MANPADS STRATEGY: COMMENTS FROM ETHIOPIA

S E C R E T ADDIS ABABA 000018 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS PM/WRA FOR STEPHANIE PICO AND SHO MORIMOTO E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/03/2018 TAGS: MARR MASS PARM XW WET SUBJECT: MANPADS STRATEGY: COMMENTS FROM ETHIOPIA REF: STATE 156001 Classified By: Ambassador Donald Yamamoto for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S/NF) Summary: Embassy Addis Ababa supports pursuit of the proposed Horn of Africa MANPADS strategy (reftel). While counter-proliferation and acquisition-related strategy elements would likely be well received in Ethiopia, and will complement on-going arrangements, elements of the stockpile security and destruction component must be handled carefully to achieve U.S. objectives without offending Ethiopian sensibilities. End Summary. FEEDBACK ON THE PROPOSED STRATEGY -------------- ¶2. (S/NF) Counter-Proliferation: Ethiopia is a very proud country. While it is generally willing to engage in partnership and receive assistance, such assistance must be framed in a way that is not perceived to be invasive or critical. Embassy Addis supports approaching MANPADS supplier countries to encourage them to vet sales to the Horn of African (HoA) region, but emphasizes that if such approaches are perceived to suggest a concern against the legitimate procurement of MANPADS by the Ethiopian military, they could jeopardize the broader bilateral military relationship. ¶3. (S/NF) Stockpile Security and Destruction: Post's interagency review team assesses that it is highly unlikely that the Ethiopian military would provide significant information about its own MANPADS stock or permit the United States to assess either that stock or security mechanisms in place to safeguard it. Instead, Post believes that, if it even acknowledges the existence of a military MANPADS stock, the Ethiopian military is most likely to either confirm to the USG that it is already adequately secured or to ask the USG to provide funding for stockpile security improvements which it itself would implement. While stockpile security is a major element of the proposed strategy, Post believes that the most effective way to approach the issue with the Ethiopian military is to offer a training course for Ethiopian officials on best practices in securing MANPADS stocks, as well as technical assistance for implementation if the Ethiopian military is receptive. The USG may learn otherwise unavailable details of the extent of the Ethiopian military's MANPADS stock through discussions on the margins of such a training. In light of the expected lack of Ethiopian disclosure of details about its MANPADS stock, securing Ethiopian military buy-in for collaborative or USG-assisted destruction of its surplus military stock may be difficult. Post advises an approach to the Ethiopian military that unilaterally highlights safety threats from old technology MANPADS believed to be in their stock (i.e. such as the risk of batteries overheating causing pre-launch explosions in SA-18s or SA-7s) and only then offering assistance with the destruction of old or unstable military stocks. Post believes that the Ethiopian Government would be receptive to assistance with legislation regarding MANPADS as well as to improved border security to detect and impede the cross-border transportation of MANPADS. ¶4. (S/NF) Acquisition: Post is already implementing an arrangement with the Ethiopian National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) through which we purchase MANPADS seized by Ethiopian government entities. To date this program has not been as productive as we would have liked, probably due to unclear chains of command and coordination among Ethiopian entities. While Post assesses that an acquisition component in the MANPADS strategy would be productive, Post's interagency team notes that even if the military is not forthcoming on details of its own stockpile, the Ethiopian military may take advantage of such an arrangement to pass off to the U.S. old SA-7s from its own stock in exchange for cash. If early discussions with Ethiopian military officials unveil a willingness to disclose to the USG details of its own MANPADS stock, those discussions may facilitate incorporating the Ethiopian military into the acquisition arrangement. If not, the acquisition arrangement may either 1) remain limited to the NISS, or 2) to the extend that the Ethiopian military is incorporated, may be limited to SA-18s or other items not believed to be in the Ethiopian military's stock. RESPONSES TO SPECIFIC QUESTIONS -------------- ¶5. (S/NF) Feasibility: Post assesses that the proposed strategy is generally feasible within the context of the challenges and information provided above. Ethiopian Counterparts: Post believes that the NISS would be the primary Ethiopian Government counterpart for implementation of this strategy. The Ministry of National Defense (MoND) would be the appropriate counterpart for the stockpile management courses or destruction collaboration, and possibly also for part of the acquisition component. The Foreign Ministry would be the appropriate conduit for initial discussions and arrangements for any formal agreements. While the Federal Police would not likely play a significant role in this strategy, they should be advised at least of the existence of the acquisition program. Timing: Post does not see any specific timing preferences for initiating discussions or the plan of action for this strategy. YAMAMOTO