C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 000503

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DOE FOR GEORGE PERSON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2018
TAGS: MARR MASS PREL PGOV ECOWAS XY NI
SUBJECT: ECOWAS STANDBY FORCE: ITS PRESENT STATUS

REF: ABUJA 447

Classified By: Political Counselor Walter Pflaumer for reasons 1.4. (b
& d).


1. (SBU) SUMMARY: The ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF) is
frequently mentioned by those in the African security
community as the best developed of the African rapid-reaction
brigades called for by the African Union (AU) in July 2004.
Indeed, ECOWAS has come a long way from the days of the
ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) interventions, with pledged
units from all member states identified, training exercises
taking place, some staff slots filled, and some conflict
prevention/resolution doctrine worked out. It has also begun
to put in place both the peace support operations (PSO)
doctrine and the organizational infrastructure necessary to
move beyond a mere military response and into the area of a
civilian peacebuilding capability. However, many of these
advances are on paper only, or are mitigated by other
factors. Serious challenges and shortcomings remain to be
overcome if ECOWAS is to intervene effectively in the next
West African crisis and avoid the mistakes of the past. This
cable provides a short analysis of the basic structure of the
ESF and an analysis of ECOWAS' achievements and shortfalls in
the arena of conflict prevention and response. END SUMMARY.

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CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND THE ESF
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2. (U) The ECOWAS Standby Force is being created to address
persistent subregional strife and the shortcomings of
previous efforts under its previous incarnation called
ECOMOG. It was developed in conjunction with the AU's
doctrine on creating an indigenous African
peacekeeping/enforcing capability. The original
configuration was 6500 soldiers from pre-selected units of
member states -- a 1500-man rapid reaction Task Force (TF)
prepared to deploy within 30 days (ECOWAS leadership has

since increased the TF size to 2773 soldiers), and a Main
Brigade (MB) of around 5000 soldiers. The MB is to be
deployable within 90 days. Both the TF and the MB are to be
self-sustainable for 90 day deployments, with one of the
following actions subsequently to occur: 1) TF elements will
return to their home states; 2) the TF will remain in place
as part of the deploying MB contingent; 3) the TF will become
an element of an AU or UN mission; or 4) the TF will hand
over operations to a UN or AU force. ECOWAS is relying on a
series of donor-financed and -led training exercises to take
place in various member states, culminating in a large-scale
Force Training Exercise sometime in 2009 for the TF to reach
mission-capable status by 2010. Strategic planning will be
done by the Mission Planning and Management Cell, and
operational planning is led by current ECOWAS ESF Chief of
Staff Brigadier General Hassan Lai, a Nigerian. Furthermore,
future military action is to be taken concurrently with
civilian peacebuilding activities to ensure a holistic,
long-term approach to conflict management, societal
rebuilding, and the protection of human rights.


3. (U) ECOWAS has also made progress on other key aspects of
creating effective conflict prevention and response
mechanisms. These include ECOWARN, a directorate with
offices throughout West Africa, whose specific tasks are to
monitor destabilizing threats of all kinds, analyze them, and
disseminate information about these threats to member states;
the Emergency Response Team, composed of civilians who are
sent out to perform such tasks as evaluation of refugee needs
and election monitoring; and the Council of the Wise,
comprised of West African elder statesmen and -women who can
be dispatched on dispute mediation and resolution missions.
ECOWAS claims to have successfully used these organs to help
create desirable outcomes, such as the sending of monitors
for Togo's 2007 elections which were subsequently judged
largely free and fair, and the dispatching of a mediation
team to Liberia to help peacefully resolve the 2005 election

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dispute between Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf and George Weah.

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SHORTFALLS AND NEEDS
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4. (C) On paper, ECOWAS appears far advanced in its ability
to manage conflict, however, serious problems and challenges
still remain, some of them barely addressed since ECOMOG days:

-- Funding issues still remain unresolved. Donor nations
(primarily the U.S., UK, and France) pay for all aspects of
the ESF's staff, training, and operational costs. Foreign
assistance risks being uncoordinated and redundant, as
traditional partners are joined by new, deep-pocketed ones
such as the European Union, who do not always act in concert
with established donors. Also, a few member states tend to
bear nearly all the mission costs, leading to
disproportionate influence over tactics, strategy, and
political developments.

