ETHIOPIA-ERITREA: SRSG ENNIFAR ON THE FUTURE OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 001001 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF AND AF/E , AND INR/AA LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER CJTF-HOA AND USCENTCOM FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/09/2018 TAGS: PREL PBTS MOPS KPKO ET ER SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA-ERITREA: SRSG ENNIFAR ON THE FUTURE OF UNMEE, BORDER UPDATE Classified By: Ambassador Donald Yamamoto. Reason: 1.4 (B) and (D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. On April 8, Acting Special Representative of the Secretary General Azouz Ennifar, United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) Force Commander Major General Mohammad Taisir Masadeh, and UNMEE Addis Ababa Head of Office Joseph Stephanides briefed the Ambassador on the Secretary General's new report on Ethiopia and Eritrea. SIPDIS Ennifar said that the report identified four options on a way forward: first, Eritrea could lift its restrictions on UNMEE; second, UNMEE could be terminated; third, a small observer mission on the border could be established; and fourth, liaison offices in Asmara and Addis Ababa could be established. Ennifar warned, however, that if the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) did not react to Eritrea's recent mistreatment of UNMEE, then Ethiopia would withdraw from the Algiers Agreement. Force Commander General Taisir reported that all UNMEE personnel except for a 164-man rear party had departed Eritrea and he explained that the Eritrean government, through the use of contractors, had agreed to transport UNMEE's equipment to Massawa for shipment out of the country. Ennifar and Taisir agreed that a UN observer mission only on the Ethiopian side of the border would have limited military value, but they emphasized that the risk of war between Ethiopia and Eritrea would increase if there were no UN presence on the border. Lastly, Taisir said that Bure, in Sub-Sector East, had become a flashpoint because the Eritrean military was extending its defensive works at night and they were now within 100 meters of the Ethiopian lines. END SUMMARY. -------------- -------------- SYG REPORT IDENTIFIES FOUR OPTIONS ON WAY FORWARD -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) Ennifar opened by stating that the Secretary General's report on UNMEE's withdrawal from Eritrea had been released and that it laid out four options on the way forward. He said that: first, Eritrea could lift its restrictions on UNMEE; second, UNMEE's mandate could be terminated; third, a small observer mission could be established; and fourth, liaison offices staffed by military and civilian personnel could be established in Asmara and Addis Ababa. He said that the UNSC was not of one mind on what to do next and there appeared to be no sense of urgency in dealing with this issue. He noted that the South Africans wanted to delay any consultations until after the April 16 UNSC joint session with the African Union Peace and Security Council in New York and the Italians did not see the need for any consultations and instead wanted "to give something to Eritrea." Ennifar agreed with the Ambassador that the border was symptomatic of the larger issues between the two countries and that a way must be found for the two to conduct simultaneous border and normalization talks. ¶3. (C) Ennifar said that if the UNSC did not react strongly to Eritrea's mistreatment of UNMEE and Eritrea's militarization of the Temporary Security Zone (TSZ),the Ethiopian government would become angry and see no alternative but to abandon the Algiers Agreement. He said that Ethiopia was waiting to see what the Security Council was going to do leading up to July when UNMEE's mandate will end. ¶4. (C) Ennifar noted that the Eritrean government was insisting that there be no more talk of demarcation, and any such discussion hinted of an alternate mechanism to undermine the boundary decision. Rather, he said, Eritrea was demanding that the UN take action to remove Ethiopian troops from the disputed territories. In Eritrea's view, demarcation was no longer an issue because the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission's (EEBC) demarcation decision by geographic coordinates had settled the boundary issue once and for all. ¶5. (C) Stephanides opined that Eritrean President Isaias had determined to remain firm on his hard-line stance to wait until the next administration in Washington to "deal with the Democrats." He said Isaias would remain inflexible and may ADDIS ABAB 00001001 002 OF 003 even backtrack, but that Isaias would have to show his cards in July when the UN would have to decide on UNMEE's future. (Note: Stephanides, in a separate meeting with PolOff on April 8, criticized the SYG's report noting that paragraph 49 undermined the possibility of establishing a mission on the Ethiopian side of the border because it states that, "...such a mission could be perceived by one party as freezing the status quo and serving the interests of the other..." He also noted that paragraph 51 would anger the Ethiopians because it called into question Ethiopia's commitment to the EEBC decision and that the report came dangerously close to an endorsement by