ETHIOPIA/ERITREA: UNMEE SRSG ENNIFAR REPORTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ADDIS ABABA 000117

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF AND AF/E , AND INR/AA
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER
CJTF-HOA AND USCENTCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/14/2018
TAGS: PREL PBTS MOPS KPKO ET ER
SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA/ERITREA: UNMEE SRSG ENNIFAR REPORTS
BORDER TENSE, UNMEE'S FUEL SITUATION CRITICAL


Classified By: Amb. Donald Yamamoto for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).


1. (C/NF) SUMMARY. On January 12, Ambassador and PolOff
attended a "Friends of UNMEE" meeting at United Nations
Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) headquarters where
acting Special Representative of the Secretary General Azouz
Ennifar briefed the diplomatic community on the current state
of play regarding UNMEE and the Ethiopian-Eritrean border.
Separately on January 15, Ambassador and Embassy officers met
with Ennifar again and Margaret Carey from UN DPKO. Ennifar
began by reporting that continued Eritrean restrictions on
UNMEE operations were greatly impeding the mission's ability
to monitor the Temporary Security Zone (TSZ). Ennifar noted
that both armies were engaged in large-scale live-fire
training exercises and he emphasized the volatility of the
situation and that "anything could happen at any time." He
reported that the cause of the December 26 border clash was
unclear, but that UNMEE determined that the engagement took
place inside Ethiopian territory. On the political front,
Ethiopia continues to insist that the November 30, 2007
Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC) decision to
demarcate by geographic coordinates is illegal. Asmara, on
the other hand, supports the "virtual demarcation" and now
asserts that the Algiers Agreement has been fully
implemented, all that remains is for Ethiopia to withdraw its
forces from the disputed territory. Ennifar was unclear as
to how Asmara now viewed the continued presence of UNMEE in
Eritrea and their position toward the TSZ. Lastly, Ennifar
revealed that UNMEE/Eritrea would have to suspend operations
by the end of January, and possibly drawdown in Eritrea,
because Asmara continues to deny UNMEE fuel since December 1,

2007. END SUMMARY.

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ERITREAN RESTRICTIONS SEVERELY LIMITING MONITORING OF TSZ
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2. (C/NF) Ennifar opened by reporting that continued
Eritrean restrictions on UNMEE were making it difficult for
the military observers to effectively monitor the TSZ.
Ennifar said that Eritrea had imposed 45 permanent movement
restrictions on UNMEE patrols in addition to daily
restrictions that appeared with no warning. He charged that
Eritrea was using these restrictions, as well as the building
of new roads in UNMEE blindspots, to mask the movement of
troops inside the TSZ. He said the problem was the worst in
the area between Sector West and Sector Center outside of the
major roads where UNMEE has no visibility whatsoever.
Ennifar estimated that Eritrea has at least six to seven
infantry divisions inside the TSZ that UNMEE could see; one
division north of Humera, four to five divisions in Sector
Center, and one division south of Assab (Note: Under the
terms of the 2000 Cease-fire Agreement, Eritrea is allowed to
deploy only lightly armed militia inside the TSZ. Ennifar's
estimate did not include Eritrean forces that are almost
certainly inside the TSZ north and west of Badme in Sector
West). Ennifar added that Ethiopia was much more
cooperative, but that Ethiopian forces restricted UNMEE
movement on an occasional basis. On January 15, Ennifar said
UNMEE had access to only five percent of 75 percent of the
TSZ.

SIPDIS

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BORDER "TENSE AND VOLATILE"
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3. (C/NF) Ennifar noted that both armies are extremely
active conducting large-scale live-fire training exercises
and he underscored that UNMEE could not predict what could
happen at anytime, referencing the December 26 border
skirmish, and was concerned that a small border skirmish
could escalate without warning. Ennifar said that both
armies had approximately 150,000 troops near the border and
that the overall situation was "tense and volatile." He said
that Eritrea had 25 divisions and Ethiopia had 20 divisions
all within 50-60 kilometers of the border. Ennifar estimated
an Eritrean division contains five to six thousand troops
while an Ethiopian division contains seven to eight thousand

ADDIS ABAB 00000117 002 OF 004


troops. In some cases, the troops were deployed within site
of each other.