-- While all member nations have pledged pre-identified units
to the TF, and General Lai reports having visited nearly all
of those units in their home bases, there is concern that
these units will be either not mission-ready or not the units
actually deployed in a crisis. Nigeria's armed forces, for
example, are already stretched to capacity with domestic and
international obligations, and under current conditions it is
hard to conceive a scenario in which they could produce their
multiple pledged units within the prescribed 30-day
timeframe. Moreover, no firm mechanism is in place to ensure
that the Main Brigade can field all 5000 troops if necessary;
there are no specific nation-by-nation numerical requirements
to fill out such a large quota within 90 days.

-- While ECOWAS has made much progress toward forging
well-reasoned, broadly supported PSO policies, history has
shown that internal politics, historical ties, personal
loyalties to specific warlords, and language have all been
factors mitigating members' reactions to the call of duty.

-- Little progress has been made toward assembling the
civilian components necessary to meet the needs of ECOWAS'
PSO doctrine. West Africa lacks the expertise to engage in
peace building activities effectively, and ECOWAS for the
short- to medium-term will need to rely on UN support for
these functions.

-- ECOWAS' approach to crisis prevention and management
remains narrow and haphazard. To date the Commission has
made laudable progress toward intervening in and ending armed
conflict, but it has done little to guard against, prepare
for, or counter equally destabilizing events and situations
such as natural disasters, pervasive narcotrafficking, or
pandemic disease. It has also shown itself to be
distressingly selective when it comes to enforcing Commission
Protocols and addressing specific member states'
transgressions. Despite a "zero tolerance" policy toward
national leaders who gain office through undemocratic means,
and despite the potential for regional destabilization caused
by unrest in West Africa's largest country, not a word was
said about Nigeria's seriously flawed 2007 presidential
election. Nor has ECOWAS expressed any interest in resolving
Nigeria's intractable Niger Delta conflict, which has
economic, military, human rights, environmental, and minority
rights aspects -- all topics of alleged vital interest to
ECOWAS.

-- Lastly, the ESF has made little progress toward developing
its own realistic logistical capabilities. In theory, TF
logistical support is supposed to come from Mali, Nigeria,
Ghana, and Senegal, along with helicopter support from
as-yet-undetermined countries. Nigeria's ability to lend
such support relies on C-130s, most of which cannot fly and
transport ships badly in need of a refit. Considering that
Mali's military is focused on its own internal low-level

ABUJA 00000503 003 OF 003


rebellion in the remote north, and is absorbed in meeting its
own logistical requirements, the most likely scenario is that
donor nations will be called upon to meet the need. The
ESF's planning capabilities are further compromised by its
inexplicable failure to staff General Lai's team fully --
after two years of full funding by ECOWAS' partners, he has
only five of eleven positions filled. Inquiries into the
reasons are met with temporization and promises of future
action. The result is what is described in reftel -- an
unrealistic request that fails to draw upon facilities the
donors have already put at ECOWAS' disposal, such as the
Murraytown, Sierra Leone Logistics Depot, which already
contains $60 million in USG-supplied ready-to-use equipment.

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MOVING FORWARD
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5. (C) That an economic community could achieve so much in
the arena of conflict resolution and prevention is
remarkable. ECOWAS has eclipsed regional organizations
better resourced and with fewer development challenges,
showing itself to be forward looking and pro-active in
addressing the subregion's history of violence and
instability. Further progress depends on several factors:
strong, focused leadership, both at the Commission and
national levels; greater buy-in and ownership on the part of
a number of members; the willingness to reform a bloated,
inefficient bureaucracy; and continued donor support. For
the U.S. the way forward in helping stand up the ESF
specifically, and advancing conflict prevention in general,
is to demand value for dollar and to decline supporting
events such as the inefficient Logistics Exercise (Logex)
described in reftel. The USG's refusal to support the Logex
as presented sent a strong message about accountability to
partner nations, and the lack of ESF ownership of and effort
in the planning process. Perhaps hearing "no" more often
from its partner nations, and being held to a higher standard
of oversight and transparency, will force ECOWAS to resolve
some of its long-term weaknesses. The USG could also expand
its influence by offering technical support for the civilian
side of the PKO/PSO strategy, currently still in its infancy,
perhaps in the areas of rebuilding civilian police capability
or a functioning judiciary.
SANDERS