NIGERIA: UN VOTING RECORD DEMARCHE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 002219

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/W, INR/AA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/31/2017
TAGS: PHUM PREL NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: UN VOTING RECORD DEMARCHE

REF: A. STATE 117848

B. ABUJA 2048

C. ABUJA 1839

Classified By: Political Counselor Walter Pflaumer for reasons 1.4. (b
& d).


1. (C) SUMMARY. During a previously scheduled November 7
meeting, Ambassador delivered reftel A points to Charles
Onianwa, Director of the MFA North and Central Americas
Division, and Bola A. Akinterinwa, Special Assistant to the
Minister of Foreign Affairs, and stressed the importance of
partnership in voting on Third Committee resolutions.
PolCouns delivered the same points November 10 to Ambassador
M.K. Ibrahim, Director of the MFA's International
Organizations Second UN Division. Ibrahim said he was "not
in a position" to say what the GON response would be on the
issue of Iran, but suggested that Nigeria would again abstain
on North Korea and would support the U.S. position on Burma.
We will look for further opportunities to raise the Iran
issue. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) AMBASSADOR ENCOURAGES GON SUPPORT: In a November 7
meeting with Charles Onianwa, Director of the MFA's North and
Central America Division, and Bola A. Akinterinwa, Special
Assistant to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador
reviewed ref A demarche and made clear that the U.S. wanted
Nigeria's support on human rights resolutions against Iran,
Burma, and North Korea. Noting that other countries in the
region had been very vocal about their support of the
resolutions, Ambassador hoped Nigeria would do the same.
Ambassador added that, in general, the U.S. wanted to see the
GON "partner" more on voting at UNGA, and more specifically
wanted Nigeria to either abstain on or vote against any
no-action resolutions. Akinterinwa responded that, although
he could not speak for the Foreign Minister, it would be
"rare" for Nigeria to vote against the U.S. on such important
issues. Akinterinwa added that he would brief the FonMin on
the demarche points as soon as he was available.


3. (C) Polcouns and Poloff (notetaker) delivered the same
demarche points to Ambassador Ibrahim on November 10. On
Iran, Ibrahim maintained that he was "not in a position" to
inform PolCouns which way Nigeria would vote either on the
no-action motion or substantive Canadian resolution, adding
that that the decision would be made at the "highest" level
(Comment: presumably the FonMin. End comment). In response
to PolCouns's question on when the GON might make a decision
regarding Iran, Ibrahim said it could change up to the very
last minute. Having been involved with Third Committee
voting on numerous occasions, Ibrahim told PolCouns of one
time he was about to cast Nigeria's vote on a resolution
concerning Iran, when the Iranian Ambassador approached him
with "someone from Abuja" (intimating the FonMin) on the
phone, who instructed him to change the vote. Ibrahim noted
that President Ahmadinejad of Iran met with President
Yar'Adua on the sidelines of UNGA last year, and had
pressured him on the issue. Ibrahim said he personally was
"crucified" by Iran after the GON ultimately abstained
because Nigeria's action changed the outcome. Ibrahim noted
that since President Yar'Adua did not attend UNGA this year,
there had not been the same kind of high level pressure, but
would not be drawn on whether this would lead to a different
GON vote. Ibrahim also noted Iran's push to have human
rights issues removed from Third Committee sessions and
handled exclusively at the UN Human Rights Council (see ref
B).


4. (C) Noting that the resolution on North Korea did not pose
the same "political problems" for Nigeria as Iran, Ibrahim
said Nigeria "should be able" to take the same action as last
year, when the GON abstained. Ibrahim tried to argue that
progress in the nuclear talks with North Korea and its
removal from the list of state sponsors of terrorism
suggested increased U.S. flexibility on the issue. PolCouns
responded that North Korea continued to be one of the most
extreme police states in the world, and that the nuclear
talks were another matter. A resolution criticizing North
Korea's human rights record should be easy for Nigeria to

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support, he argued. Ibrahim would not commit to doing so,
but noted that the GON is trying to reduce its number of
abstentions.


5. (C) On Burma, Ibrahim indicated that Nigeria would vote
the same as last year, stating that there would be "no
difficulty" for the GON in voting against the no-action
resolution, then supporting a resolution critical of the
Burmese government.


6. (C) COMMENT: Ambassador Ibrahim has always been an open
and frank interlocutor and, due to his experience at UNGA, we
believe a good judge of the current GON thinking. However,
as he noted, many of these decisions are made at the highest
level - i.e. the President and Foreign Minister - and remain
in flux due to international pressure on the GON from many
players. Ambassador will continue to press the Iran issue in
particular in future contacts with the Foreign Minister. END
COMMENT.
Sanders