4. (C/NF) Ennifar highlighted that both militaries were
currently in defensive positions, but that either could
transition to an offensive posture in as little as one or two
days. He said the bulk of Ethiopia's forces were deployed
slightly back from the front lines and capable of moving
forward quickly. Ennifar estimated that Ethiopia had the
logistic capacity to sustain military action and that the
Ethiopian military was qualitatively superior to Eritrea's
forces, but that the Eritrean terrain allowed for a strong
Eritrean defensive capability. He added that Eritrea could
sustain a guerrilla campaign for an extended period of time.

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CAUSE OF DECEMBER 26 BORDER SKIRMISH UNCLEAR
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5. (C/NF) Ennifar explained that UNMEE could not determine
what started the clash between Ethiopian and Eritrean forces
near Tsorena on December 26. He said that the battle lasted
approximately 30-40 minutes and occurred inside Ethiopian
territory where UNMEE military observers (milobs) saw
scorchmarks and a large amount of blood on the ground. UNMEE
milobs were close enough during the engagement to see and
hear the explosions. Ennifar noted that Ethiopia continues
to officially deny that the battle took place. He said UNMEE
did not know the full number of casualties, but that Eritrea
had allowed UNMEE to interview two soldiers who Asmara
claimed were Ethiopian POWs captured during the fight.
(Note: An UNMEE milob reported to PolOff on January 2 that
UNMEE believes this engagement was the largest to occur
between the two adversaries since 2000 in terms of number of
combatants--several hundred on each side--and volume of fire.
UNMEE says in addition to small arms, the combatants
employed heavy machine guns, RPGs, and mortars.)

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ASMARA SUPPORTS EEBC DEMARCATION BY COORDINATES DECISION...
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6. (C/NF) On the political front, Ennifar said Eritrean
President Isaias fully supports the demarcation by geographic
coordinates finalized on November 30, 2007 by the
Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC) and now considers
the Algiers Agreement fulfilled and all that remains is to
liberate the territory under "Ethiopian occupation."
Ennifar, referencing a January 5 media interview of Eritrean
President Isaias, said Isaias considers the "virtual
demarcation" to be better than demarcation on the ground as
it renders the decision "indisputable." Ennifar added that
Eritrea continues to oppose anything that might be considered
a new mechanism, including recent overtures by United Nations
U/SYG Lynn Pascoe, and Isaias insists there is no basis for
discussion until Ethiopia complies with the border decision.
(Note: More information on the Isaias interview can be found
at www.shabait.com, an Eritrean government website.)

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...BUT VIEW OF UNMEE AND TSZ UNCLEAR
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7. (C/NF) Ennifar cautioned, however, that since Asmara now
considers the Algiers Agreement fulfilled it is unclear how
Isaias views the continued presence of UNMEE and the
existence of the TSZ. Ennifar said that in one instance an
Eritrean official had asked whether UNMEE had a mandate to
continue as is since the Algiers Agreement had been
fulfilled. He suggested that Asmara might now view UNMEE's
only job as removing Ethiopian troops from the territory
awarded to Eritrea. Ennifar added that Eritrea was now
demanding that UNMEE produce inventory lists of every asset
brought into Eritrea since UNMEE was stood up in 2000. On
January 15, Ennifar went further speculating that when UNMEE
departs Eritrea, Isaias would confiscate all of UNMEE's
assets.


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8. (C/NF) Ennifar predicted that Eritrea would look for any
legal means to get the territory returned from Ethiopia
including calling on the UN Security Council to enforce the
EEBC decision. He said Asmara would justify its call using
the "virtual demarcation" to declare that Ethiopia is
illegally occupying Eritrean soil.

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ADDIS ABABA SAYS DEMARCATION BY COORDINATES ILLEGAL
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9. (C/NF) Regarding Ethiopia, Ennifar said that Addis Ababa
continues to consider the EEBC demarcation by coordinates
decision illegal. He said Ethiopia still considers UNMEE
useful, but that it is not fulfilling its responsibility in
maintaining the demilitarization of the TSZ. Ethiopia
maintains that the TSZ ceased to exist in September 2006 when
Eritrea first moved in tanks and artillery.

