Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08ABUJA2118
2008-10-27 17:03:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Abuja
Cable title:
NIGERIA'S FORCE CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNAMID AND AMISOM
VZCZCXRO5798 PP RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHTRO DE RUEHUJA #2118/01 3011703 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 271703Z OCT 08 FM AMEMBASSY ABUJA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4282 INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 0069 RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 1449 RUEHOS/AMCONSUL LAGOS 0142 RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 002118
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR AF/W, AF/SPG, INR/AA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/31/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO SU NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA'S FORCE CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNAMID AND AMISOM
REF: SECSTATE 109716
Classified By: Political Counselor Walter Pflaumer for reasons 1.4. (b
& d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 002118
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR AF/W, AF/SPG, INR/AA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/31/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO SU NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA'S FORCE CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNAMID AND AMISOM
REF: SECSTATE 109716
Classified By: Political Counselor Walter Pflaumer for reasons 1.4. (b
& d).
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: In an October 21 meeting with DATT and
Poloff, Defense Headquarters Director of Peacekeeping
Operations Major General F.N. Osokogu confirmed that the GON
will meet its stated commitments to deploy troops to UNAMID
and AMISOM. He shared a number of details about the status
of the deployments that highlighted the challenges Nigerian
troops face both in deploying and on the ground. General
Osokogu intends to visit his UNAMID battalions on October 26,
and has promised later to share his impressions with us on
the state of the troops. Although it was clear at times that
Osokogu was not fully informed, Post believes his statements
offer valuable insights to Nigeria's troop deployment
problems to both locations. END SUMMARY.
--------------
UNAMID
--------------
2. (SBU) On October 21, Major General Osokogu met with DATT
and Poloff to respond to reftel questions about UNAMID and
AMISOM deployments. He affirmed that the Nigerian Armed
Forces (NAF) will meet their stated commitments, and already
upgraded the battalion size for UNAMID from 680 to 800
troops. Regarding self-deployment to Darfur, Osokogu said
that the GON petitioned the UN for permission to do this, but
he expected the request to be denied. He expressed
frustration at the UN's insistence that out of Nigeria's
fourteen international airports, only Abuja and Lagos were
approved for use by UN aircraft. He expressed a strong
preference for the Maiduguri airport to be used, avoiding
long overland trips for most deploying troops. (Note:
Osokogu's concerns may not be just over lost time and petrol.
Forty-six soldiers returning home from Darfur were killed in
May in an accident with a fuel truck on the Bauchi-Maiduguri
highway. End note.) Osokogu further complained about the
infrequency of UN flights, noting that he had troops sitting
at Abuja's airport since October 18 waiting for an airlift.
This problem was compounded by the absence from Abuja of the
Bangladeshi UN liaison officer responsible for coordinating
Nigerian deployment efforts, who has not yet returned from a
UN trip to Darfur.
3. (SBU) Osokogu confirmed that Nigeria's Level II hospital
arrived in Darfur, but logistical problems prevented its
deployment to the proposed site. He reported that Nigerian
troops in Darfur have 80 new recently delivered Cobra Armored
Personnel Carriers (APCs),as well as 26 APCs that Canadian
troops left behind (of which he believed only around 30% were
functional),thereby reaching the UN standard of 104
vehicles. (Note: Per DAO conversations with Canada's DATT
for West Africa, due to cancellation of their local
maintenance contract and the generally poor condition of
those vehicles, Canada will withdraw their APCs currently on
loan to UNAMID by the end of 2008. End note.) Osokogu said
he will travel to Darfur on October 26 for an inspection of
his troops, and will discuss with us his findings.
--------------
AMISOM
--------------
4. (SBU) Osokogu confirmed that the Somalia-bound units were
"identified, trained, and have been on stand-by for some
time," and that, like UNAMID, their battalion size would be
UN-regulation 800. The main hold-up to their deployment was
the procurement of some final equipment by the MOD. In light
of the heavy urban fighting experienced by Ugandan troops in
Mogadishu, he also acknowledged the need for armor,
mentioning that light tanks, possibly Scorpions already in
the NAF inventory, would be sent at the soonest opportunity.
5. (C) COMMENT: Osokogu was very open and informative, but he
did not always seem to have entirely accurate information.
For example, he seemed unaware that AMISOM is an African
ABUJA 00002118 002 OF 002
Union-sponsored mission, did not know about a recent scouting
mission to Mogadishu performed by Defense Headquarters Staff,
and was unaware that the 26 Canadian APCs are almost
certainly going to be withdrawn. That said, Post believes
his comments on the logistical obstacles faced by deploying
Nigerian battalions are accurate and provide an important
insight into the factors behind Nigeria's delays. Post will
follow up with Osokogu upon his return to Abuja and will
report any substantive information septel. END COMMENT.
