PRESS FREEDOM - OPPRESSIVE OR PERMISSIVE: DRL A/S

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 002159 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: KDEM PGOV PREL ET SUBJECT: PRESS FREEDOM - OPPRESSIVE OR PERMISSIVE: DRL A/S KRAMER ENGAGES ETHIOPIAN STAKEHOLDERS REF: ADDIS 890 SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (SBU) During his July 23-25 visit to Addis Ababa, Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor David Kramer met with media professionals and civil society leaders on the state of press freedom in Ethiopia and engaged senior Ethiopian Government (GoE) leaders on press freedom and the newly passed Mass Media and Freedom of Information Law (hereafter the "Press Law"). Media practitioners blasted the Law as repressive and lamented growing GoE restrictions over the press as one more realm of the government's broader systematic closure of political space in Ethiopia since 2005. In stark contrast, Prime Minister Meles labeled the Law "permissive" and his senior advisor and former Information Minister Bereket Simon defended the Law and government dominance over the media sector as a defense against the previous pervasive environment in which the private press was intent on undermining the constitution and calling for "ethnic cleansing." In the face of the now-approved Law, A/S Kramer urged GoE interlocutors to adopt an expansive and liberal approach to registering journalists and media outlets and confirming its professed intent of guaranteeing press freedom through implementation of the Law. End Summary. A RE-"PRESS"-IVE ENVIRONMENT -------------- ¶2. (SBU) In a July 24 roundtable discussion with prominent private journalists, participants overwhelmingly argued that the private press is fighting against the GoE for press freedom which is increasingly in retreat despite significant constitutional protections on paper. Media practitioners called the Press Law which Parliament passed on July 1 "repressive." While Embassy Addis is still waiting for an English translation of the final Law to conduct our own review, roundtable participants criticized provisions that grant the Information Ministry sole discretion on whether to license journalists, that prevent individuals from owning shares in more than one media outlet, and that declare the defamation and false accusation of government officials to be prosecutable matters of the state against which the truth of the reports may not serve as a defense. According to the participants, the Law defines biographical information about GoE officials as classified, places the burden of proof of guilt in judicial proceedings on accused journalists, and imposes a maximum penalty of 100,000 birr (approximately US$10,000) for violations of the law in contrast to maximum sentences for violent crimes, such as rape, capped at a fraction of that level. By targeting the entire supply chain of the press process, the Law can be used to hold everyone from news sources, to journalists, to street vendors culpable for information disseminated. Unlike many media regulation regimes internationally that define actions as permissible unless they are expressly prohibited, participants argued that the Ethiopian Press Law renders actions prohibited unless explicitly permitted. They further noted that whereas other countries make public information available but protect private information, in Ethiopia the law makes private information releasable while it closes access to public information. ¶3. (SBU) Media professionals argued that the Press Law reflects only the latest step in the systematic rolling back of press freedoms and the broader narrowing of political space in Ethiopia since 2005. Participants cited the following examples: --A Broadcasting Law passed in 2007 prevents private ownership of television broadcasting and short-wave radio transmission, limiting private electronic media to broadcasting via FM stations with a maximum reach radius of 90 kilometers; --The 2005 closure of most private newspapers which are yet to be reopened (13 of which were forcibly closed and others closed in response to indirect pressure, market forces, and self-censorship); ADDIS ABAB 00002159 002 OF 003 --Before the Press Law, media outlets were legally registered if the GoE failed to provide a response within thirty days of application submission, but now registration is not legal until the Information Ministry explicitly registers the requesting media outlet; --The Press Law imposes maximum penalties equivalent to US$10,000, whereas the previous law capped them at US$1,000; --The dual functions of the Information Ministry as both the government spokesperson as well as the regulator of the media risks undercutting the release of relevant information to the public; and --The Amharic word used in the freedom of information portion of the Law to outline the more than 60 subjects barred from public disclosure has a double meaning that could be interpreted as also barring media coverage of these issues, not just barring the GoE's release of such information. ¶4. (SBU) One newspaper editor explained the GoE's approach as being driven by the ideology of the "developmental state" espoused by the ruling Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) party. The editor argued that under the "developmental state," eliminating poverty is the priority while anything that impedes that effort, including the disclosure of unflattering developments by a watchdog press, is secondary. Further, the state must be powerful and dominant, rather than just a facilitator. Still, media practitioners did not reserve their criticism for the GoE. Several argued that opposition political parties also do not stand for press freedom and protest the watchdog eye of the media focusing on them. MELES: "A PERMISSIVE LAW..." -------------- ¶5. (SBU) In response to A/S Kramer's assertion that the media is critical to the checks and balances necessary for a strong democracy, Prime Minister Meles retorted that "the private