 months remaining in the transitional period, "we must objectively assess the situation," and that there were "no sacred cows in Somalia." He said that we must achieve some level of stability, and that Yusuf was a barrier to that stability because he was unable to see beyond his subclan interests. He underscored that Yusuf would never be acceptable to the Hawiye clan. Tekeda said "Yusuf used to be our friend, but that he was incorrigible." Tekeda: "Everything is on the Table at the Summit" -------------- -------------- ¶3. (S/NF) Noting that there were multiple options available for the upcoming summit, Tekeda said that in Nairobi IGAD could push for an "Addis Ababa II" agreement and "prod and cajole" the President and Prime Minister to work together, but he noted that we have already seen that promises and pledges are useless. He said that IGAD could also push to change the prime minister, and allow Yusuf to have another pawn to manipulate and counter, but he noted that Yusuf "could not work smoothly even with God." Tekeda said that the Ethiopian government had not made up its mind yet, but "we have no illusion that allowing the three (president, prime minister, and speaker) to continue would produce anything positive." Tekeda stressed that all options must be explored. ¶4. (S/NF) Tekeda went on to emphasize that some type of arrangement between the TFG and the opposition was critical to bring stability to Somalia. He said otherwise in 10 months no one in Somalia will be legitimate. Tekeda stated that all options were under discussion including extending the TFG's mandate by two or three years, amending the TFG Charter, forming a unity government between the TFG and the opposition, changing the size and composition of the parliament, and replacing the top three TFG officials. Tekeda was adamant that any decisions that changed the nature ADDIS ABAB 00002848 002 OF 003 of the TFG must be made with the coordination and consent of the opposition, and that the TFG, as it currently stands cannot make those decisions on its own. ¶5. (S/NF) Having a Somali government that had a constituency on the ground, particularly in the predominantly-Hawiye Mogadishu, Tekeda said, was vital, and he reiterated that this would never happen as long as Yusuf was president. He reminded the Ambassador that Yusuf had once said publicly that the Hawiye should be pushed into the sea. He said that the president did not have to be Hawiye, but at least had to be sensitive to Hawiye interests. Tekeda admitted that Ethiopia had made a mistake in the mid 1990s by not understanding the need to have broad Hawiye buy-in on the formation of a Somali government. He stated that any government that had to rely on foreign forces for security would not succeed in Somalia. When pressed, Tekeda suggested that the presidency was too high for ARS/Djibouti head Sheikh Sharif, but that Sharif as prime minister was possible. He added that Sharif should have some role in the government because he had some level of acceptance and credibility among Somalis. Tekeda noted that he had just gotten off the phone with Sharif, and that their discussions over the formation of a unity government were continuing. He also said that Sharif and the opposition would go to Nairobi to participate in the summit. Tekeda declined to name possible replacements for Yusuf. ¶6. (S/NF) The Ambassador expressed concern that changing the TFG leadership at this junction could undermine the entire process, and argued that it was more important that all efforts be focused on governance and capacity building. Tekeda responded that he did not understand why the United States should take this decision now, and pushed back saying that it was too late for that, and that we must move forward "with an open mind." ¶7. (S/NF) When queried how IGAD and the international community could engage the TFG during the summit to keep the proceedings from getting out of hand, Tekeda replied that hard work would be done between now and the conference so that there is consensus on a way forward going into the summit. Tekeda said Ethiopia would conduct exhaustive consultations over the course of the next several weeks with all the stakeholders including the United States, the United Kingdom, France, UN Special Representative to Somalia Amedou Ould-Abdallah, IGAD, the TFG, and the opposition. Tekeda admitted that he did not know what might happen at the end of the consultations, and that anything was possible. Tekeda: "Uganda and Kenya Do Not Understand Somalia" -------------- -------------- ¶8. (S/NF) Tekeda told the Ambassador that Ethiopia had a lot of work yet to do with the