ELECTIONS HERALD #1: LOCAL ELECTIONS HEADED FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ADDIS ABABA 000261 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2018 TAGS: KDEM PGOV PHUM ET SUBJECT: ELECTIONS HERALD #1: LOCAL ELECTIONS HEADED FOR TROUBLE, POTENTIAL BOYCOTT BY OPPOSITION IN FACE OF POLITICAL MANIPULATION REF: A. ADDIS 145 ¶B. ADDIS 214 Classified By: Ambassador Donald Yamamoto for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) This is the first in a series of reports analyzing the run-up to, and conduct of, Ethiopia's April 13 and 20 local elections. Four weeks into the voter registration process and two weeks into the candidate registration process, the prevailing environment in Ethiopia is marked by success by the ruling Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) party to weaken, divide, and prevent the largest of the opposition parties from participating in the upcoming local elections. We are receiving reports in the main urban area of Addis Ababa -- an opposition stronghold -- of a lack of public confidence in the credibility of the electoral process. Through a series of technically legal decisions the constitutionally-independent National Electoral Board (NEB) supported the ruling party in effecting the breakup of the largest opposition party, the Coalition for Unity and Democracy Party (CUDP),successor to the unified opposition party CUD, that won huge popular support in the 2005 national elections. The apparent blockage of opposition supporters from registering as voters and candidates further impedes the opposition from participating in the upcoming local elections. Further, the NEB has set conditions on donor assistance for capacity building support to help ensure a more free and fair election. Opposition members report that local cadres and security forces in rural areas continue to harass and detain their supporters, hindering those opposition parties that are technically eligible to participate in the election. ¶2. (C) Voter apathy has increased, based on action by the NEB, which Post believes will lead to low voter registration rates countrywide, low voter turnout on election day -- especially in urban areas -- and the possibility of a boycott by the opposition parties. The ruling EPRDF party has been successful in redefining the political playing field to undermine opposition parties and promote the government party, enabling it to continue to control the important city councils and local assemblies, key to controlling funds and distribution of benefits to the local population. February 19 begins the formal campaign season. With only ten weeks until the local elections, only the government apparatus is in a position to take actions necessary to correct the seemingly biased actions of the NEB and party cadres nationwide. The United States Government is, uniquely, in a position to influence the GoE to take such action and Post is taking advantage of every opportunity to raise our concerns privately with senior GoE and NEB officials and ruling party cadres. Post is also working closely with other donors to ensure that we present a consistent and persistent approach to Ethiopian leaders regarding the pre-election playing field and electoral process. If the GoE does not take some remedial action in the immediate term -- to enable opposition parties to truly participate -- the chance of these local elections being credible, with low voter turnout and even an opposition boycott, will set back much of the political openness gained in the historic 2005 elections, which saw a dramatic rise in opposition representation in the national parliament. End summary. THE NEB: A TOOL WITHOUT EVEN A VENEER -------------- ¶3. (C) Ref A highlights the early-January NEB decisions stripping the party symbol and legal party registration from the corps of opposition leaders overwhelmingly perceived as representing the true Coalition for Unity and Democracy Party (CUDP) and who had the support of the electorate who voted for them in 2005. The actions by the NEB mean that the CUD leaders have no party and are not registered for the upcoming election. The name, brand, and symbol of the CUDP party have been distributed to other opposition groups, but mostly those which support working with the ruling party. These actions, and inactions, by the NEB are technically legal but clearly favor the ruling party. the public, particularly in the heavy opposition stronghold of Addis Ababa, view these NEB actions as supportive, and under the manipulation, of the ruling EPRDF party. Despite efforts by the now-displaced ADDIS ABAB 00000261 002 OF 004 CUDP leaders to meet with the NEB leadership, the NEB only met with the formerly elected, ex-detainees after they issued a written statement disavowing armed struggle -- a demand allegedly made by the Prime Minister. On January 11, Ambassador asked NEB Chair and Vice Chair, Drs. Merga and Adissu respectively, about opposition parties' complaints that their supporters are being detained and that they are not able to register voters or candidates. Drs. Merga and Adissu responded that no single opposition party has submitted names, dates, and location details to the NEB for the Board to follow-up on such claims. Since then, several