MSF-SWITZERLAND LEAVES ETHIOPIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 002337 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/21/2018 TAGS: PHUM EAID PGOV ASEC ET SUBJECT: MSF-SWITZERLAND LEAVES ETHIOPIA REF: ADDIS 381 Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Deborah R. Malac for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) After over a year of bureaucratic impediments to its operations in the Ogaden area of Ethiopia's Somali region, two rounds of detention without charge of its staff members, and the recognition of its fundamental inability to operate, Medecins Sans Frontieres-Switzerland (MSF-CH) terminated its operations in Ethiopia on August 26. On the eve of his departure, Head of Mission Stephane Reynier de Montlaux reviewed with Embassy MSF-CH's experiences over the past nine months in Fik zone alleging diversions of food aid, encountering insurgents, and facing persistent restrictions on operations on August 20. End Summary. OPERATIONAL BARRIERS -------------- ¶2. (C) MSF-CH has operated in Ethiopia since 1993, providing relief to vulnerable populations in every major emergency since then. In late 2007, the Ethiopian Government granted MSF-CH authorization to operate mobile medical clinics in the Ogaden, predominantly in and around Fik zone. Since then, MSF-CH has only been allowed to operate for a total of ten, not necessarily consecutive, weeks. Because of the lack of predictability and inconsistency of operations permitted, the rural, largely pastoral community seldom congregated at mobile clinic sites. As a result, MSF-CH was able to conduct only 667 medical consultations over the first six months of ¶2008. Montlaux said that it was never clear or consistent with whom NGOs must coordinate their programmatic activities with the often competing or redundant authorities of the Somali regional state (SRS) government, the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF),the regional Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Bureau (DPPB),and others each occasionally exerting their authority. As a result, when they are allowed to operate, NGOs in the Ogaden go where the Ethiopian Government (GoE) allows them, not where the need is. According to Montlaux, SRS government officials themselves complained about facing many of the same operational and movement restrictions by the ENDF and central government officials. (Note: The Federal government often makes similar claims blaming the regional government for impediments. End Note). In addition to the three week detention of six MSF-CH staff members in Kebri Dehar in late January (reftel),the ENDF again detained without charge five MSF-CH staff members from Fik on June 18 for 19 days. The latter group was only released when MSF-CH announced that it would end its Fik operations. FOOD DIVERSIONS AND HUMANITARIAN FINDINGS -------------- ¶3. (C) Montlaux offered his assessment that political factors guide food distribution decisions and noted symptoms of a widespread humanitarian crisis observed in MSF-CH's area of operations throughout Fik zone. He reported that the World Food Program (WFP) delivers food only to the SRS capital Jijiga where DPPB takes custody and control over it. From there, DPPB, guided by the ENDF deliver the food to locales throughout the region. WFP confirmed that this is how WFP food is distributed in Somali region. Montlaux reported statements from villagers throughout MSF-CH's area of operations in Fik zone that they have observed DPPB and the ENDF deliver food to villages a bit outside of larger towns where colluding sellers collect it, bring it back into towns, and sell it for a profit. While MSF-CH has not directly observed this, it reported observing such food being sold in towns while some nearby villages went without relief food deliveries, evidencing the potential veracity of such claims. Local government conscripted militias are reported by locals, and seen by MSF-CH, to be receiving WFP food in their barracks, sometimes when the surrounding community lacks food. While MSF-CH did not suggest that this practice is omnipresent or necessarily systematic, they did report directly observing militias with relief food and allegations of the same from various locales around Fik. Villagers have argued to MSF-CH that families and villages in Fik zone get, ADDIS ABAB 00002337 002 OF 003 or are denied, food distributions based on whether, or how many, men they have contributed to the local militia to fight the insurgents. MSF-CH confirmed observing adjacent villages facing equal humanitarian challenges, in which one has food and the other does not, consistent with these claims. ¶4. (SBU) While MSF-CH reported that a couple of commercial trucks did deliver food and goods to Fik town a few weeks ago, they noted that that was the first commercial delivery since February and, otherwise, MSF-CH reports that the commercial embargo remains in place. Findings from MSF-CH conducted rapid nutritional assessments around Fik zone over the past three months showed severe acute malnutrition (SAM) rates ranging from 5-12 percent. One broader assessment of 349 individuals found a SAM rate of 9 percent outside of Fik town. Montlaux assessed that rampant public fear of the ENDF has prompted many people to hide in remote areas. In the absence of predictability of mobile clinic visits, such people often miss clinic visits. When visits were announced, however, larger groups from more distant areas would access these services, and with them, the higher SAM rates were found. When asked whether the local population was aware of