6. (U) This cable coordinated with Consulate Lagos.
Sanders
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR AF/W, AF/SPG, INR/AA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/31/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO SU NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA'S FORCE CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNAMID AND AMISOM
REF: SECSTATE 109716
Classified By: Political Counselor Walter Pflaumer for reasons 1.4. (b
& d).
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: In an October 21 meeting with DATT and
Poloff, Defense Headquarters Director of Peacekeeping
Operations Major General F.N. Osokogu confirmed that the GON
will meet its stated commitments to deploy troops to UNAMID
and AMISOM. He shared a number of details about the status
of the deployments that highlighted the challenges Nigerian
troops face both in deploying and on the ground. General
Osokogu intends to visit his UNAMID battalions on October 26,
and has promised later to share his impressions with us on
the state of the troops. Although it was clear at times that
Osokogu was not fully informed, Post believes his statements
offer valuable insights to Nigeria's troop deployment
problems to both locations. END SUMMARY.
--------------
UNAMID
--------------
2. (SBU) On October 21, Major General Osokogu met with DATT
and Poloff to respond to reftel questions about UNAMID and
AMISOM deployments. He affirmed that the Nigerian Armed
Forces (NAF) will meet their stated commitments, and already
upgraded the battalion size for UNAMID from 680 to 800
troops. Regarding self-deployment to Darfur, Osokogu said
that the GON petitioned the UN for permission to do this, but
he expected the request to be denied. He expressed
frustration at the UN's insistence that out of Nigeria's
fourteen international airports, only Abuja and Lagos were
approved for use by UN aircraft. He expressed a strong
preference for the Maiduguri airport to be used, avoiding
long overland trips for most deploying troops. (Note:
Osokogu's concerns may not be just over lost time and petrol.
Forty-six soldiers returning home from Darfur were killed in
May in an accident with a fuel truck on the Bauchi-Maiduguri
highway. End note.) Osokogu further complained about the
infrequency of UN flights, noting that he had troops sitting
at Abuja's airport since October 18 waiting for an airlift.
This problem was compounded by the absence from Abuja of the
Bangladeshi UN liaison officer responsible for coordinating
Nigerian deployment efforts, who has not yet returned from a
UN trip to Darfur.
3. (SBU) Osokogu confirmed that Nigeria's Level II hospital
arrived in Darfur, but logistical problems prevented its
deployment to the proposed site. He reported that Nigerian
troops in Darfur have 80 new recently delivered Cobra Armored
Personnel Carriers (APCs),as well as 26 APCs that Canadian
troops left behind (of which he believed only around 30% were
functional),thereby reaching the UN standard of 104
vehicles. (Note: Per DAO conversations with Canada's DATT
for West Africa, due to cancellation of their local
maintenance contract and the generally poor condition of
those vehicles, Canada will withdraw their APCs currently on
loan to UNAMID by the end of 2008. End note.) Osokogu said
he will travel to Darfur on October 26 for an inspection of
his troops, and will discuss with us his findings.
--------------
AMISOM
--------------
4. (SBU) Osokogu confirmed that the Somalia-bound units were
"identified, trained, and have been on stand-by for some
time," and that, like UNAMID, their battalion size would be
UN-regulation 800. The main hold-up to their deployment was
the procurement of some final equipment by the MOD. In light
of the heavy urban fighting experienced by Ugandan troops in
Mogadishu, he also acknowledged the need for armor,
mentioning that light tanks, possibly Scorpions already in
the NAF inventory, would be sent at the soonest opportunity.
5. (C) COMMENT: Osokogu was very open and informative, but he
did not always seem to have entirely accurate information.
For example, he seemed unaware that AMISOM is an African
ABUJA 00002118 002 OF 002
Union-sponsored mission, did not know about a recent scouting
mission to Mogadishu performed by Defense Headquarters Staff,
and was unaware that the 26 Canadian APCs are almost
certainly going to be withdrawn. That said, Post believes
his comments on the logistical obstacles faced by deploying
Nigerian battalions are accurate and provide an important
insight into the factors behind Nigeria's delays. Post will
follow up with Osokogu upon his return to Abuja and will
report any substantive information septel. END COMMENT.
6. (U) This cable coordinated with Consulate Lagos.
Sanders