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UNMEE/ERITREA RUNNING OUT OF FUEL, SITUATION CRITICAL
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10. (C/NF) Lastly, Ennifar revealed that UNMEE's continued
ability to operate in Eritrea beyond January is jeopardized
by Asmara's refusal to sell UNMEE diesel fuel. He said that
Asmara had refused to sell fuel to UNMEE since December 1,
2007 and refused to allow UNMEE to import fuel on its own.
Ennifar reported that UNMEE/Eritrea, "would have no choice
but to retreat," if the fuel situation is not fixed. He
added that the retreat decision would have to come from the
UN Security Council, but that by January 25 the mission will
be paralyzed from lack of fuel. He said that UNMEE had
already begun reducing the number of daily patrols and
implementing other fuel saving measures to extend their
operations. Ennifar stressed that if they did not receive
fuel by the end of January, UNMEE would have to use its
strategic reserves which can only be used for evacuation of
the force.


11. (C/NF) Ennifar did not know Eritrea's motivation in
denying UNMEE fuel, but speculated that Asmara could be
hoarding fuel for possible military action. He acknowledged
that Eritrea was undergoing a nationwide fuel shortage, but
said that did not explain why Asmara would deny UNMEE from
importing its own fuel.


12. (C/NF) On January 15, Ennifar added UNMEE would not
withdraw from Eritrea unless directed to do so by the
Security Council, but that by January 25 UNMEE would have to
start closing border posts. He said UNMEE would not leave
its personnel in the field without fuel to run their vehicles
and generators essential for electricity and refrigeration of
food and medical supplies. Carey emphasized that UNMEE would
have no choice but to leave Eritrea if UNMEE did not gain
access to fuel soon. Ennifar also said that A/SYG Edmond
Mulet and A/SYG Jane Lute had both attempted to talk to the
Eritrean government about this issue, but that their requests
were being ignored by Eritrean officials.


13. (C/NF) When asked what UNMEE would do if no solution
was found, Ennifar responded that he would start moving
personnel across the border into Ethiopia leaving their
equipment behind. He said it was easier to move people into
Ethiopia than to bring them back to Asmara (Note: Of the five
border crossing points, Humera Bridge is closed to UNMEE, but
Deda Lala, Mereb Bridge, Zela Ambessa, and Bure crossings are
still open to UNMEE personnel, but not transport of fuel).
He also said that UNMEE could import fuel from the UN mission
in Sudan within 48 hours if given permission by Eritrea.
Ennifar then commented that even without the fuel problem, he
did not anticipate UNMEE would be in Eritrea in six months as
the growing restrictions on UNMEE by Asmara might force them
to have to withdraw if Asmara did not eject the force
directly. Ennifar predicted that if UNMEE withdrew, the
Ethiopian military would move, "everything it had" forward to
the border.


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14. (C/NF) Ennifar went on to speculate that Isaias was
using the fuel issue to gain attention from the Security
Council leading up to the mandate renewal at the end of
January, although he said Asmara had told the UNMEE force
commander that the denial of fuel to UNMEE was not a
political decision. He said Isaias was waiting to see what
the Security Council would do and he expected Isaias would be
greatly displeased if the UN renewed the mission's mandate as
is for another six months. He expected a strong reaction
from Isaias when that happened, but he could not predict what
that reaction might be.

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COMMENT
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15. (C/NF) While Asmara's future intentions may remain
unclear and the near term prospect for a political solution
remains highly unlikely, Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles
continues to assure us that Ethiopia has no intention of
initiating conflict against Eritrea. Meles has repeatedly
asserted that if Asmara attacks with the intention of
capturing the disputed territory, Ethiopia will respond with
overwhelming force. Post anticipates that the border will
remain tense for the foreseeable future and additional
skirmishes are possible, but Ethiopia for now appears to be
capable of keeping any skirmishes from escalating out of
control suggesting a move to conflict would have to be a
political decision by one of the parties rather than the
result of an accidental firefight. Post continues to assess
that UNMEE's presence along the border remains useful for its
early warning role. However, Asmara's denial of fuel to
UNMEE and UNMEE's possible withdraw from the TSZ as a result
will only increase the volatility of the military stand-off.
END COMMENT.
YAMAMOTO