(C/NF) NIGERIA: IMN GROWTH THOUGH LIMITED,

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 ABUJA 000970 SIPDIS NOFORN DEPT FOR INR/AA, INR/TNC, INR/I NIAMEY FOR DKORAN E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/29/2033 TAGS: PGOV PINR KISL KIRF SOCI NI SUBJECT: (C/NF) NIGERIA: IMN GROWTH THOUGH LIMITED, THREATENS MUSLIM UNITY REF: A. ABUJA 321 ¶B. ABUJA 780 ¶C. TD-314/024903-08 ¶D. 07 ABUJA 1558 ¶E. 05 ABUJA 792 ¶F. 07 ABUJA 1630 Classified By: A/Pol/C Heather Merritt, reasons 1.4 (b, c & d). ¶1. (S//NF) SUMMARY: Intra-religious strife among Muslims in Nigeria is growing, as evidenced by several recent assassinations of Sunni imams, who have been critical of the Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN),which is thought to be responsible for these murders. The perceived "Shi'ite" orientation of the IMN distinguishes it from other Islamic reformist organizations in northern Nigeria, which are Sunni. However, these assassinations did not take place because of inherent doctrinal disagreements between Sunni imams and "Shi'ite" followers of the IMN. Rather, the IMN presumably went after these Islamic religious figures because they used the pulpit to undermine and discredit the IMN's contention that the Nigerian government is corrupt and un-Islamic, and that Islamic leaders who work with the government are breaching the tenets of their faith. Neutralizing the IMN's reproach of Islamic religious leaders helps preserve the unity of Muslims in the North, which have historically respected differences of opinion, and stressed harmony over confrontation. ¶2. (S//NF) SUMMARY CONT'D: The appeal of the IMN appears limited to northern Nigeria's disenfranchised and uneducated youth, and its growth remains hampered by lack of funding, local support, and an emphasis on political reform without an accompanying program for social reform like other Islamic organizations. Unsurprisingly, Sunni religious leaders are apprehensive about the presumed or rumored growth of Shi'ism in Nigeria, given pervasive antipathy for Shi'ism's doctrine and fears that the IMN's followers may possibly be violent toward other Muslims. In light of recent assassinations of Sunni imams, the Sultan of Sokoto told PolOff in late April that he considered the IMN a destabilizing force, possibly intent on assassinating him in order to raise its profile among Muslims in the North. END SUMMARY. -------------- THE IMN AND ISLAMIC REFORM IN THE NORTH -------------- ¶3. (C) Islamic reformist organizations in Nigeria, which compete with each other for influence to interpret religion and politics in the Muslim community, have been a fixture in the North for several decades. Earlier traditions of reform were often prepared to cooperate, at least in circumscribed terms, with the government and with other Islamic reformist elements in society. However, recent Islamic reformist groups emphasize the importance of struggling against the government, and condemning it for corruption, immorality, or for failure to respond to the needs of its citizens. These reformist groups also reproach other Islamic organizations which work with the government. ¶4. (C) The reformist Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN),had formerly been known as the Ikhwan al-Muslimin (Muslim Brotherhood),which was an offshoot of the Muslim Student's Society (MSS) founded in 1954. Following this, the Jama'atul Tajdid Islam (JTI, Society for the Revival of Islam) then broke away from the Muslim Brotherhood in 1994, excoriating its founder Ibrahim al-Zakzaky for his undemocratic leadership style and for secretly promoting Shi'ism as the group's ideology. Following al-Zakzaky's periodic arrests in the late 1990s (he had been released in 1999),the JTI fused with the reformist Jama'atul Izalatul Bida'a wa Iqamatus Sunnah (JIBWIS or Izala, Society for the Eradication of Innovation and Restoration of Tradition),and acceded to cooperation, not confrontation, with the Nigerian government (and the North's Sufi brotherhoods). ¶5. (C//NF) Unlike the Izala and the Sufi brotherhoods, the ABUJA 00000970 002 OF 005 IMN does not have large-scale, developed programs of social reform. Whereas the Izala began propagating modern Islamic education through the establishment of Islamiyya schools in the late 1970s, which also inspired the Sufi brotherhoods to follow suit, the IMN has maintained an emphasis on political reform. In particular, the IMN wishes to see greater "Islamicization" of the North whereby political institutions reflect Islamic values. The Muslim Brotherhood formally transmuted into the IMN, in part, to reflect its "Shi'ite" orientation. However, while the leadership of the IMN appears committed to the doctrines of Shi'ism, the majority of its followers are not. (In fact, it remains unclear to what extent it is appropriate to term the IMN a bonafide "Shi'ite" movement.) Due to frequent leadership disputes between al-Zakzaky and other ambitious IMN members, the IMN is believed to have splintered into several factions. -------------- THE IMN'S POPULARITY -------------- ¶6. (S//NF) The IMN currently draws its followers from among the uneducated urban and rural underclass, in contrast to its former appeal when it was under the MSS and Muslim Brotherhood, which primarily constituted northern university intellectuals (some of whom have since become leading northern politicians and technocrats). The IMN has been most popular across the emirate states (i.e., Sokoto, Kebbi, Zamfara, Kano, Katsina, Zaria, Jigawa, Bauchi, and Gombe) because of its criticism of the emirs (including the Sultan of Sokoto),establishment Nigerian Islamic institutions like the Sufi brotherhoods, and other Islamic reformist organizations like the Izala. The IMN's appeal, in part, results from al-Zakzaky's capacity to effectively discredit other Islamic reformist organizations for aligning themselves too closely with what al-Zakzaky deems a corrupt, un-Islamic government. The youth who identify with the IMN today also do so for the sense of identity and community (and economic advantage) such associations engender. Overall, the IMN's allure has not been a function of its association with Shi'ite doctrine. Its popularity emanates from al-Zakzaky's capacity to present himself as a voice for Islam in Nigeria by articulating the concerns of northern Nigeria's disenfranchised and unemployed youth, and by himself maintaining the appearance of incorruptibility and righteousness. ¶7. (C//NF) The IMN maintains an impressive ability to draw a crowd, as attested to by the January 18-19, 2008 commemorations for Ashura, in which thousands gathered in Kano, Zaria, and Sokoto to recognize the "martyrdom" of Shia Islam's most revered figures. PolOff witnessed the celebrations in Zaria on January 18, 2008 in which al-Zakzaky delivered a speech (in Hausa) extolling the virtues of Islam (and not Shi'ism) and exhorting followers to resist excess in worldly affairs. He also admonished followers to emulate the example of Sokoto caliphate founder Shehu Usman Dan Fodio, who al-Zakzaky said exemplified the virtues of Islam in militating against unbelief and moral laxity. Moreover, al-Zakzaky censured the Nigerian government for corrupt practices and "godlessness" and accused the U.S. of fomenting discord between Muslims around the world (see also Ref A). Ambassador noted on a recent trip to Usman Dan Fodio University in Sokoto that even its faculty and students tend to harbor suspicions of U.S. motives toward Islam. Al-Zakzaky's messages are widely disseminated through the IMN's populist Hausa-language newspaper al-Mizan (almizan.net),audio tapes, pamphlets, and sermons. ¶8. (C//NF) Comment: Al-Zakzaky's frequent reference to popular Islamic figure Usman Dan Fodio and characterization of his 1804 jihad as a struggle against the forces of evil in society, resonates with northern youth. By making reference to the Sokoto jihad led by Dan Fodio, al-Zakzaky is also attempting to co-opt a symbol of Islamic pride and legitimacy for the North. Above all, al-Zakzaky seeks relevance, and to be regarded as a credible voice for Nigerian Muslims. The erstwhile attempts to monopolize the field of Islamic reform ABUJA 00000970 003 OF 005 in Nigeria to ensure unity among Muslims, as the Izala and Sufi orders have tried to do, will continue to threaten al- Zakzaky's relevance as he seeks to compete for influence as a reformer. End Comment. -------------- IMN VIEWED AS "DESTABILIZING" -------------- ¶9. (S//NF) As Ref B suggests, the IMN is allegedly attempting to join forces with former governor of Sokoto, Attahiru Bafarawa (Democratic People's Party),to establish a base at the seat of Islamic legitimacy in Nigeria, the Sokoto caliphate. Current Sultan of Sokoto Muhammadu Abubakar in late April voiced to PolOff his trepidation that the IMN is actively seeking to malign him, possibly even assassinate him because the IMN views him and the emirate system he governs as corrupt and an illegitimate spokesperson for Islam in Nigeria. Although apprehension over the presumed or rumored growth of Shi'ism in Nigeria is unsurprising given pervasive antipathy within Nigeria's Islamic community for Shi'ism (see Ref C),in light of the IMN's recent activities in Sokoto, both the Sultan and the political elite there (including former president Shehu Shagari),contend that the IMN is a "destabilizing" force, given the group's capacity to mobilize and its targeting of Islamic religious leaders who speak out against the IMN. ¶10. (C//NF) The State Security Services (SSS) have kept a close watch over the IMN's activities in the North. The group was believed to have gone into quiescence in the late 1990s; however, the recent assassinations of imams critical of the IMN have heightened concerns that al-Zakzaky and the IMN are seeking, at minimum, to raise their profile in the North, particularly in Sokoto. Specifically, on March 7, 2008 an imam was killed by assailants likely connected to the IMN in Sokoto. Two individuals were apprehended and later charged with the imam's murder. Clashes between Sokoto's IMN faction and Sokoto residents had earlier sparked violence in July 2007 (Ref D) and in May 2005, when IMN members attempted to overtake the city's central Sultan Bello mosque (Ref E). (The IMN's largely unsuccessful strategy of taking over mosques to co-opt followers and establish a presence in communities, rather than obtaining permission to purchase land to erect their own mosques, reflects, in part, IMN's limited funding and local support. Moreover, the March 7 murder of the imam mentioned above comes almost a year after the murder of Imam Ja'afar Adamu in April 2007 in Kano. This trend will likely continue, particularly as imams intensify their vociferous anti-IMN rhetoric in weekly sermons.) ¶11. (C//NF) On May 27, the Sokoto Sharia Upper Court sentenced prominent IMN Sokoto leader Kasimu Tawaye and 114 others (see Ref F for background) to eight years imprisonment