opposition parties have presented to Embassy officers copies of letters of complaint submitted to the NEB conveying just such details. Opposition parties have brought to Post's attention cases in which voter registration stations in pro-opposition rural areas remain closed impeding voters from registering; examples of prospective voters being advised to "come back tomorrow" after walking five kilometers to register; and local NEB offices refusing to register candidates if an opposition party attempts to register several candidates for multiple seats in a single local government entity. ¶4. (C) We cannot confirm that the above examples are widespread, but the apparent difficulty and blockages leading to the upcoming local elections place opposition groups in a position of not being able to engage substantively in the necessary steps to participate in the upcoming elections. The NEB has been equally active in delaying assistance by donor partners to improve the capacity of the NEB to conduct these elections. In 2006 the donor community commissioned a comparative study of international best practices in election administration, working closely in tandem with the then-Board members to devise a new NEB organizational structure and reform strategy that had ruling and opposition party support. Since late Summer 2007, donor partners have tried to engage the new NEB members to move forward with programming the $1.4 million currently available in support of the reform program. For several months, the NEB refused to consider the previous analysis, insisting instead for an Ethiopian consultant to be funded to provide another organizational reform analysis. Such a consultant, a management specialist with no previous elections-related experience, was finally identified in late-January, leaving no time for his input to be applied before the local elections. Similarly, the U.S. Mission bilaterally has pressed the NEB to move forward in programming the $1.4 million that we have allocated to fund training of local election observers. With the elections ten weeks away, the NEB has yet even to lay-out the directives which potential observers must follow to express their interest. Once the directives are set by the NEB, they must still be approved by the GoE before interested organizations may even express their candidacy. The NEB must then approve and license those organizations that it deems appropriate before observer training can even begin. Despite strong donor interest in supporting necessary steps to improve the credibility of this election process, the NEB appears unwilling to act decisively. ¶5. (C) The Ambassador spoke with the NEB Chairman and Vice Chair to inquire about election observation by foreign Embassies. The response was "no" to international observation of any kind. Local observation was sufficient with international assistance. But the Carter Center reports that the EPRDF Central Committee has refused to permit it to conduct a pre-election playing field assessment and NEB procedural delays continue to block it from even training local observers. The Carter Center stand prepared to conduct election observation training to local observers. Post plans to raise and support the Carter Center's efforts to oversee training, programs, and investments in support of the local elections. ¶6. (C) The opposition has called the current election environment, including the administrative decapitation of the CUDP, the worst point in Ethiopia's developing political environment. VOTER APATHY -------------- ¶7. (C) While the prelude to the 2005 national elections was vibrant with talk of politics, 2008 could not be further from ADDIS ABAB 00000261 003 OF 004 that example. Instead, voter registration levels are far below expectations. With only approximately 60% of eligible voters having registered, the NEB on January 25 extended the deadline for voter registration until February 8. An EPRDF insider accused the opposition of calling on the electorate to refrain from registering in a January 17 discussion with AF Bureau PDAS (ref B). While Addis Ababa residents confirm that opposition leaders are not calling for non-registration, they do report an absolute lack of confidence in this year's election process. Several explain that they already voted for the opposition, mostly the CUD, in 2005 and GoE actions blocked the opposition from fulfilling the mandate which they did get (even if not a majority). Perhaps more detrimental to Ethiopia's developing democracy than a voter boycott is the sentiment expressed by many in Addis Ababa of absolute resignation. One local professional explained that refraining from discussing the elections has effectively become an unspoken rule, even among educated professionals who strongly supported the opposition in 2005. People had placed so much hope and expectation in the truly open 2005 campaign process that the ensuing political restrictions by the NEB appear to be manipulation by the ruling party. Many in Addis Ababa view this as demonstrating absolute party control. NEXT STEPS: WHAT WE ARE DOING -------------- ¶8. (C) As the local elections approach, concerns about how the pre-campaign playing field is panning out have risen to the top of our talking points with