the U.S. and international community's efforts to provide food and/or humanitarian relief to their region, Montlaux replied that the people have no idea of such efforts. Instead, he suggested, the local population believes that the United Nations is backing the ENDF because it is the ENDF that is escorting whatever food reaches their communities. SECURITY ENVIRONMENT -------------- ¶5. (C) Montlaux recounted tales of a population in fear and extreme efforts to monitor and control them. MSF-CH reported observing nightly round-ups by local community (kebele) administrators of the entire kebele populations throughout Fik zone for GoE propaganda meetings. Each night, these are concluded with a roll call to confirm who is present. Kebele administrators again conduct roll calls each morning. MSF-CH opined that all people not under direct GoE observation in these kebele meetings are believed to be supporting the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) insurgents. People continue to report a lot of fear and animosity toward ENDF. Although the local population seldom comments about their sentiments toward ONLF, Montlaux noted that the ONLF continue to conduct targeted strikes against the ENDF and then hide among the local population. ¶6. (C) MSF-CH reported encountering ONLF as well as United Western Somali Liberation Front (UWSLF) roadblocks while traveling in remote areas. Montlaux reported that both groups would inquire as to who they were, where they were coming from and going to, what they were doing in the region, how long they were there, and allowed them to pass unharmed and with appreciation for their humanitarian assistance. Periodically, MSF-CH staff overnighting in villages in Fik zone would encounter ONLF members in villages at night asking about the MSF-CH presence. Montlaux posited that the ONLF appears more robust and effective, at least in Fik zone, than it did one year ago. He made this assessment based on the increased presence of ONLF roadblocks, increased presence in villages, and expanded size and scope of their operations. Montlaux highlighted a mid-June ONLF attack in which the insurgents reportedly defeated three ENDF companies, looting their camp. LITTLE VISIBILITY ON HUMAN RIGHTS -------------- ¶7. (C) Despite the continued insurgent and counter-insurgency operations, MSF-CH reported observing or hearing only limited allegations of human rights abuses. Montlaux speculated that this may have been due to MSF-CH's presence being predominantly limited to Fik town where there is a relatively broader security presence and less opportunity to raise such allegations. While in detention in Fik town in June, MSF-CH staff directly observed ENDF forces taking women from police custody back to their barracks nightly. Based on reports of similar incidents in other parts of the Somali region, MSF-CH staff assumed that the women were taken to be raped. MSF-CH staff also observed ENDF and security forces destroying food-stocks, denying civilians' access to food, and blocking civilians access to water when local groups were suspected of ADDIS ABAB 00002337 003 OF 003 supporting insurgents. Montlaux reported that rural populations had reported a pattern of ENDF troops surrounding rural villages and conducting hut-to-hut searches. Villagers reported that on several occasions, ENDF troops and militias have shot and killed civilians during such operations, even when there is no ONLF presence. According to Montlaux, one of MSF-CH's local staff-members was killed in one such operation. AND IF THAT WASN'T ENOUGH... -------------- ¶8. (SBU) MSF-CH's July 10 decision to depart Ethiopia, however, did not end its harassment. On August 14, Federal Police appeared at MSF-CH offices in Addis Ababa and detained the Deputy Head of Mission. The Police presented a document supposedly from the Gambella Regional Supreme Court ordering an MSF-CH representative to appear before the court immediately to address an outstanding case against the organization from the former staff of its long since concluded Gambella operations. After a grueling 12-hour drive, the official was presented to the head of the court who reported that no such order had been given and who noted that MSF-CH's previous appeal of the case remained under review. COMMENT -------------- ¶9. (C) NGOs like MSF-CH that have tried to work in the Ogaden continue to report instances of harassment, intimidation, detention, and operational impediments to relief operations. While many of the impediments MSF-CH has encountered are common to most NGOs operating in the Ogaden, the GoE has also particularly targeted MSF operations on the alleged belief that they are coordinating with the ONLF -- allegations for which we have seen no evidence. An August 14 UNOCHA-produced map showing the two small pockets of SRS where NGOs are currently allowed to operate, sent to AF/E on August 19, graphically demonstrates the lack of humanitarian coverage to respond to the humanitarian needs of the region's 4.5 million people. Now, more than ever, the GoE should be finding ways to attract more providers of humanitarian relief to Somali region. Post continues to press the GoE to expand access for humanitarian relief providers throughout the Somali region and remains actively engaged in GoE-donor discussions to implement a hub-and-spoke relief distribution system to address the humanitarian needs. The Ambassador will be meeting with the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, as well as with the UN, in coming days to push for better coordination on food distribution. End Comment. YAMAMOTO