U.S.-ETHIOPIAN RELATIONS MESHED IN UNEASY INTERNAL

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ADDIS ABABA 002112

NOFORN
SIPDIS

FROM AMBASSADOR YAMAMOTO FOR:
NSC SENIOR DIRECTOR FOR AFRICA BOBBY PITTMAN
STATE DEPARTMENT ASSISTANT SECRETARIES FRAZER (AF),KRAMER
(DRL),WITTEN (PRM),AND FORT (INR)
DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR P, D, F, G, S/CRS, AND S/P
USAID ADMINISTRATOR FORE AND ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATORS
ALMQUIST (AFR) AND HESS (DCHA)
OSD DAS WHALEN
DNI NIO/AFRICA CARSON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/01/2018
TAGS: PREL KDEM PGOV ASEC EAID ET
SUBJECT: U.S.-ETHIOPIAN RELATIONS MESHED IN UNEASY INTERNAL
POLITICAL DYNAMICS

REF: A. ADDIS 1154

B. ADDIS 1571

Classified By: Ambassador Donald Yamamoto for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).

SUMMARY
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1. (S/NF) The growing independence in bilateral policy
discussions by hard-liners within the ruling Ethiopian
People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) party --
including members of the Central Committee and Executive
Committee or "Politburo", as well as by powerful outsiders
like military Chief of Staff General Samora and National
Intelligence Service Chief Getachew Assefa -- combined with
the "foils" of Prime Minister Meles in sending negative
messages to the U.S. and other nations, have led to reversals
as well as shifts in the Ethiopian Government's (GoE)
actions. Almost overthrown by central committee dissenters
in 2001 over differences on the Eritrea border conflict, the
Prime Minister has recovered and enjoys solid control within
the Committee. Still, underlying fissures within the
Committee remain, exacerbated by growing perception gaps
between the Committee and outsiders requiring careful
management by the Prime Minister. Both Gen. Samora (a
non-member of the Committee) and Getachew are clearly
"tougher" hard-liners who are not advocates of the U.S.
relationship, but due to their senior and influential
positions could potentially pose problems for U.S. relations
despite the close ties their respective ministries have with
the United States. The hard-liners in general are not
opposed to the U.S., but seek tough EPRDF control over
government operations, procedures, and structures. In
pressing the GoE, whether in advancing our human rights and
democratic reform objectives or advocating military and
development programs, we must engage in a more concerted,
deliberate, and discrete dialogue with the GoE to avert any
unforeseen or unintended consequences.


2. (S/NF) Meles, release of 71 political detainees last
year, handling of the Eritrea border dispute, and debate over
the proposed Charities and Societies Organizations (CSO) law
have sparked debate and differences of views within the
Central Committee. Yet Meles has the full support of the
Committee on issues such as greater control of the press and
banking institutions, as well as their blessing to control
opposition parties which has led to the effective
neutralization of the opposition in the parliament, recent
local elections, and in political debates. The 78 percent
food inflation rate and 55 percent overall inflation rate, a
rising budget deficit, a trade deficit that has ballooned
beyond USD 4 billion, the worst drought crisis since 2002,
and harsh international criticism of human rights abuse in
Somalia and the Ogaden have put the Prime Minister on the
defensive and raised serious debate within the Central
Committee on how to address and manage these issues. More
concerning has been discussion within the Committee of an
anticipated deterioration in U.S. relations after the next
U.S. presidential election in November as Committee members
firmly believe the U.S. will press Ethiopia on human rights
and democratic reforms as the centerpiece of its policy
towards Ethiopia.


3. (S/NF) In engaging with Ethiopian officials, whether on
human rights or counterterrorism issues, the Ambassador has
stressed the importance of Ethiopia as a cornerstone country
with a broad-based and complex, yet mutually supportive,
relationship with the U.S. For instance, the Prime Minister
and his government have been strong partners with the U.S. on
counterterrorism and humanitarian relief efforts and both
countries have discussed developmental issues with the U.S.
focused more on trying to expand developmental assistance.

