A DIALOGUE ON ETHIOPIA'S DEMOCRATIZATION: DRL A/S

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ADDIS ABABA 002078

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/28/2018
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PREL ET
SUBJECT: A DIALOGUE ON ETHIOPIA'S DEMOCRATIZATION: DRL A/S
KRAMER MEETS PRIME MINISTER MELES

Classified By: Ambassador Donald Yamamoto for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
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1. (C) In a broad-ranging 90-minute conversation, DRL
Assistant Secretary David Kramer effectively noted senior
Washington concerns about recent developments in Ethiopia's
progress toward democratization with Prime Minister Meles
Zenawi on July 23. In response, the Prime Minister conveyed
the most comprehensive, succinct explanation of the Ethiopian
Government's (GoE) view of its own democratic track record
since the contentious 2005 national elections. While
commending the strong bilateral strategic partnership, A/S
Kramer's approach of "coming to hear the Ethiopian
perspective" set the stage for a candid non-adversarial
discussion while noting that the United States is watching
Ethiopian developments closely and concerned with recent
trends. Arguing that "democracy is necessary for Ethiopia's
continued existence," the Prime Minister painted a picture of
a committed government in a rough neighborhood struggling to
build democratic institutions in the face of affronts by a
political opposition bent on undermining the constitution to
seize power. From his side, Meles also expressed concern
about the "dysfunctional dialogue" with the U.S. and
international community that suggests a lack of international
confidence in Ethiopia's trajectory if left unattended by
international minding. In light of the clear unrelenting GoE
commitment to its current approach to domestic politics as
conveyed by the Prime Minister, it is now more critical than
ever to accept the Prime Minister's suggestion of an on-going
senior bilateral dialogue on democracy and human rights
issues if the USG is going to avert potentially destabilizing
internal developments in
Ethiopia as we approach the critical 2010 elections. Septels
will report on the Prime Minister and other interlocutors'
perceptions of the draft civil society organizations (CSO)
law and the press law. End Summary.

NOTING WASHINGTON'S CONCERNS
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2. (C) In the first intensive bilateral discussion focused
solely on Ethiopia's democratic process by a senior
Washington principal in over a year, DRL Assistant Secretary
Kramer highlighted the United States concern with the broadly
perceived backsliding by the GoE on democracy and human
rights since 2005. Kramer emphasized that in contrast to the
GoE's clear and steady positive progression of democratic
reform between 1991 and 2005, Ethiopia watchers in
Washington, both within and outside of the USG, are concerned
with the democratic trends that the GoE has taken since 2005,
which most perceive as in stark contrast to the earlier
progress. Kramer argued that regardless of the results of
the coming U.S. election, the USG's close attention to
democracy and human rights issues in Ethiopia will certainly
continue into the next Administration. Specifically, A/S
Kramer noted the widely-held perception of a narrowing of
Ethiopia's political space since 2005, particularly as
punctuated by a draft CSO law that restricts foreign-funded
CSOs from engaging in democracy and human rights related
issues, local elections in April in which all but three of
the 3.6 million contested seats went to the ruling and
affiliated parties, a quickly passed Press Law, and
widespread reports of rights abuses.

DEMOCRACY IS FUNDAMENTAL TO NATIONAL SURVIVAL...
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3. (C) Prime Minister Meles acknowledged that peace and
security is not, and should not be, the totality of
U.S.-Ethiopia bilateral relations and expressed his hope that
A/S Kramer's visit would be the start of an on-going
bilateral discussion on democracy and human rights issues.
Meles argued that the GoE is convinced of the values Ethiopia
shares with the U.S., but noted that Ethiopia will develop
those values in its own way. Meles emphasized that the
ruling Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front
(EPRDF) holds democracy as a core belief because
democratizing Ethiopia is not a matter of choice, but is an
existential issue fundamental to national survival. Meles
pointed to the Ethiopian constitution as the prime example of
the GoE's commitment to democracy, arguing that the GoE has

