SOMALIA: MFA HINTS AT AN EXTENDED TFG TRANSITION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 001063

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/15/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO SO ET
SUBJECT: SOMALIA: MFA HINTS AT AN EXTENDED TFG TRANSITION


Classified By: Ambassador Donald Yamamoto for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
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1. (C) Ethiopian State Minister for Foreign Affairs Dr.
Tekeda Alemu told Ambassador Yamamoto and visiting Director
of the Office of East African Affairs James Knight that the
Special Representative of the UN Secretary General Ahmedou
Ould-Abdallah is working on a plan to extend Somalia's
"Transitional" period by an additional 18 months to allow for
the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) to advance national
reconciliation and engage substantively on the actions
envisioned in the transitional Charter. Echoing previously
reported Ethiopian Government (GoE) complaints about Ethiopia
bearing the burden of sustaining the TFG process and Somali
security in the absence of adequate international community
support, Tekeda warned that the world could "wake up one day
to find Ethiopia having pulled out" of Somalia. Tekeda
expressed equal frustration at the TFG's "lack of
seriousness," particularly by TFG President Yusuf. Failure
to handle Somalia well, Tekeda concluded, could prompt the
broad resurrection of extremist elements to seize control of
Somalia's precarious situation. End Summary.

YOU MAY NOT HAVE ETHIOPIA TO KICK AROUND ANYMORE
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2. (C) Dr. Tekeda opened the April 10 working lunch
discussion on Somalia by noting that "if the international
community doesn't step up to the plate (save for the U.S.),
it could wake up one day to find that Ethiopia has pulled out
of Somalia, because Ethiopia has no national interest to stay
in Somalia for the long term." Pre-empting the argument of
detractors, Tekeda emphasized that there is no chance that
the GoE is trying to impose a puppet government in Somalia
because the TFG wouldn't last if viewed as an Ethiopian
"stooge." Tekeda briefly acknowledged the utility of the
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) if fully deployed,
but immediately emphasized that Ethiopia (an the
international community) cannot afford to put all of its eggs
in one basket. Instead, Tekeda highlighted the need to train
TFG police and military officers not only in tactics, but
also in discipline as the only sustainable way to support
security within Somalia. MFA Chief of Staff Abdeta Dribssa
highlighted that Ethiopia is currently training 1,100 TFG
police and a similar number of TFG troops. When asked if the
trained forces would be paid, Abdeta defensively noted that
the previous TFG "deserters" had been trained in Somalia, and
so lacked discipline, which would not be the case for
Ethiopian trained forces.


3. (C) Tekeda next expressed the GoE's frustration with the
TFG's "lack of seriousness," noting particularly the case of
TFG President Abdullahi Yusuf. Providing a comparative
analysis, Tekeda noted that at least Prime Minister Nur Adde
is attempting to broker reconciliation and governance,
whereas former Prime Minister Gedi, though a friend of
Ethiopia, was single-minded in his focus to amass personal
wealth. Tekeda noted that the southern Somali trend diverged
notably from that observed in Somaliland where a sincere
commitment to governance does exist., He hypothesizing that
Somaliland's English colonial influence left clan dynamics
and the people's accountability to clan elders largely
intact, while the Italian influence in southern Somalia
largely decimated the internal discipline maintained by
clans. Abdeta posited that Somaliland's relative lack of
meddling by external players may also contribute
significantly to the distinct approach by those in power.

A TRANSITION EXTENDED?
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4. (C) When asked whether he viewed the TFG as a viable
entity capable of achieving the actions laid out in the
transitional Charter, Dr. Tekeda instead disclosed that SRSG
Ould-Abdallah had been intensively engaged in a process of
dialogue with Somali opposition entities about the
possibility of extending the transitional period in Somalia
by an additional 18 months beyond the originally envisioned
five year period. Instead of a notional concept, however,
Tekeda went into a fair amount of detail in what a compromise
encompassing such an extension might include. Tekeda
specifically noted that 1) certain benchmarks of progress

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would be established in advance, 2) moderate previous Members
of the TFG Parliament -- approximately 30 in number -- would
return to Parliament and would be joined by an additional 50
new MPs, and 3) President Yusuf's term in office would be
extended through the additional 18 months.


5. (C) If not handled well, Tekeda warned, the former Council
of Islamic Courts and associated extremists could exert
control. Avoiding this would require a delicate balance
composed of 1) restraining the "muscular" approach while 2)
taking care in just how inclusive an "all inclusive" process
should be allowed to be. Tekeda made clear that the
inclusion of Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys would be a non-starter
and that a too inclusive process risked exposing the effort
to a stronger, negative role by Eritrea. Disclosing just how
far along this initiative had moved, Tekeda noted that
Ould-Abdallah is pushing Djibouti to provide a venue for the
rapprochement effort, but that Saudi Arabia could play a
useful role and Jeddah or Mecca may be sought as a venue for
a final meeting to conclude the arrangement. While an
agreement signed at the Muslim world's holiest city is
attractive, the Saudi hosts could insist on the inclusion of
Aweys. Tekeda argued that the inclusion of Aweys in such an
agreement would be a non-starter, but if Aweys remained
excluded, President Yusuf's buy-in would be possible.

OPPOSITION PERSONALITIES
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6. (C) Tekeda noted that former CIC Chairman Sheikh Sharif
remains beholden to Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki (due to
the provision of two villas and allowing Sharif two wives)
and, as such, remains fairly inflexible. Former TFG
Parliament Speaker Sharif Hassan is more flexible. SRSG
Ould-Abdallah, Tekeda stated, wants to keep these two
together in an effort to avoid the fracturing of the Somali
opposition into splinter groups. The challenge, therefore,
according to Tekeda, is to get Sheikh Sharif out of President
Isaias' influence.


7. (C) Tekeda noted that Ethiopian Foreign Minister Seyoum
Mesfin's interventions have been successful in positively
influencing Yusuf and Nur Adde to collaborate, stressing that
"there is no alternative to Nur's approach" of
reconciliation. Nevertheless, Tekeda warned that the
approach is not guaranteed.


8. (C) When asked to speculate on an eventual replacement for
Yusuf if he died or left office, Tekeda did not proffer any
individual name, but suggested that a Yusuf replacement could
not be a Hawiye as long as Nur Adde remained as Prime
Minister. He added that, unless there is a very strong
reason, the replacement would have to be a Darood, and likely
a Majeerteen.

COMMENT
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9. (C) While the working lunch was the first time Post had
heard of the possibility of extending the TFG's transitional
period, the degree of detail that Dr. Tekeda provided in
terms of the compromises that such an agreement would
include, with details down to the location of venues for the
meetings suggests that this proposal has been significantly
advanced among key stakeholders on Somalia. While the GoE
continues to lament the TFG's "lack of seriousness" and slow
progress, this potential extension leads Post to question the
sincerity of GoE suggestions that it may pull out of Somalia.
Such a move would only further undermine Somalia's, and the
TFG's fragile stability (to the extent that such exists),and
serve at cross purposes with this option for providing a
second wind to the TFG effort. End Comment.
YAMAMOTO