ETHIOPIA/ERITREA: UNMEE SRSG ENNIFAR REPORTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ADDIS ABABA 000117 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF AND AF/E , AND INR/AA LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER CJTF-HOA AND USCENTCOM FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/14/2018 TAGS: PREL PBTS MOPS KPKO ET ER SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA/ERITREA: UNMEE SRSG ENNIFAR REPORTS BORDER TENSE, UNMEE'S FUEL SITUATION CRITICAL Classified By: Amb. Donald Yamamoto for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). ¶1. (C/NF) SUMMARY. On January 12, Ambassador and PolOff attended a "Friends of UNMEE" meeting at United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) headquarters where acting Special Representative of the Secretary General Azouz Ennifar briefed the diplomatic community on the current state of play regarding UNMEE and the Ethiopian-Eritrean border. Separately on January 15, Ambassador and Embassy officers met with Ennifar again and Margaret Carey from UN DPKO. Ennifar began by reporting that continued Eritrean restrictions on UNMEE operations were greatly impeding the mission's ability to monitor the Temporary Security Zone (TSZ). Ennifar noted that both armies were engaged in large-scale live-fire training exercises and he emphasized the volatility of the situation and that "anything could happen at any time." He reported that the cause of the December 26 border clash was unclear, but that UNMEE determined that the engagement took place inside Ethiopian territory. On the political front, Ethiopia continues to insist that the November 30, 2007 Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC) decision to demarcate by geographic coordinates is illegal. Asmara, on the other hand, supports the "virtual demarcation" and now asserts that the Algiers Agreement has been fully implemented, all that remains is for Ethiopia to withdraw its forces from the disputed territory. Ennifar was unclear as to how Asmara now viewed the continued presence of UNMEE in Eritrea and their position toward the TSZ. Lastly, Ennifar revealed that UNMEE/Eritrea would have to suspend operations by the end of January, and possibly drawdown in Eritrea, because Asmara continues to deny UNMEE fuel since December 1, ¶2007. END SUMMARY. -------------- -------------- ERITREAN RESTRICTIONS SEVERELY LIMITING MONITORING OF TSZ -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C/NF) Ennifar opened by reporting that continued Eritrean restrictions on UNMEE were making it difficult for the military observers to effectively monitor the TSZ. Ennifar said that Eritrea had imposed 45 permanent movement restrictions on UNMEE patrols in addition to daily restrictions that appeared with no warning. He charged that Eritrea was using these restrictions, as well as the building of new roads in UNMEE blindspots, to mask the movement of troops inside the TSZ. He said the problem was the worst in the area between Sector West and Sector Center outside of the major roads where UNMEE has no visibility whatsoever. Ennifar estimated that Eritrea has at least six to seven infantry divisions inside the TSZ that UNMEE could see; one division north of Humera, four to five divisions in Sector Center, and one division south of Assab (Note: Under the terms of the 2000 Cease-fire Agreement, Eritrea is allowed to deploy only lightly armed militia inside the TSZ. Ennifar's estimate did not include Eritrean forces that are almost certainly inside the TSZ north and west of Badme in Sector West). Ennifar added that Ethiopia was much more cooperative, but that Ethiopian forces restricted UNMEE movement on an occasional basis. On January 15, Ennifar said UNMEE had access to only five percent of 75 percent of the TSZ. SIPDIS -------------- BORDER "TENSE AND VOLATILE" -------------- ¶3. (C/NF) Ennifar noted that both armies are extremely active conducting large-scale live-fire training exercises and he underscored that UNMEE could not predict what could happen at anytime, referencing the December 26 border skirmish, and was concerned that a small border skirmish could escalate without warning. Ennifar said that both armies had approximately 150,000 troops near the border and that the overall situation was "tense and volatile." He said that Eritrea had 25 divisions and Ethiopia had 20 divisions all within 50-60 kilometers of the border. Ennifar estimated an Eritrean division contains five to six thousand troops while an Ethiopian division contains seven to eight thousand ADDIS ABAB 00000117 002 OF 004 troops. In some cases, the troops were deployed