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To correct misunderstandings, Prime Minister Meles and other
senior Ethiopian officials have suggested closer
U.S.-Ethiopian bilateral talks, similar to the ones conducted
with China, India and Japan. Such discussions would be
useful as the U.S. expands activities in Ethiopia from trade
and development support for closer information sharing and
cooperation on counterterrorism. Easing Ethiopian anxieties
and highlighting our shared interests and programs will best
achieve our core objectives and improve our bilateral
relationship without undermining the internal stability of
the Central Committee or ultimately Meles, political
position. End Summary.

THE POWERFUL CENTRAL COMMITTEE: COMPROMISING DECISIONS
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4. (S/NF) The Central Committee is composed of 225 members
from the four regional component parties within the EPRDF
coalition. The Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF)
forms the main and most powerful part of the Central
Committee. The smaller and more important decision making
Executive Committee or "Politburo" is composed of 36 members.
Prime Minister Meles clearly does not rule with unquestioned
authority and needs to forge consensus to advance his agenda,
which he must compromise to secure approval. Prime Minister
Meles, decision to release last summer 71 political
detainees arrested after the 2005 elections was criticized by
the Central Committee. Meles was persuasive and secured the
Committee's support, expending political capital in the
process, though earning international support. The Central
Committee has also questioned the Prime Minister's posture on
the Eritrean border conflict. The Prime Minister was
supportive of a post-UNMEE (United Nations Mission to Eritrea
and Ethiopia) military observer mission. However, General
Samora was highly critical of any foreign observers and
quickly nixed the process. The Prime Minister and Foreign
Minister Seyoum were persuaded to shift positions and
criticized the lack of support from the Security Council in
changing their mind to oppose a follow-on UNMEE mission.


5. (S/NF) The recently proposed CSO law, which had the
support of hard-liners in the Central Committee, was delayed
by the Prime Minister and Committee moderates in the wake of
strong international criticism and calls for revision. The
delay has angered hard-liners in the Central Committee and
divided some of its members, such as the Relief Society of
Tigray's (REST) influential Director Teklewoini Assefa, who
receives USAID funding and is leading efforts to revise the
law. In our July 30 meeting, the Prime Minister argued that
the Central Committee's anger with CSOs/NGOs has brought the
Central Committee into direct opposition to the aggressive
posture of the CSOs/NGOs towards the government over the
proposed law. This has so politicized and "poisoned"
discussion of the law that Meles has become the arbiter
trying to mediate differences among those hard-liners within
the Central Committee supportive of restrictions of CSOs/NGOs
and other members who favor discussion.

TOUGH HARD-LINERS ON THE OUTSIDE
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6. (S/NF) General Samora, Chief of Staff of the Ethiopian
military, is not a member of the Central Committee but holds
a powerful position as head of the military. General Samora
has now become one of the most powerful figures in Ethiopian
politics. He has done so through his partnership with
hard-liners in the Central Committee and his actions of
replacing generals -- mostly Western trained and highly
skilled non-Tigrayans -- with not necessarily qualified
Tigrayans who are loyal to Samora. Samora also succeeded
through his superb bureaucratic infighting in getting one
pro-U.S. State Minister of Defense dismissed and securing his

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position as more powerful than the Minister of Defense.
Getachew Assefa, chief of the National Intelligence and
Security Service, is not a skilled bureaucrat nor is he liked
by others in his own agency. His position as head of the
intelligence service, however, automatically makes him an
important player. Getachew is very much like General Samora;
they lack the support and respect their predecessors
commanded. Samora and Getachew are perhaps "tougher"
hard-liners than their hard-line supporters within the
Central Committee.

UNDERSTANDING THE HARD-LINERS
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7. (S/NF) Hard-line Central Committee members form the
majority of the Central and Executive Committees, from people
like Sebhat Nega, Abadi Zemo, and most of the other dominant
Tigrayan members of the Committees. Yet these members do not
oppose the U.S., per se, but are fundamentally wedded to
maintaining tight EPRDF control over the levers of power and
influence in Ethiopia. They seek specific benefits from the
U.S. to meet their overall objectives. More important, they
share a common agenda of greater government control of
institutions and procedures which corresponds to their views
of "Revolutionary Democracy" (Ref. A) which asserts that
government oversight is critical until a middle class is
formed, under government auspices.