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had to struggle to uphold the constitution against opponents
seeking to undermine it. Meles also highlighted the lack of
a precedent in Ethiopia for the public to acknowledge or
accept a constitution. To mitigate against these challenges
of history and anti-democratic sectors of society, the EPRDF
has focused on democratizing society by developing a national
consensus to bring Ethiopians to see the virtue of a
constitutional order "even if it means preparing for a civil
war, through a peaceful process, to convince the public." At
the same time, the EPRDF is "providing adequate political
space to those who pursue their efforts through
constitutional means." In addition to developing a national
consensus about democracy, Meles argued that the GoE is
focused on building lasting democratic institutions such as
the police, army, and judiciary.

...BUT THE OPPOSITION IS UNDERMINING THE CONSTITUTION
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4. (C) Despite the GoE providing adequate political space,
Meles argued, many 2005-era opposition leaders were former
Derg officials opposed to the constitution and seeking to
change the constitution through extra-constitutional means.
While the EPRDF has had successes and challenges since coming
to power, Meles accused the opposition of fueling popular
resentment of the ruling party for its failings and prompting
the public to take to the streets. By capitalizing on these
resentments, formerly-Derg opposition leaders sought to spur
street protest momentum to dismantle the constitutional
system. When the opposition rejected constitutional means of
election result redress, the GoE established an alternative
election complaints review process. That process, Meles
claimed, reached outcomes inconsistent with the opposition's
claims.


5. (C) After the 2005 elections, Meles argued that the ruling
and opposition parties tried to establish a process of
inter-party dialogue to address issues raised by the
opposition -- parliamentary procedure, the media, the
National Electoral Board (NEB),etc. -- through peaceful,
legal means. When the opposition rejected this effort in
favor of civil disobedience, the EPRDF drew the line.
Because the opposition's civil disobedience resulted in
scores of deaths, the GoE took the opposition leaders to
court. Only when they expressed regret for their actions and
pledged to uphold the constitution did the GoE grant them
pardons. Despite the opposition abandoning the process of
dialogue, Meles argued, the EPRDF still pursued the issues
they raised to make national institutions stronger. As a
result, Meles acclaimed Ethiopia's parliamentary procedures
as among the best in the world granting the opposition more
than adequate space in Parliament, including positions
influencing the parliamentary agenda. The GoE similarly
reviewed best practices from around the world to revise the
National Electoral Board, electoral law, and Media Law.
"Some opposition accepted provisions, while others rejected
them," Meles claimed. (Note: After the EPRDF rejected
virtually every major best practice recommended by the main
opposition parties, the UEDF, OFDM, and then CUD under
Temesgen Zewdie walked out of the interparty dialogue
process. The EPRDF passed the electoral law with support
from UEDP-Medhin and Ayele Chamisso in June 2007 claiming to
have the backing of the opposition. End Note).

THE EPRDF: OF, FOR, AND BY THE PEOPLE
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6. (C) Meles highlighted this engagement with the opposition
parties and consideration of international best practices as
evidence that Ethiopia's political space is actually wider
than ever, not narrowed since 2005. In addition to building
strong institutions, Meles argued that the EPRDF has
redoubled efforts to reach out to the grassroots while
opposition parties have fractured from infighting and the
popular recognition that their protest votes were misplaced.
Additionally, responsible opposition parties have recognized
that they must play by the rules and have therefore split
from the extremist opposition groups. As a result, the "2005
protest vote is gone and is unlikely to return." Meles
claimed that the GoE wants a vibrant opposition because
fighting in parliament is better than fighting in the
mountains. While the EPRDF wants opposition engagement and
dialogue, "because the EPRDF occupies the middle ground in

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Ethiopia, there is only a narrow agenda left for the
opposition to claim."