for unlawful assembly, resisting arrest, and violating public Sharia strictures on defamation of Islam. Tawaye and the others had been accused of, though never formally charged with, inter alia, the July 2007 killing of Dan-Maishiya. Sokoto state Attorney General (AG) Inuwa Abdul-Qadir (strictly protect) told PolOff May 18 that given the poor coordination between the AG, police, SSS, and secular court system, which impaired their efforts to prosecute these individuals despite the strong evidence against them, the case was taken to a Sharia court. (Although Sharia courts have been known to deliver justice more swiftly, it appears that the judgment against Tawaye and the 114 other individuals was politically expedient, given the unpopularity of the IMN and the fears articulated by Sokoto's political elite about the IMN. With the conviction of these members of IMN,s Sokoto faction, it remains to be seen whether this will lead to greater violence between the IMN and the government (or other Muslims),or will force the movement into quiescence.) -------------- -------------- (C/NF) COMMENT: IMN GROWTH THOUGH LIMITED, WEAKENS MUSLIM UNITY -------------- -------------- ABUJA 00000970 004 OF 005 ¶12. (C//NF) We believe that the IMN's rhetorical base has been appreciably, though not completely affected by Nigeria's move to civilian rule. Its predecessor the Muslim Brotherhood had exploited rising discontent against military rule as its platform for dissent; it appealed across the intellectual (and religious) spectrum in the North, attracting educated (and oftentimes, leftist) elites critical of military government, political actors desirous of greater political inclusion, and civil society activists censorious of extra-judicial detentions and corruption. However, unlike the Muslim Brotherhood then, the IMN today has been unable to assert a following among this diverse set of individuals. In part, the state governments across the twelve northern states which adopted Sharia criminal law in 2000, wittingly or not, helped to co-opt a principal grievance of Islamic reformist movements like the IMN, who advocate for a more "Islamized" North. In addition, given widespread antipathy for Shi'ism in Nigeria, conflating the IMN and Shi'ism has worked to lessen the IMN's credibility and, consequently, its attraction. Further still, the IMN's popularity has been severely limited since it remains largely unfocused on providing social services to needy Muslims, in contrast to other Islamic organizations like the Izala and the Sufi brotherhoods. ¶13. (C//NF) While the sense of identity and fraternity the IMN offers may be a salient factor in its recruitment, it does not appear to be sustainable since, for the most part, poor and disaffected northern Muslims will gravitate toward organizations which help meet their everyday needs. The Izala and Sufi brotherhoods have successfully worked to provide social services; in contrast, the IMN remains focused on condemning and discrediting the Nigerian government and on rebuking those Islamic organizations which work with, and approve of, the government. This is simply not a significant enough message in a country where corruption is endemic, and ordinary citizens look toward their government to provide for their material needs despite their disapproval of the government's activities. ¶14. (C//NF) Nonetheless, growing dissatisfaction with actual Sharia implementation, and in particular, its failure to mitigate the burgeoning disparity between the wealthy and poor as well as the IMN's demonstrated capacity to articulate Muslim grievances against injustice and oppression will curry support for the IMN. The degree to which northern Muslims continue to feel affronted by state and national policies that do not help the plight of ordinary northerners may also attract followers to the IMN, simply because the IMN remains fiercely critical of the Nigerian government's failure to care for its citizens. Of course, it remains true that the uneducated and disaffected youth, which constitutes the IMN's current base, need not, and usually do not, support the group for any intellectual (or doctrinal) reason. ¶15. (S//NF) While Ref C noted that Sunni imams are beginning to advocate a "stricter" version of Sunni Islam to counteract the growth of the IMN (and Shi'ism) in Nigeria, it appears that such an approach is not only misguided, but tentatively deleterious. It reflects the fact that these Sunni imams essentially view the IMN through the optic of doctrine. However, simply discrediting the IMN on doctrinal bases would not address what fundamentally makes it a viable alternative to other Islamic reformist organizations. At the same time, the call for a "stricter" version of Sunni Islam would likely lead to greater fractionalization of the already splintered northern Muslim community in Nigeria. Given the growth of Christianity in the traditionally-Muslim North as well as the desire to enhance the chances of Muslim politicians to win state and federal elections, northern Muslims have exhibited a high degree of tolerance for differences within the Islamic community in the interest of unity and would strongly censure efforts which may jeopardize that tenuous concordance. The challenge for Sunni Islam in Nigeria rests in its capacity to incorporate (or co-opt) the "Shi'ite" narrative, which calls for a distinct, though unified and more "Islamized" northern Nigeria. END COMMENT. ABUJA 00000970 005 OF 005 SANDERS