ETHIOPIA LOOKING TO WITHDRAW FROM MOGADISHU

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 002232 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/11/2018 TAGS: PREL MOPS KPKO SO ET SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA LOOKING TO WITHDRAW FROM MOGADISHU Classified By: CDA Deborah Malac. Reason: 1.4(B). ¶1. (C/NF) SUMMARY. Ethiopian MFA Acting Chief of the Minister's Cabinet Abdetta Dribssa told PolOffs on August 7 that he expected the Ethiopian military to withdraw from Mogadishu by the end of September and redeploy to Baidoa and other areas outside of the city, allowing the newly trained Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) troops to secure Mogadishu. He said that his government was pressuring TFG President Yusuf to back Prime Minister Nur Adde's firing of Mohammed Dheere. He explained that the Ethiopian threat to withdraw from Somalia entirely was the only real card Ethiopia had to play with Yusuf. Abdetta would not speculate on what was going to happen next and expressed frustration that his superiors have been unable to decide on a clear way forward for Ethiopian policy on Somalia. END SUMMARY. -------------- ETHIOPIA LOOKING TO WITHDRAW FROM MOGADISHU -------------- ¶2. (C/NF) In response to PolOffs query regarding Ethiopian intentions to remain in Somalia, Abdetta replied that he expected the Ethiopian military to withdraw from Mogadishu by the end of September and redeploy to Baidoa and other locations outside the city. He said that the 2,000 newly trained TFG troops would take over security in Mogadishu from the departing Ethiopian troops. Abdetta praised the capabilities of the new TFG troops, but he noted that payment was a problem. He said that the Ethiopian government had paid them when they first returned to Somalia last month, but he criticized the TFG for failing to pay them since their return. Abdetta also said that African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) commanders in Mogadishu asked the Ethiopian military to inform them in advance of their withdrawal from the city to allow for the peacekeepers to pull out, but Abdetta did not confirm whether the Ethiopian government would provide such notice. -------------- -------------- THREAT TO WITHDRAW FROM SOMALIA MEANT TO PRESSURE YUSUF -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C/NF) PolOffs conveyed Washington's message that the Ethiopian government should press President Yusuf to back the Prime Minister and sign Mohammed Dheere's dismissal papers. Abdetta was adamant that Dheere should be dismissed and explained that Ethiopia's threat to withdraw from Somalia entirely was the only real card Ethiopia had to play to pressure Yusuf. Abdetta affirmed that the Ethiopian government was pressuring Yusuf to back the Prime Minister and fire Dheere. Abdetta denied that Ethiopia was actively attempting to replace President Yusuf, but he emphasized that Yusuf was a major impediment to the effectiveness of the TFG. He referred to Yusuf as, "the most stubborn man in Somalia," and said that the TFG would be better off without him. When queried, Abdetta said that the best way to get both Yusuf and Nur Adde to perform was to squeeze them, and he said that Ethiopia was in the best position to do that noting that "the racquet is in Nairobi, but the ball is in Addis Ababa." Abdetta argued that it is critical for the USG to also squeeze both to move beyond their pettiness and engage on moving the TFG forward. ¶4. (C/NF) Abdetta went on to offer that, in his personal opinion, it would be easier to replace both the President and Prime Minister rather than replace one or the other as both would continue to bribe TFG MPs to prevent a successful impeachment vote. He emphasized that neither his bosses nor the TFG parliament had considered this possibility, but he thought that this might be the best way to improve the capacity of the TFG and secure adequate votes in parliament. Abdetta said that replacing only the Prime Minister would effectively kill the Djibouti agreement as long as Yusuf remained president. Abdetta declined to name a possible replacement for Yusuf, but he stressed that the replacement would not be Darood/Majerteen. He was emphatic that once Yusuf was gone the power of the Majerteen would be finished for good and argued that a Yusuf replacement would not, necessarily, have to be a Darood. ¶5. (C/NF) Abdetta said that the TFG could survive without Yusuf, if Yusuf was impeached by the parliament. He added that Yusuf and his supporters frequently portray themselves ADDIS ABAB 00002232 002 OF 002 to the international community as the only group in Somalia committed to fighting the extremists. At the same time, they portray the Prime Minister and his group as too soft on the extremists and the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS). Abdetta explained that this was a false assertion. He reported that when the fight began over Dheere, Yusuf sent an envoy to meet with ARS leader Sheikh Sharif. He said that Yusuf offered the prime ministership to Sheikh Sharif if Sharif would ally with Yusuf against Prime Minister Nur Adde. Yusuf reportedly also offered to join the ARS in kicking the Ethiopians out of Somalia. Abdetta asked, "does this sound like a man committed to fighting the extremists?" In response to a query whether Sheikh Sharif could be prime minister, Abdetta responded, "sure, why not president?" -------------- NO CLEAR WAY FORWARD IDENTIFIED -------------- ¶6. (C/NF) When asked, Abdetta would not speculate on what would happen next, nor explain the steps his government was going to take in the near term to navigate the current crisis. He expressed disappointment that his government had not received any high-level requests from Washington for consultations on the issue. He added that his bosses had been expecting closer coordination. However, he also conveyed frustration that his superiors had not identified a clear way forward, and noted that there was a lot of debate on the issue, but few decisions. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶7. (C/NF) Abdetta's idea that it would be easier to replace both president and prime minister was probably his personal trial balloon meant to influence U.S. thinking, possibly hoping that U.S. officials would raise it with his seniors with whom he is clearly frustrated. Abdetta's frustration with his superiors has been apparent in all of our meetings with him over the last month, and suggests that the Ethiopian government is having considerable difficulty determining what steps to take next to keep the TFG afloat, and improve its capability to allow the Ethiopians to leave Somalia. As much as the Ethiopians would like to withdraw from Somalia, they realize that it will leave a security vacuum unless there is a strong TFG and/or a capable international peacekeeping mission in place. The plan to withdraw from Mogadishu in the coming weeks is probably a test to see if the new TFG security forces can operate on their own, as well as an attempt to reduce Ethiopian casualties, but Abdetta made it clear that recent Ethiopian threats to withdraw from Somalia altogether have been more intended to press Yusuf to engage than true expressions of an immediate policy intent. Given Abdetta's comments regarding consultations with Washington, and the apparent lack of a clear way forward for Ethiopia on Somalia, it may be appropriate for the Special Envoy for Somalia, or an official from Washington, to visit Addis Ababa for discussions with senior Ethiopian officials in the coming weeks. END COMMENT. MALAC