DRL A/S KRAMER NOTES U.S. CONCERN ON CSO LAW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 002103 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/31/2018 TAGS: KDEM PGOV PREL ET SUBJECT: DRL A/S KRAMER NOTES U.S. CONCERN ON CSO LAW REF: ADDIS 1593 (AND PREVIOUS) Classified By: Ambassador Donald Yamamoto for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (SBU) DRL Assistant Secretary David Kramer highlighted significant U.S. concerns over the likely impact and potentially unintended consequences of Ethiopia's draft Civil Society Organizations (CSO) law in meetings with Prime Minister Meles, State Minister for Foreign Affairs Dr. Tekeda Alemu, donors, CSO representatives, and the press during his July 23-25 visit to Ethiopia. While donors and CSO representatives detailed their concerns about the impact of the draft law, Prime Minister Meles and his advisor Bereket Simon confirmed that the Ethiopian Government (GoE) is convinced about the fundamental issues captured in the draft law and that there is unlikely to be any drastic change in its view over time. A/S Kramer emphasized to all interlocutors the USG desire to establish the democracy and human rights pillar of U.S.-Ethiopia bilateral relations on firmer ground to ensure that it is not shorter than other pillars of the relationship. The British Ambassador noted that due to strong domestic opposition to the draft law within the U.K., Ethiopia's CSO law is "getting close to being a red line" for Her Majesty's Government. In light of the clear impact that sustained international pressure against the CSO law appears to have had, it is critical to sustain senior U.S.G. pressure, both in Addis Ababa and from Washington, to prevent the passage of a CSO law that would severely restrict civil society operations and U.S. assistance programs in Ethiopia. End Summary. DONORS AND CSO'S ON THE CSO LAW -------------- ¶2. (SBU) NGO representatives at a July 23 luncheon with Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Rights, and Labor David Kramer acknowledged that some amendments made to the second version of the draft law represent improvements -- particularly walking back slightly on some of the Civil Society Agency's (CSA) authorities, now allowing foreign-funded NGOs to work on community development, and requiring NGOs' re-registration every three years rather than annually. Still, by dramatically increasing criminal penalties for administrative errors and adding new prohibited sectors for foreign-funded NGOs' engagement (i.e. advancing the rights of children and the disabled, and promoting gender equity),in many ways the revised draft is much more draconian than the first draft. Participants at a luncheon argued that by establishing a false dichotomy among NGOs based on their engagement in "advocacy" efforts, the law indicates the GoE's intent to further close Ethiopia's political space. Although Prime Minister Meles told A/S Kramer that the CSA would not have authority to detain individuals, one U.S. NGO representative engaged in the donors' legal analysis of the draft law argued that this interpretation is incorrect. In fact, the CSA can explicitly appoint the police as its representatives who can, in turn, detain CSO officers. The representative further noted that the revised draft only permits "national" NGOs to appeal questions of law to the courts, leaving the CSA as the final appellate authority on questions of fact. A domestic human rights organization expressed concern that the CSA's authority to force the disclosure of NGO information could force human rights organizations to divulge what would normally be protected sources (often within the GoE) reporting abuses, which the GoE could then use to retaliate against such informants. Further the guaranteed CSA presence at NGO meetings risks silencing voices. ¶3. (SBU) In response to A/S Kramer's question whether the law was a response to any particular development, one participant argued that it is rather an element of the broader resurgence of the ruling party's Revolutionary Democracy ideology (see Addis 1154) being implemented to close political space sufficiently to prevent a repeat of the broad vocal discontent of 2005 as Ethiopia approaches the 2010 national elections. The British Ambassador echoed this arguing that the GoE remains fundamentally Marxist-Leninist and has introduced this draft bill and taken other actions since 2005 to maintain control domestically after the 2005 threat of ADDIS ABAB 00002103 002 OF 003 losing power. NGO RECOMMENDATIONS: KILL IT, OR DELAY IT -------------- ¶4. (C) NGO representatives argued that engaging the GoE on the details of the draft NGO law risks allowing the GoE to simply pick and choose which (cosmetic) changes to make, while defending final passage of the version of the law it wants with the argument that it had made compromises in response to stakeholder pressure. Instead, many NGOs strongly urged A/S Kramer and other assembled donor representatives to counter the draft law in its entirety, rather than seeking to improve it around the margins. NGO representatives recommended that donors first seek to kill the law, and if not, to delay it. The French Ambassador noted a degree of concerns about the draft law within the GoE as well, which may present an opportunity to exploit through sustained international pressure. (Note: On July 28, the British Ambassador reported that ruling party central committee member Teklewoine Assefa confided to him that morning that the international pressure against the law, if sustained, may prove successful in causing the GoE to delay introduction of the law to parliament by months, and possibly years. End Note). The British Ambassador also noted that due to strong domestic opposition to the draft law within the U.K., Ethiopia's CSO law is "getting close to being a red line" for Her Majesty's Government. MELES: GOE THINKING ON CSOS UNLIKELY TO CHANGE... -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) Prime Minister Meles confirmed to A/S Kramer that the GoE is convinced about the fundamental issues captured in the draft law and that there has not been, and will not likely be, any drastic change in its view over time. He suggested