SUPPLEMENT TO COUNTRY TEAM ASSESSMENT FOR PURCHASE

S E C R E T ADDIS ABABA 002587 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/08/2018 TAGS: EAID MASS PREL ET SUBJECT: SUPPLEMENT TO COUNTRY TEAM ASSESSMENT FOR PURCHASE OF NIGHT VISION DEVICES (NVDS). REF: A. 07 ADDIS 3266 ¶B. 08 ADDIS 2266 Classified By: AMB YAMAMOTO FOR REASONS 1.4B AND D ¶1. (S)Embassy Addis Ababa's Country Team still supports the purchase of Night Vision Devices (NVDs) for the Ethiopian National Defense Force (REFTELs) and offers the below information for clarification of outstanding issues. The requirement is for the procurement of 400 AN/PVS 7-B and ancillary equipment which will be used in the establishment of a Counter-Terrorism (CT) Battalion (BN). NVDs will be purchased using 1206 funds and the economic impact on the Host Nation will be negligible ¶2. (S//NF) Reason for Article or Service: No Change. ¶3. (U) Effect on Recipient's Force Structure: No Change ¶4. (S//NF) Contribution to U.S. and Recipient's Defense/Security Goals: No Change ¶5. (S//NF) Justification for Type and Amount of Articles or Services Required: The amount requested will provide the ability for the deployment of one BN, conducting CT missions, with the ability to conduct 24 hour operations. ¶6. (U) Anticipated Reactions of Neighboring Nations: No Change ¶7. (S//NF) A small USSOF presence in Ethiopia would provide for professional influence within the ENDF while also assuming the role of primary trainers and advisors for the reception, integration, maintenance, security, and employment of the proposed NVGs. The NVG capability for the ENDF would be consistent with the current training and advising program and would compliment their progression towards a more professional force. The ENDF would likely support the integration of the USSOF trainers for training and any reaction resulting from this presence would be minimal; if visible at all. ¶8. (S//NF) There would be no significant change in current USMIL footprint to integrate the proposed NVGs. The USSOF training team would remain small, nearly without notice or an adverse impact. ¶9. (S//NF) As part of the inherent training program by USSOF, the USSOF would conduct professional development sessions and human rights awareness. The USSOF team would continue this professional development training with their ENDF partners. Additionally, USSOF serve as advisors that �A;actively influence the actions of the ENDF Soldiers. Through training, the ENDF would understand the proper application and employment of NVG capability and through strict accountability and security procedures USSOF would maintain application oversight. Regular human rights vetting is required prior to integration and will be conducted per required interval or as requested. ¶10. (S//NF) As long as there are USSOF advisors with the ENDF, the USMIL will retain the ability to directly influence, coach, and observe the end use of the proposed NVGs. The USSOF could provide sustained training in the maintenance, security, and employment of the proposed NVGs. In the event that USSOF are no longer training with the ENDF, and are unable to observe firsthand the end use of the NVG EUM monitoring, compliance will become the responsibility of the Security Assistance Office Golden Sentry POCs. ¶11. (S//NF) It is highly recommended that the USG approve transfer of the NVGs to increase not only the counterterrorism capacity of the ENDF, but also to improve the bilateral military relationship with a CT Partner Nation that supports United States National Interests in the Horn of Africa. A relationship between the USMIL / USG and the ENDF is strategic in nature as it supports and encourages our mutual interests. ¶12. (S//NF) The proposed end user(s) of the NVGs within the ENDF will be USSOF trained, equipped, and advised ENDF Counterterrorism Unit Soldiers. The ENDF CT Unit Soldiers would employ the NVG capability, as does USMIL; force protection during static and active guard patrols during hours of limited visibility, while conducting ground convoys at night, and during night combat operations. The primary mission of the ENDF Unit designated to receive the material solution is to counter external threats to national stability. The proposed NVGs are an earlier version of USMIL NVGs to ensure interoperability with USSOF during training and subsequent combat operations. Size of the unit will range between 400-600 individuals depending on operational needs. Distribution plan will be one per soldier contingent on mission requirements and force size. ¶13. (U) Assessment of the purchaser,s capacity to provide substantially the same degree of security and accountability note contained in Table C5.T5. In a 09 Sep 2008 meeting with the Foreign Liaison Office Chief, BG Hassan, the ENDF reconfirmed their intent to comply with Enhanced End Use Monitoring requirements as briefed in a 09 July meeting and outlined in a letter from the Security Assistance Office to the MOND. Although no formal plan for storage currently exists USSOF personnel responsible for the fielding and training of this equipment will assist in the development of the storage plan. ¶14. (S//NF) SAO plan for End Use Monitoring and compliance verification. SAO Addis will maintain a primary and alternate Golden Sentry POC responsible for ensuring the End Use Monitoring of the NVGs. Golden Sentry POCs working with USSOF counterparts will ensure that the proper storage facilities exist and accountability measures are ready to be executed prior to the delivery of NVGs to the ENDF. Prior to delivery the appropriate Golden Sentry POC will review the terms and conditions of the LOA with the Host Nation to ensure they understand their legal responsibilities and ramifications for non-compliance. SAO Golden Sentry personnel will monitor the USSOF integration and training of the NVGs as the operational and security environment allows. SAO Personnel working with their USSOF counterparts will coordinate for and execute required serial number inventories which will be captured in the fiscal budget programming and execution cycles. When USSOF are no longer training with the ENDF, Golden Sentry personnel will conduct routine EUM visits with host nation in conjunction with other assigned duties and continue with required serial number inventories which will be recorded in the Security Cooperation Information Portal and reported to DSCA along with proposed dates for future compliance verification visits. Golden Sentry POCs will immediately report the destruction, loss, theft, or unauthorized access of any NVGs to DSCA, the combatant command, JCS J-5, and Defense Technology Security Administration. YAMAMOTO