Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08ADDISABABA2266
2008-08-19 04:29:00
SECRET
Embassy Addis Ababa
Cable title:  

COUNTRY TEAM ASSESSMENT FOR PURCHASE OF NIGHT

Tags:  EAID MASS PREL 
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VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHDS #2266/01 2320429
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 190429Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1733
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEADWD/DA WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUKLDAR/CDRUSASAC ALEXANDRIA VA
S E C R E T ADDIS ABABA 002266 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/07/2018
TAGS: EAID MASS PREL
SUBJECT: COUNTRY TEAM ASSESSMENT FOR PURCHASE OF NIGHT
VISION DEVICES (NVDS).

REF: 07 ADDIS 3266

Classified By: CDA MALAC FOR REASONS 1.4B AND D

S E C R E T ADDIS ABABA 002266

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/07/2018
TAGS: EAID MASS PREL
SUBJECT: COUNTRY TEAM ASSESSMENT FOR PURCHASE OF NIGHT
VISION DEVICES (NVDS).

REF: 07 ADDIS 3266

Classified By: CDA MALAC FOR REASONS 1.4B AND D


1. (S) Embassy Addis Ababa's Country Team supports the
purchase of Night Vision Devices (NVDs) for the Ethiopian
National Defense Force (ENDF) (reftel 07 Addis 3266). The
requirement is for the procurement of 400 AN/PVS 7-B and
ancillary equipment.


2. (S//NF) Reason for Article or Service:

ENDF Counter-Terrorism (CT) and Peace Keeping Operations
(PKO) forces possess very limited nighttime operations
capability, resulting in an inability to sustain pressure on
extremists in Somalia and perform effective PKO outside of
daytime hours. Due to this deficiency, terrorist groups and
routine violators of United Nations Security Council
Resolutions and Peace Accords have a freedom of maneuver that
allows them to utilize the cover of nightfall to prepare for
future operations against civilian populations, sanctioned
PKOs, and potentially U.S. interests. Additionally, the
inability to properly identify targets at night is a
significant factor in ENDF targeting errors, causing
significant collateral damage, injury to non-combatants, and
further turning the will of already xenophobic populations
against outside intervention.


3. (U) Effect on Recipient's Force Structure:

These NVDs will represent a new capability for the ENDF
since there is no equivalent in the force structure. This
sale will add a logistical burden to the ENDF for parts and
maintenance and may lead to a spare parts and maintenance
program to sustain these devices.


4. (S//NF) Contribution to U.S. and Recipient's
Defense/Security Goals:

Ethiopia has been a key ally in East African stability
operations, support for the Transitional Federal Government
(TFG) in Somalia, and deterring Eritrea,s aggressive
impulses. ENDF operations in Somalia have kept the Council
of Islamic Courts from fomenting terrorism/extremism in
neighboring countries, enabled shipping lanes in the region
to remain open by forcing extremist organizations to commit
personnel in Mogadishu, and contributed to the general
stability of the region. However, lack of night-fighting
capability has limited the capability of ENDF to sustain
pressure on groups desiring to create regional instability.
In the strategic context of the War on Terror (WOT),enhanced
CT capability for the ENDF enables the U.S. and other allies
to retain the initiative and continue to play a critical role
in East African stability. From a diplomatic standpoint the
provision of NVDs to Ethiopia demonstrates the USG's
commitment to train and equip viable CT and PKO BNs and could
ultimately lead to an invitation by the GOE for the
re-establishment of CT training in Bilate and Hurso. Post
understands that these devices could provide the ENDF with a
tactical advantage against legitimate, nationalist insurgent
movements or civilians within Ethiopia and has weighed this
against the expanding threat of extremists and terrorists in
the region. Given the current situation it is the consensus
of the embassy that the expanding threat to U.S. personnel,
facilities, and interests justifies the provision of the
equipment as necessary to support our top priority in
Ethiopia of protecting American citizens and U.S. interests.


5. (S//NF) Justification for Type and Amount of Articles or
Services Required:

The amount requested will provide the ability for the
deployment of one Regiment, conducting either PKO and/or CT
missions, with the ability to conduct 24 hour OPNs.
Currently there are two options to integrate the proposed
NVDs that have been presented by the ENDF. The first and
least desirable COA has been presented by the ENDF Foreign
Liaison Office. The NVDs would be centrally controlled by
the Logistics Department and hand receipted to Agazzi (ENDF
Special Operations) or other Infantry units deploying on CT
or PKO missions. The other, and more desirable, suggestion
provided by the GOE Prime Minister, the ENDF Director of Ops,
and the ENDF Director of Intel, is to integrate the NVDs into
the ENDF Aghazzi SOF Regiment under an existing capacity
building program between ENDF SOF and USSOF. There is
currently a train, equip, advise program between the two
Special Forces and the proposed NVDs could be integrated into
the ENDF via this compartmentalized program. The benefit to
this intended integration would be persistent USMIL control /
E

influence over the use and accountability of the NVDs. The
ENDF leadership has demonstrated an acceptance of the
Enhanced End Use Monitoring requirements identified in the
Security Assistance Management Manual for NVDs including the
provision of a written physical security and accountability
control plan and by serial number inventories at the request
of the Security Assistance Office.


6. (U) Anticipated Reactions Of Neighboring Nations:

Minimal; Kenya has received similar devices with no
negative impact on the stability of the Horn.
MALAC

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