EXPLAINING THE LOCAL ELECTIONS
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7. (C) A/S Kramer drew specific attention to the April 2008
local election results, in which opposition candidates won
only three of 3.6 million contested seats, as another example
that shapes perceptions about Ethiopia's democracy. Meles
explained that despite having adequate space to compete, the
opposition did not compete well. He further argued that the
democratic process should be defined by the quality of the
process, not the results. Meles offered that the 3.6 million
to three outcome is not a surprise when three particular
dynamics are considered. First, while 85% of the seats were
rural and the elections required 300 candidates for each of
the 15,000 rural "kebele" councils, opposition parties were
unable to field adequate candidates as no opposition party
has more than a few thousand members. The Prime Minister
suggested that this dynamic accounted for roughly 50% of the
local election results. Second, since 2005 the EPRDF has
struggled to correct the rural public's misconceptions of the
EPRDF's efforts. By resolidifying this rural, core
constituency, Meles suggested, the EPRDF secured an
additional roughly 30% of the results. Finally, Meles
feigned surprise that the EPRDF secured the urban vote,
arguing that it was only in the past year, after securing its
core rural constituency, that the EPRDF began addressing the
urban misconceptions of the EPRDF's record. The Prime
Minister explained the EPRDF's urban win as stemming from 1)
an urban realization that as long as the EPRDF wins the rural
vote, they will stay, so an opposition vote is useless, 2)
the growing economy has shown that "we are not country
bumpkins" earning the EPRDF further goodwill, and 3) the
urban dwellers saw the unconstitutional opposition's true
intent when they didn't take control over the Addis Ababa
municipality after the 2005 elections. Meles concluded that
the 2008 local election process "was clean" but half confided
that he himself questions whether the urban outcome is
sustainable into another election.

THE GOE TOO IS CONCERNED
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8. (C) Near the end of the discussion, the Prime Minister
shifted the dialogue noting that he too is concerned about
"dysfunctional" aspects of the bilateral dialogue. Meles
specific raised concerns of misinformation about the country
in the international community. "Ethiopia is more than aware
about international processes than it is given credit for,"
Meles argued. "I know how the human rights game is played,"
he stated arguing that often a large volume of allegations
about concerning developments "trumps" confirmation of those
allegations. Meles emphasized that he hopes USG statements
about human rights are based on facts and that the USG gets
the facts right and verifies them. Meles further lamented
that the USG often raises human rights concerns in the annual
human rights report without ever raising them directly with
the GoE before publication or subsequently.


9. (C) Meles further noted the GoE sentiment that the
international community has no confidence in Ethiopia's
democratic trajectory unless the international community is
constantly minding it. This starting assumption of a
narrowing of democratic space and of human rights abuses
"poisons the well." Instead, it would be proper for Ethiopia
to be granted the benefit of the doubt, which Meles argued,
would remove a large portion of the dysfunctionality from the
bilateral dialogue. Kramer pushed back, noting that both the
Embassy and the Department work strenuously to verify any
concerns in our reporting. He also noted that perceptions of
the situation in Ethiopia have a way of taking a certain
reality, a point Meles acknowledged and agreed was a
challenge his government needed to face. Kramer welcomed the
opportunity to make the dialogue on these issues as effective
and candid as possible.

COMMENT
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10. (C) Although a highly stylized version of recent events
that runs in stark contrast with the prevailing analysis in

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Addis Ababa's diplomatic community, Prime Minister Meles's
comments offered an intensive and expansive insight into the
GoE and EPRDF's perception of political developments since

2005. His narrative unveils an unrelenting commitment at the
senior levels of the GoE to Ethiopia's current democratic
trajectory devoid of any suggestion of a reversal or
alteration of course. Post, and the broader Addis Ababa
diplomatic community, is growing increasingly convinced that
the unmitigated pursuit of the GoE and EPRDF's existing
democratic trajectory and tactics will risk thrusting the
country into political violence as national elections
approach in 2010. As such, it is now more critical than ever
to accept the Prime Minister's suggestion of an on-going
senior bilateral dialogue on democracy and human rights
issues if the USG is going to avert potentially destabilizing
internal developments in Ethiopia as we approach these
critical elections. End Comment.


11. (U) A/S Kramer has edited and cleared this report.
YAMAMOTO