the SYG of the EEBC's demarcation by geographic coordinates. Paragraph 51 notes that, "Ethiopia's position that the demarcation coordinates determined by the (EEBC) are invalid...raises questions about its commitment to accept the final and binding status..." He emphasized that any endorsement of the "virtual demarcation" by the UN would drive the Ethiopians to leave the Algiers Agreement.) -------------- ONLY 164 UNMEE PERSONNEL REMAIN IN ERITREA -------------- ¶6. (C) General Taisir said that only 164 UNMEE personnel remained in Eritrea. He added that this number included a small number of Indian and Jordanian troops who were tending to their respective countries' equipment, but that those Indian and Jordanian forces would leave Eritrea when their equipment was shipped out. -------------- -------------- ERITREAN GOVERNMENT TO MOVE UNMEE'S EQUIPMENT TO PORT -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) Ennifar briefed that the Eritrean government had agreed to transport all of UNMEE's equipment, through the use of contractors, from Asmara to the port of Massawa for shipment out of the country. He expected that the Indian and Jordanian equipment would be shipped out sometime in May with the UN's equipment to be shipped out sometime thereafter. General Taisir added that he had successfully moved all of the contingent equipment--including vehicles, arms, and ammunition--to Asmara and Assab where it is being containerized and made ready to ship. Ennifar said Eritrea would rather allow contractors the fuel to move the equipment than give fuel to UNMEE and allow UNMEE to move it themselves. He added that the Eritrean commissioner to UNMEE said that Eritrea wants nothing of UNMEE to remain behind and that if UNMEE left anything behind the Eritrean government would give it away rather than keep it. -------------- -------------- OBSERVER MISSION ONLY IN ETHIOPIA OF LIMITED UTILITY, BUT... -------------- -------------- ¶8. (C) General Taisir remarked that a UN observer mission only on one side of the border in Ethiopia would have limited military value and Ennifar said that a mission only in Ethiopia would be perceived by Eritrea as the UN siding with Ethiopia. Taisir said that the observer's ability to see into Eritrea was extremely limited because of the mountainous terrain, but that if UNMEE had sophisticated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance equipment the force could be more effective. Taisir said that Ethiopian Chief of Defense (CHOD) General Samora was critical of a mission only in Ethiopia, but Ennifar added that the Ethiopians probably would accept an Ethiopia only mission if only as a gesture of good will to the international community. -------------- ...THE RISK OF WAR WILL INCREASE ABSENT UNMEE -------------- ¶9. (C) Nevertheless, Ennifar and General Taisir agreed that the risk of war will increase if there were no UN presence on the border. General Taisir went on to assert that there remained some utility in maintaining an observer presence at the primary flashpoints of Humera, Badme, Mareb Bridge, Tsorena, Zela Ambessa, and Bure. Taisir said that the risk SIPDIS ADDIS ABAB 00001001 003 OF 003 will increase because the armies are face to face and getting closer, it was unclear how long both sides could support the costly border deployments and mobilization, the flashpoints are becoming more critical and tense, and there would be no UN monitors to mediate incidents or conduct patrols. He added that both sides were moving equipment and forces closer to the border. Ennifar said that if Eritrea continues its provocation at some point Ethiopia will respond, but that it would not solve anything. -------------- BURE AN EMERGING FLASHPOINT -------------- ¶10. (C) Lastly, General Taisir raised the issue of the increasing tensions at Bure in Sub-Sector East where in the last several weeks the Eritrean military had begun building new trenches that were now within 100 meters of Ethiopian trenches. Ennifar and Taisir agreed that Isaias was doing this deliberately to test both UNMEE and Ethiopia to see how far he could push and get away with it. Taisir said that the Eritreans were digging the trenches at night, but that UNMEE could not determine whether the new trenches were in Ethiopia, as the Ethiopians maintained, or in Eritrea. Taisir said he had asked Eritrea for permission for an UNMEE patrol to cross the border at Bure and investigate the new activity, but was denied. Taisir planned to raise this issue with Ethiopian CHOD General Samora at the earliest opportunity. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶11. (C) The Ethiopian government is becoming increasingly frustrated with the lack of action on the part of the international community and the UN Security Council. Prime Minister Meles is demanding strong action on the part of the UN to respond to Eritrea's continued and increasing violations of the Algiers Agreement. If the UN does not deal decisively with Eritrea's treatment of UNMEE and militarization of the TSZ, and/or the UNSC endorses the demarcation by geographic coordinates decision, then Prime Minister Meles, under increasing pressure from within his own party for action, probably will have little choice but to abandon the Algiers Agreement in response. END COMMENT. YAMAMOTO