NIGERIA: UN VOTING RECORD DEMARCHE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 002219 SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/W, INR/AA E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/31/2017 TAGS: PHUM PREL NI SUBJECT: NIGERIA: UN VOTING RECORD DEMARCHE REF: A. STATE 117848 ¶B. ABUJA 2048 ¶C. ABUJA 1839 Classified By: Political Counselor Walter Pflaumer for reasons 1.4. (b & d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. During a previously scheduled November 7 meeting, Ambassador delivered reftel A points to Charles Onianwa, Director of the MFA North and Central Americas Division, and Bola A. Akinterinwa, Special Assistant to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and stressed the importance of partnership in voting on Third Committee resolutions. PolCouns delivered the same points November 10 to Ambassador M.K. Ibrahim, Director of the MFA's International Organizations Second UN Division. Ibrahim said he was "not in a position" to say what the GON response would be on the issue of Iran, but suggested that Nigeria would again abstain on North Korea and would support the U.S. position on Burma. We will look for further opportunities to raise the Iran issue. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) AMBASSADOR ENCOURAGES GON SUPPORT: In a November 7 meeting with Charles Onianwa, Director of the MFA's North and Central America Division, and Bola A. Akinterinwa, Special Assistant to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador reviewed ref A demarche and made clear that the U.S. wanted Nigeria's support on human rights resolutions against Iran, Burma, and North Korea. Noting that other countries in the region had been very vocal about their support of the resolutions, Ambassador hoped Nigeria would do the same. Ambassador added that, in general, the U.S. wanted to see the GON "partner" more on voting at UNGA, and more specifically wanted Nigeria to either abstain on or vote against any no-action resolutions. Akinterinwa responded that, although he could not speak for the Foreign Minister, it would be "rare" for Nigeria to vote against the U.S. on such important issues. Akinterinwa added that he would brief the FonMin on the demarche points as soon as he was available. ¶3. (C) Polcouns and Poloff (notetaker) delivered the same demarche points to Ambassador Ibrahim on November 10. On Iran, Ibrahim maintained that he was "not in a position" to inform PolCouns which way Nigeria would vote either on the no-action motion or substantive Canadian resolution, adding that that the decision would be made at the "highest" level (Comment: presumably the FonMin. End comment). In response to PolCouns's question on when the GON might make a decision regarding Iran, Ibrahim said it could change up to the very last minute. Having been involved with Third Committee voting on numerous occasions, Ibrahim told PolCouns of one time he was about to cast Nigeria's vote on a resolution concerning Iran, when the Iranian Ambassador approached him with "someone from Abuja" (intimating the FonMin) on the phone, who instructed him to change the vote. Ibrahim noted that President Ahmadinejad of Iran met with President Yar'Adua on the sidelines of UNGA last year, and had pressured him on the issue. Ibrahim said he personally was "crucified" by Iran after the GON ultimately abstained because Nigeria's action changed the outcome. Ibrahim noted that since President Yar'Adua did not attend UNGA this year, there had not been the same kind of high level pressure, but would not be drawn on whether this would lead to a different GON vote. Ibrahim also noted Iran's push to have human rights issues removed from Third Committee sessions and handled exclusively at the UN Human Rights Council (see ref B). ¶4. (C) Noting that the resolution on North Korea did not pose the same "political problems" for Nigeria as Iran, Ibrahim said Nigeria "should be able" to take the same action as last year, when the GON abstained. Ibrahim tried to argue that progress in the nuclear talks with North Korea and its removal from the list of state sponsors of terrorism suggested increased U.S. flexibility on the issue. PolCouns responded that North Korea continued to be one of the most extreme police states in the world, and that the nuclear talks were another matter. A resolution criticizing North Korea's human rights record should be easy for Nigeria to ABUJA 00002219 002 OF 002 support, he argued. Ibrahim would not commit to doing so, but noted that the GON is trying to reduce its number of abstentions. ¶5. (C) On Burma, Ibrahim indicated that Nigeria would vote the same as last year, stating that there would be "no difficulty" for the GON in voting against the no-action resolution, then supporting a resolution critical of the Burmese government. ¶6. (C) COMMENT: Ambassador Ibrahim has always been an open and frank interlocutor and, due to his experience at UNGA, we believe a good judge of the current GON thinking. However, as he noted, many of these decisions are made at the highest level - i.e. the President and Foreign Minister - and remain in flux due to international pressure on the GON from many players. Ambassador will continue to press the Iran issue in particular in future contacts with the Foreign Minister. END COMMENT. Sanders