within site of each other. ¶4. (C/NF) Ennifar highlighted that both militaries were currently in defensive positions, but that either could transition to an offensive posture in as little as one or two days. He said the bulk of Ethiopia's forces were deployed slightly back from the front lines and capable of moving forward quickly. Ennifar estimated that Ethiopia had the logistic capacity to sustain military action and that the Ethiopian military was qualitatively superior to Eritrea's forces, but that the Eritrean terrain allowed for a strong Eritrean defensive capability. He added that Eritrea could sustain a guerrilla campaign for an extended period of time. -------------- CAUSE OF DECEMBER 26 BORDER SKIRMISH UNCLEAR -------------- ¶5. (C/NF) Ennifar explained that UNMEE could not determine what started the clash between Ethiopian and Eritrean forces near Tsorena on December 26. He said that the battle lasted approximately 30-40 minutes and occurred inside Ethiopian territory where UNMEE military observers (milobs) saw scorchmarks and a large amount of blood on the ground. UNMEE milobs were close enough during the engagement to see and hear the explosions. Ennifar noted that Ethiopia continues to officially deny that the battle took place. He said UNMEE did not know the full number of casualties, but that Eritrea had allowed UNMEE to interview two soldiers who Asmara claimed were Ethiopian POWs captured during the fight. (Note: An UNMEE milob reported to PolOff on January 2 that UNMEE believes this engagement was the largest to occur between the two adversaries since 2000 in terms of number of combatants--several hundred on each side--and volume of fire. UNMEE says in addition to small arms, the combatants employed heavy machine guns, RPGs, and mortars.) -------------- -------------- ASMARA SUPPORTS EEBC DEMARCATION BY COORDINATES DECISION... -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C/NF) On the political front, Ennifar said Eritrean President Isaias fully supports the demarcation by geographic coordinates finalized on November 30, 2007 by the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC) and now considers the Algiers Agreement fulfilled and all that remains is to liberate the territory under "Ethiopian occupation." Ennifar, referencing a January 5 media interview of Eritrean President Isaias, said Isaias considers the "virtual demarcation" to be better than demarcation on the ground as it renders the decision "indisputable." Ennifar added that Eritrea continues to oppose anything that might be considered a new mechanism, including recent overtures by United Nations U/SYG Lynn Pascoe, and Isaias insists there is no basis for discussion until Ethiopia complies with the border decision. (Note: More information on the Isaias interview can be found at www.shabait.com, an Eritrean government website.) -------------- ...BUT VIEW OF UNMEE AND TSZ UNCLEAR -------------- ¶7. (C/NF) Ennifar cautioned, however, that since Asmara now considers the Algiers Agreement fulfilled it is unclear how Isaias views the continued presence of UNMEE and the existence of the TSZ. Ennifar said that in one instance an Eritrean official had asked whether UNMEE had a mandate to continue as is since the Algiers Agreement had been fulfilled. He suggested that Asmara might now view UNMEE's only job as removing Ethiopian troops from the territory awarded to Eritrea. Ennifar added that Eritrea was now demanding that UNMEE produce inventory lists of every asset brought into Eritrea since UNMEE was stood up in 2000. On January 15, Ennifar went further speculating that when UNMEE departs Eritrea, Isaias would confiscate all of UNMEE's assets. ADDIS ABAB 00000117 003 OF 004 ¶8. (C/NF) Ennifar predicted that Eritrea would look for any legal means to get the territory returned from Ethiopia including calling on the UN Security Council to enforce the EEBC decision. He said Asmara would justify its call using the "virtual demarcation" to declare that Ethiopia is illegally occupying Eritrean soil. -------------- -------------- ADDIS ABABA SAYS DEMARCATION BY COORDINATES ILLEGAL -------------- -------------- ¶9. (C/NF) Regarding Ethiopia, Ennifar said that Addis Ababa continues to consider the EEBC demarcation by coordinates decision illegal. He said Ethiopia still considers UNMEE useful, but that it is not fulfilling its responsibility in maintaining the demilitarization of the TSZ. Ethiopia maintains that the TSZ ceased to exist in September 2006 when Eritrea first moved in tanks and artillery. -------------- -------------- UNMEE/ERITREA RUNNING OUT OF FUEL, SITUATION CRITICAL -------------- -------------- ¶10. (C/NF) Lastly, Ennifar revealed that UNMEE's continued ability to operate in Eritrea beyond January is jeopardized by Asmara's refusal to sell UNMEE diesel fuel. He said that Asmara had refused to sell fuel to UNMEE since December 1, 2007 and refused to allow UNMEE to import fuel on its own. Ennifar reported that UNMEE/Eritrea, "would have no choice but to retreat," if the fuel situation is not fixed. He added that the retreat decision would have to come from the UN Security Council, but that by January 25 the mission will be paralyzed from lack of fuel. He said that UNMEE had already begun reducing the number of daily patrols and implementing other fuel saving measures to extend their operations. Ennifar stressed that if they did not receive fuel by the end of January, UNMEE would have to use its strategic reserves which can only be used for evacuation of the force. ¶11. (C/NF) Ennifar did not know Eritrea's motivation in denying UNMEE fuel, but speculated that Asmara could be hoarding fuel for possible military action. He acknowledged that Eritrea was undergoing a nationwide fuel shortage, but said that did not explain why Asmara would deny UNMEE from importing its own fuel. ¶12. (C/NF) On January 15, Ennifar added UNMEE would not withdraw from Eritrea unless directed to do so by the Security Council, but that by January 25 UNMEE would have to start closing border posts. He said UNMEE would not leave its personnel in the field without fuel to run their vehicles and generators essential for electricity and refrigeration of food and medical supplies. Carey emphasized that UNMEE would have no choice but to leave Eritrea if UNMEE did not gain access to fuel soon. Ennifar also said that A/SYG Edmond Mulet and A/SYG Jane Lute had both attempted to talk to the Eritrean government about this issue, but that their requests were being ignored by Eritrean officials. ¶13. (C/NF) When asked what UNMEE would do if no solution was found, Ennifar responded that he would start moving personnel across the border into Ethiopia leaving their equipment behind. He said it was easier to move people into Ethiopia than to bring them back to Asmara (Note: Of the five border crossing points, Humera Bridge is closed to UNMEE, but Deda Lala, Mereb Bridge, Zela Ambessa, and Bure crossings are still open to UNMEE personnel, but not transport of fuel). He also said that UNMEE could import fuel from the UN mission in Sudan within 48 hours if given permission by Eritrea. Ennifar then commented that even without the fuel problem, he did not anticipate UNMEE would be in Eritrea in six months as the growing restrictions on UNMEE by Asmara might force them to have to withdraw if Asmara did not eject the force directly. Ennifar predicted that if UNMEE withdrew, the Ethiopian military would move, "everything it had" forward to the border. ADDIS ABAB 00000117 004 OF 004 ¶14. (C/NF) Ennifar went on to speculate that Isaias was using the fuel issue to gain attention from the Security Council leading up to the mandate renewal at the end of January, although he said Asmara had told the UNMEE force commander that the denial of fuel to UNMEE was not a political decision. He said Isaias was waiting to see what the Security Council would do and he expected Isaias would be greatly displeased if the UN renewed the mission's mandate as is for another six months. He expected a strong reaction from Isaias when that happened, but he could not predict what that reaction might be. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶15. (C/NF) While Asmara's future intentions may remain unclear and the near term prospect for a political solution remains highly unlikely, Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles continues to assure us that Ethiopia has no intention of initiating conflict against Eritrea. Meles has repeatedly asserted that if Asmara attacks with the intention of capturing the disputed territory, Ethiopia will respond with overwhelming force. Post anticipates that the border will remain tense for the foreseeable future and additional skirmishes are possible, but Ethiopia for now appears to be capable of keeping any skirmishes from escalating out of control suggesting a move to conflict would have to be a political decision by one of the parties rather than the result of an accidental firefight. Post continues to assess that UNMEE's presence along the border remains useful for its early warning role. However, Asmara's denial of fuel to UNMEE and UNMEE's possible withdraw from the TSZ as a result will only increase the volatility of the military stand-off. END COMMENT. YAMAMOTO