8. (S/NF) Interestingly, both Samora and Getachew support
Israel as well as China, and to a certain extent India and
Russia, because these countries do not raise human rights in
their dialogue with the government and they provide some
benefits from military arms sales to low interest loans.
Samora's outward views have become more pronounced since he
took over his position in 2001. A commander of moderate
success, Samora rules the military with a heavy hand and
never misses an opportunity to criticize the U.S. for its
"wrong" decision of tying military assistance to human
rights. He is especially critical of the suspension of the
delivery of Humvees after the 2005 national election in which
ENDF forces used U.S. procured Humvees to quell violent
demonstrations. In dialogue with U.S. officials, Samora and
other GoE officials have pointed to this event as evidence of
the U.S. as not a completely trustworthy ally.


9. (S/NF) Samora and Getachew have not been the most
supportive elements for U.S. relations and have undercut some
U.S. initiatives and opposed other U.S. programs. General
Samora, for instance, has prevented the United States from
mitigating the popular lure of extremists by expelling
CJTF-HOA civil affairs teams from the Ogaden in 2006 and has
ended Ethiopian officers' training in the U.S., though mostly
out of fear of his officers not returning, but he has
nevertheless focused on training in Russia, China and India
as a counter weight to the U.S. Prime Minister Meles has
used both to pass unpleasant decisions to the U.S. For
instance, in the wake of the AC-130 gunship strikes in
Somalia from Ethiopian bases in early-2007 -- which Samora
opposed and Meles supported -- the program ended as a result
of press leaks from the U.S. Samora was the main conveyor of
the bad news which he always delivers with firmness and, we
suspect, partial enjoyment. For his part, Getachew has
prevented FBI access to individuals of national security
interest in Ethiopian custody (Ref. B).

ADVOCATING U.S. POLICY MUST BE JUDICIOUS
--------------


10. (S/NF) The U.S. is important to Ethiopia and the Central
Committee frequently discusses U.S. policy. The Prime
Minister has called in the Ambassador for private discussions
on U.S. politics and delves into details of American foreign

ADDIS ABAB 00002112 004 OF 004


policy issues with American visitors. Many Central Committee
members do not fully understand American issues or the world
around them. A troubling trend has been the growing belief
that the EPRDF must brace itself for a tougher and more
confrontational relationship with the U.S. after the next
presidential election, as the U.S. takes on human rights and
democratic reforms as the centerpiece of bilateral policy
over the current cooperation on counterterrorism. General
Samora and Getachew are very much share this assumption, as
do hard-liners from the Central Committee and Executive
Committee of the EPRDF, particularly from members from the
Tigray region, the power base of the EPRDF. General Samora
and hard-line Central Committee members reject the U.S.
linking assistance and benefits and associating issues to
human rights. The Ambassador has explained that
U.S.-Ethiopian relations are complex and while human rights
and democratic reforms are a fundamental priority for U.S.
policy, the U.S. has a wide range of issues where the U.S.
and Ethiopia have a very positive relationship. This
includes counterterrorism cooperation, emergency humanitarian
relief efforts, development assistance programs, and mutual
concern for regional instability and other issues.

MOVING FORWARD
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11. (S/NF) It is clear that in engaging Ethiopian officials
in pursuit of U.S. foreign policy priorities -- particularly
on human rights and democratic reforms -- we must carefully
consider, and mitigate against any potential unintended
consequences of our actions on Ethiopia's highly fluid
internal political debate, which easily misinterprets and
thinks the worst is yet to come. If our actions do undercut
the Prime Minister or yield tougher responses from hard-line
members, we could find advocating for our position and
achieving results more difficult and relations more
antagonistic with the ruling party.


12. (S/NF) The Ethiopian government has suggested convening
close bilateral discussions with the U.S. similar to those
handled with China, India, and Japan to help advance better
understanding. Such discussions would help underscore the
importance of our bilateral posture advocating for more
political debate over issues of concern. Further, bilateral
discussions will help U.S. relations with Ethiopia, as well
as guide U.S. interlocutors in navigating issues to focus on,
issues to avoid, approaches to delicate issues we expect to
disagree on, and common messages to advance as we explain our
position and the intricacies of U.S. decision making and also
ease their anxieties and misinterpretations. In this
context, the Ambassador and Embassy staff have made it a
priority to meet with and discuss issues with the Central
Committee members, who welcome the intervention. Further,
only the U.S. has taken this measure, which will ultimately
enhance our relations.
YAMAMOTO