senior GoE officials. Ambassador raised concerns of opposition harassment, and slow progress on steps necessary to receive capacity building support, with the NEB leaders on January 11. AF PDAS Linda Thomas-Greenfield very pointedly expressed these USG concerns to EPRDF Central Committee member Bereket Simon on January 17 and called on the ruling party to repeat its 2005 public call for its cadres and supporters to establish a conducive environment for a free and fair campaign and election process. Post continues to meet regularly with opposition party officials to urge them to remain engaged in the election process and to exercise extreme diligence in detailing harassment claims and perceived election law violations to the NEB. Ambassador will seek private meetings with Bereket Simon, the NEB, and the Prime Minister in the coming weeks to re-emphasize U.S. concerns and to urge the ruling party to shift tactics now. Post encourages the Africa Bureau to raise these concerns with Ethiopian Ambassador Samuel Assefa. ¶9. (C) In moving forward, Post will continue to press the NEB to take the necessary steps quickly to allow us to fund training for local election observers. The U.S. Embassy has partnered with the Embassies of Germany, Japan, Canada, and the UK to conduct a series of de facto electoral playing field assessments in eight particularly contentious regions around Addis Ababa. (Note: While Post initially proposed to the GoE that The Carter Center implement a concerted playing field assessment, the ruling party and GoE refused to permit such a project. As such, the diplomatic community is conducting a de facto assessment on our own. End note). ¶10. (SBU) Post also seeks to deploy campaign-period and election observers for the April poll. While the NEB informed the diplomatic community in November that foreign election observers will not be permitted for the April 2008 local elections, further clarifications on the subject from the NEB Chairman and the ruling party differ both from that statement and the actual electoral law. As reported in Ref B, the EPRDF's Bereket Simon told AF PDAS on January 17 that foreign observers would be acceptable in principle, but have to request permission. The NEB's Dr. Merga told Ambassador on January 11, however, that while foreign civil society observers would not/not be permitted, foreign embassy observers must request permission from the Foreign Ministry to observe the elections. In contrast, the electoral law says that the "government may invite foreign observers as deemed necessary." In light of the various responses, Post will request that the GoE permit the Embassy to dispatch election observers. A response should be available in the coming weeks. COMMENT: PERVERSE PROSPECTS ADDIS ABAB 00000261 004 OF 004 -------------- ¶11. (C) Despite the current troubling political environment, Embassy Addis recognizes the monumental role of the coming local elections in April. Following the election rigging in Nigeria this summer, the ethnic violence seen in Kenya following its late-December election, and as the first nation-wide election in Ethiopia since the historic May 2005 elections -- though devastating post-election violence -- it is evident that Africa can ill afford another less-than-credible election. In light of the current election environment, two tracks are possible if the U.S. and international community are unable to move the GoE to correct the problems of the NEB, the upcoming elections will face low voter turnout and potentially a boycott from the opposition parties. First, the continued harassment and apparent manipulation of the election process by the ruling party has a very strong likelihood of prompting the opposition parties to boycott the local elections. While such an induced boycott would cause Ethiopia to revert to the status quo of 1995 and would be a major setback to the significant gains made by the 2005 election, it would likely be good for public safety and stability. The EPRDF would "win" an overwhelming majority which it will certainly call a "mandate" in support of its agenda, the ruling party would continue to administer the all-important local and regional legislative and executive bodies as it does currently, and the opposition would reject the results but refrain from calling for public action. The second scenario would have the opposition struggling to participate against a stacked playing field. In the absence of action to adjust the upcoming elections by the ruling party and the GoE, the opposition's participation, and poor official performance, may prompt a repeat of the 2005 post-election climate of calls for civic disobedience, protests, and violence. ¶12. (C) Even with successful concerted international pressure, however, unless the opposition is given a significant opportunity to fully participate, mainly allowing the largest ruling party membership, the CUDP, to register and participate in the elections, the public will certainly take a pass on these elections. Pending the results of the Ambassador's coming private meetings, Post may seek additional senior level U.S. outreach to press the GoE to take action to minimize the likely negative consequences of the two scenarios currently foreseen. End Comment. MALAC