Ugandan and Kenyan governments, and that they "needed to be convinced." He said neither government really understood the complexities of Somalia, and that both might still support Yusuf. Tekeda said that Yusuf was playing both Kenya and Uganda to maintain their support. He said the Djiboutian government understands the situation better, and needs little persuasion that major changes are needed. Tekeda: Leaving Mogadishu is a Question of When not If -------------- -------------- ¶9. (S/NF) Tekeda emphasized that his government had made the decision to withdraw from Mogadishu, it was now only a question of how to do it without giving al-Shabaab the opportunity to take advantage of Ethiopia's departure. He said Ethiopia did not want to leave a vacuum that the extremists could fill, and reemphasized that replacing Yusuf was key to gaining acceptance for the TFG on the ground. Eritrean President Isaias to Attend Summit? -------------- ¶10. (S/NF) The Ambassador inquired whether Tekeda had heard that the Kenyan government had invited President Isaias to the summit. Tekeda responded that he was aware of it, but that he did not believe that Isaias had any constructive role to play. He said if Isaias did attend, he could be managed, ADDIS ABAB 00002848 003 OF 003 and that he would not prevent the summit from being effective. How the Idea for the Nairobi IGAD Summit Was Born -------------- -------------- ¶11. (S/NF) Tekeda said Ethiopian Foreign Minister Seyoum Mesfin, using the occasion of the UN General Assembly in New York to hold an IGAD ministerial, proposed to the ministers that IGAD travel to Baidoa to address the TFG parliament to prod them into action. However, the Kenyan representative insisted that Kenyan officials were barred from traveling to Somalia, and instead suggested that the TFG meet IGAD in Nairobi. According to Tekeda, FM Seyoum was opposed to the idea, but since he was serving as the chair of the meeting, he felt he could not speak out against it. Rather, Seyoum opened the floor for comments on the idea from the other IGAD representatives at which time they unanimously agreed that the Nairobi meeting was a good idea. Tekeda then complained that sometime after the meeting the Kenyan FM erroneously reported to Ould-Abdallah that Ethiopia's intent for the meeting was to extend the TFG's mandate before Ould-Abdallah could be fully briefed and consulted on IGAD's decision. TFG Official Assisting Ethiopia with Sheikh Sharif -------------- -------------- ¶12. (S/NF) Ambassador and PolOff met separately on October 14 with TFG Ambassador Abdi Karin Farah who revealed that he was an interlocutor between the Ethiopian government and Sheikh Sharif. Farah said he had traveled to Nairobi and Sana'a in September with Tekeda to meet secretly with Sharif. Farah confirmed that the Ethiopian government was "cooking the books" leading up to the summit, and that several prominent parliament members were currently in Addis Ababa for that purpose. He said Ethiopia was promising future positions to key Somali politicians in the post summit Somali government rather than handing out cash. He also claimed that Prime Minister Nur Adde "knew he would not be prime minister in two weeks," and was resigned to the upcoming changes. Farah stated that Ethiopia's intention at the summit was to tell the parliament that as Somalia's lawmakers they had to act, which meant they needed to change the charter and name a new leadership. Farah also claimed that President Yusuf had stopped talking with TFG Foreign Minister Ali Jama, and that Yusuf had promised to imprison him if he returned to Mogadishu because the minister was not strictly following Yusuf's directives. Comment -------------- ¶13. (S/NF) The Ethiopian government appears to have come to the conclusion that the only way to create conditions for their withdraw, first from Mogadishu, and eventually from the rest of Somalia, is to leave behind some form of unity TFG/ARS government that has enough support on the ground to fill the security vacuum that their departure will almost certainly create. They now appear to believe that the quickest way to fulfill that goal is to obtain some level of Hawiye support for the TFG with Sheikh Sharif as prime minister. The Ethiopian government's disappointment with what they perceive as a lack of support from the international community on Somalia may also have increased their resolve to go their own way regarding TFG composition. Post will continue to impress upon the Ethiopian government that this is not the time for a radical change of the TFG, but the train may have already left the station. End Comment. YAMAMOTO