press in Ethiopia is an opposition press." Meles argued that the private press holds similar political views as opposition political parties and supports the same kind of actions that would undermine the constitution as opposition parties. Meles conceded that there is no pro-government press beyond the state press, noting that some is "less pro-opposition" while others are specifically linked to individual opposition parties. Meles deflected all questions from A/S Kramer regarding the recently approved Press Law, arguing that the law was submitted directly to parliament without going through the cabinet. Meles rejected any problems that people may have with the Law, arguing that "I understand it to be a permissive law." "...EVEN WHEN THE RULE OF LAW FAILS," BEREKET -------------- ¶6. (SBU) While Meles claimed to be unaware of the details regarding the press, his senior advisor and former Information Minister Bereket Simon was expansive during a July 24 lunch. Bereket argued that prior to 2005, the GoE tried to maintain a hands-off approach to the press. Unfortunately, much of the private press was intent on undermining the constitution. Unchecked in their publication of extremist rhetoric and misinformation, the press succeeded in provoking public resentment toward the GoE, which led to the 2005 post-election violence. Bereket resurrected the 2005/2006 EPRDF mantra arguing that the press was "preaching to kill Tigrayans along the lines of Rwanda-style ethnic violence." ¶7. (SBU) A/S Kramer emphasized the constructive role that civil society and the media play in a democracy and expressed the USG's hope that the Press Law would establish a conducive environment for responsible journalism and access to information. A/S Kramer went on to note with concern the GoE's closure of 13 newspapers in 2005 and persistent refusals by the Information Ministry to register new media outlets affiliated with journalists charged in the 2005 turmoil. Bereket stressed that the Press Law was subjected to an extensive donor-supported dialogue and the first draft was improved by input from a USAID-funded media regulation ADDIS ABAB 00002159 003 OF 003 specialist. He further argued that "no complaints about the final Law hold water." Ignoring the fact that most opposition parties opposed the Law, Bereket defended the consultative process by noting that some opposition leaders (Lidetu Ayelu of the CUD-breakaway EDUP-Medhin party) offered minor changes to improve it. Despite the new Law having the effect of greatly expanding criminal penalties for the publication of certain types of information, Bekeret commended the Press Law for stripping the previous criminal provisions from the Press Law and redirecting them to the Penal Code. Ultimately, though, Bereket argued that the Press Law has increased political space and freedom of the press. ¶8. (SBU) Following up on a request from Eskinder Nega (one of the journalists arrested in 2005 and charged with "outrages against the constitution"),A/S Kramer noted concern that the Information Ministry had refused to approve licenses for certain new media outlets. Bereket argued that as long as journalists accept the law of the land, they would have no problem, but if individuals were previously engaged in undermining the constitution, the GoE cannot allow them to continue, particularly if the judiciary had found them culpable. EmbOff noted that the High Court not only acquitted Eskinder, but dropped all charges against him in April 2007 after the prosecution failed to present adequate grounds to pursue charges against him. Bereket argued that Eskinder and others charged "used front men to cover their criminal writings," manipulated the judicial process, and charges against them were dismissed on technicalities. Still, he stressed, the GoE knows that he was among those journalists most intent on undermining the constitution. Bereket explicitly alleged that "their papers called for ethnic cleansing." (Note: The GoE initially charged a dozen journalists, editors, and publishers and scores of opposition political leaders with capital offenses from "outrages against the constitution" to "genocide" in a November 2005 through July 2007 political trial. Upon the conclusion of the prosecution's case, the Ethiopian High Court dismissed all charges against the journalists and all charges of "genocide" against all defendants for lack of evidence. Several publishing houses were later found guilty on the one charge of "outrages against the constitution" as corporate entities, but journalists affiliated with them were not. End Note.) Bereket clearly emphasized that despite having never been convicted by a court of law, Eskinder would never be licensed to practice journalism again in Ethiopia unless the GoE had a guarantee that he and his colleagues had changed their ways and would abide by the constitution. When pressed by A/S Kramer on how they could prove such a change, Bereket argued that they would have to publicly admit their involvement in undermining the constitution and accept responsibility for the violence and turmoil they had caused before the GoE even considered a new license request. COMMENT -------------- ¶9. (SBU) A formal analysis of the Press Law by Post (once it is available) will shed light on appropriateness of concerns over its provisions. Still, the message from media and civil society leaders was clear: the media environment is oppressive and an indicator of the broader narrowing of political space. Ethiopia's private press is generally of marginal quality and prone to political bias, but improved media training offers a preferable remedy over the GoE's approach of tighter control. Bereket Simon is a tremendously influential member of the ruling party's central committee. His comment that the GoE will take executive action in cases where the judicial system provides an incorrect finding (as in the case of Eskinder Nega) is alarming and offers an insight into the mind-set of Ethiopia's ruling elite. End Comment. MALAC