that the international community's issues with the draft CSO law stemmed partly from a misunderstanding of the draft CSO law and partly from a difference of opinion on the role of civil society. The draft law is not intended to stop NGO activity or block foreign funding from NGOs. Instead, Meles claimed that the intent was to divide NGOs between those engaged in political activities and those not. For those not engaged in political activities, Meles argued the purpose of the law was to provide transparency about funding and accountability about expenditures. Meles argued that non-political NGOs "should have celebrated the law, unless they have something to hide." Meles argued that political activity is a right reserved for citizens. While non-citizens may have the privilege of being involved on such issues, they do not have a right to be involved. Meles further argued that "Ethiopia's civil society must be revitalized from within, not as a consequence of its external ties. The GoE is not convinced that foreign-funded NGOs are the way forward for Ethiopia's civil society." ¶6. (C) To formalize this division of CSOs, Meles was emphatic that the GoE would stand by the threshold of 10% of funding from external sources as a defining characteristic by which to classify foreign from national NGOs. Meles stressed the view that "foreign governments should not be involved in political activities in Ethiopia except in support of GoE efforts, and upon explicit GoE requests to support implementation of our vision." Still, Meles noted that the draft law does allow the GoE to bring in the foreign expertise that it needs and which is consistent with its governance vision through foreign NGOs. Still, Meles argued the GoE's fundamental perspective that "Ethiopia's democratic progress will be weakened if dependent on foreign funding, and foreign funding should be limited to training and capacity building for an organic civil society process to succeed." Meles discounted A/S Kramer's concerns that the law would affect many U.S. programs in Ethiopia by arguing that there are many ways the U.S. can support GoE needs, but these must be by an invitation from, and in agreement with, the GoE. In response to A/S Kramer's concern that the new Civil Society Agency's reporting requirements would be onerous on NGOs, Meles assured that copies of existing NGO reports provided to their funding agencies would suffice to meet the stipulated reporting requirement and that the CSA would strive to minimize additional reporting requirements. Meles dismissed objections to the provision of the law that denies foreign-funded NGOs judicial appeal by arguing that ADDIS ABAB 00002103 003 OF 003 such organizations would only be operating in country by invitation from the GoE and, therefore the GoE could rescind the invitation at any time without requiring the intervention of the judiciary. (Note: While this argument is pertinent for foreign-funded NGOs focused on political activities through an agreement with the GoE, it ignores the denial of judicial appeal to the far broader grouping of foreign-funded NGOs engaged in non-prohibited development activities. End Note.) ...BECAUSE CSOS ARE UNDERMINING ETHIOPIA, BEREKET -------------- -------------- ¶7. (SBU) In a follow-on July 24 lunch with ruling Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) central committee member and advisor to the Prime Minister Bereket Simon, Bereket took an even tougher stance on the CSO law. Bereket acknowledged that the GoE and NGOs are at loggerheads, but "we didn't start the fight." Instead, Bereket explicitly asserted that NGOs are working closely with terrorists and undermining Ethiopia's constitution. He specifically cited NGOs' roles in the international media campaign to derail the CSO law, various recent human rights reports, and UNICEF's inflated figure of six million Ethiopian children at risk of malnutrition as examples of NGOs' efforts to undermine Ethiopia. To defend against these challenges, Bereket argued that the GoE has a country to build and holds the sovereign power to promulgate laws based on the "cold calculations of our interests." Highlighting the GoE's active stakeholder dialogue on the draft bill, Bereket lamented that "stakeholders were not sufficiently prepared." While confirming that the GoE has no intent to rush the law through without due consideration, he was adamant that the GoE would incorporate others' suggestions "only if convinced that specific existing provisions will negatively affect Ethiopia's democratization process." COMMENT -------------- ¶8. (C) A/S Kramer's engagements with GoE and CSO interlocutors were important in noting senior Washington concern about the pending draft CSO law. Meetings with GoE and EPRDF principals, however, were crucial in eliciting the fundamental belief among ruling party hard-liners such as Bereket, that CSOs are undermining Ethiopia by supporting terrorists and the Prime Minister's confirmation that the GoE's perspective on CSOs will not change. These two disclosures confirm NGO representatives' concerns that international advocacy for improvements to the law will result in only cosmetic improvements to a law closing political space for civil society. Still, one cannot rule out that Meles and Bereket, despite their rhetoric, might rethink their rigid position under continued pressure and expressions of concern. Post and A/S Kramer agree that international pressure to either "kill" or delay the bill would better serve U.S. interests and promote American democratic values in Ethiopia. Ambassador Yamamoto, along with his British and French counterparts, will meet with Prime Minister Meles on July 30 to press the GoE along these lines. The insider's confession from Teklewoine that the pressure is working, combined with the British Ambassador's confirmation of increasing opposition to the draft law by HMG, suggests that redoubled USG opposition to the law now, both from Post and Washington, is critical to protecting against a further closure of Ethiopia's political space and ensuring a continued avenue for USG support for Ethiopia's democratization. End Comment. ¶9. (SBU) DRL A/S Kramer edited and cleared this report. YAMAMOTO