COUNTRY TEAM ASSESSMENT FOR PURCHASE OF NIGHT

S E C R E T ADDIS ABABA 002266 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/07/2018 TAGS: EAID MASS PREL SUBJECT: COUNTRY TEAM ASSESSMENT FOR PURCHASE OF NIGHT VISION DEVICES (NVDS). REF: 07 ADDIS 3266 Classified By: CDA MALAC FOR REASONS 1.4B AND D ¶1. (S) Embassy Addis Ababa's Country Team supports the purchase of Night Vision Devices (NVDs) for the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) (reftel 07 Addis 3266). The requirement is for the procurement of 400 AN/PVS 7-B and ancillary equipment. ¶2. (S//NF) Reason for Article or Service: ENDF Counter-Terrorism (CT) and Peace Keeping Operations (PKO) forces possess very limited nighttime operations capability, resulting in an inability to sustain pressure on extremists in Somalia and perform effective PKO outside of daytime hours. Due to this deficiency, terrorist groups and routine violators of United Nations Security Council Resolutions and Peace Accords have a freedom of maneuver that allows them to utilize the cover of nightfall to prepare for future operations against civilian populations, sanctioned PKOs, and potentially U.S. interests. Additionally, the inability to properly identify targets at night is a significant factor in ENDF targeting errors, causing significant collateral damage, injury to non-combatants, and further turning the will of already xenophobic populations against outside intervention. ¶3. (U) Effect on Recipient's Force Structure: These NVDs will represent a new capability for the ENDF since there is no equivalent in the force structure. This sale will add a logistical burden to the ENDF for parts and maintenance and may lead to a spare parts and maintenance program to sustain these devices. ¶4. (S//NF) Contribution to U.S. and Recipient's Defense/Security Goals: Ethiopia has been a key ally in East African stability operations, support for the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in Somalia, and deterring Eritrea,s aggressive impulses. ENDF operations in Somalia have kept the Council of Islamic Courts from fomenting terrorism/extremism in neighboring countries, enabled shipping lanes in the region to remain open by forcing extremist organizations to commit personnel in Mogadishu, and contributed to the general stability of the region. However, lack of night-fighting capability has limited the capability of ENDF to sustain pressure on groups desiring to create regional instability. In the strategic context of the War on Terror (WOT),enhanced CT capability for the ENDF enables the U.S. and other allies to retain the initiative and continue to play a critical role in East African stability. From a diplomatic standpoint the provision of NVDs to Ethiopia demonstrates the USG's commitment to train and equip viable CT and PKO BNs and could ultimately lead to an invitation by the GOE for the re-establishment of CT training in Bilate and Hurso. Post understands that these devices could provide the ENDF with a tactical advantage against legitimate, nationalist insurgent movements or civilians within Ethiopia and has weighed this against the expanding threat of extremists and terrorists in the region. Given the current situation it is the consensus of the embassy that the expanding threat to U.S. personnel, facilities, and interests justifies the provision of the equipment as necessary to support our top priority in Ethiopia of protecting American citizens and U.S. interests. ¶5. (S//NF) Justification for Type and Amount of Articles or Services Required: The amount requested will provide the ability for the deployment of one Regiment, conducting either PKO and/or CT missions, with the ability to conduct 24 hour OPNs. Currently there are two options to integrate the proposed NVDs that have been presented by the ENDF. The first and least desirable COA has been presented by the ENDF Foreign Liaison Office. The NVDs would be centrally controlled by the Logistics Department and hand receipted to Agazzi (ENDF Special Operations) or other Infantry units deploying on CT or PKO missions. The other, and more desirable, suggestion provided by the GOE Prime Minister, the ENDF Director of Ops, and the ENDF Director of Intel, is to integrate the NVDs into the ENDF Aghazzi SOF Regiment under an existing capacity building program between ENDF SOF and USSOF. There is currently a train, equip, advise program between the two Special Forces and the proposed NVDs could be integrated into the ENDF via this compartmentalized program. The benefit to this intended integration would be persistent USMIL control / E influence over the use and accountability of the NVDs. The ENDF leadership has demonstrated an acceptance of the Enhanced End Use Monitoring requirements identified in the Security Assistance Management Manual for NVDs including the provision of a written physical security and accountability control plan and by serial number inventories at the request of the Security Assistance Office. ¶6. (U) Anticipated Reactions Of Neighboring Nations: Minimal; Kenya has received similar devices with no negative impact on the stability of the Horn. MALAC