NIGERIA: U.N. CALLS FOR NIGER DELTA DEVELOPMENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 001989 SIPDIS STATE FOR AF/W, INR/AA E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL PM EPET KDEM NI SUBJECT: NIGERIA: U.N. CALLS FOR NIGER DELTA DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT AND GIVES UPDATES ON NEW MINISTRY REF: A. ABUJA 1950 ¶B. ABUJA 1951 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Lisa Piascik for reasons 1.4. (b & d). ¶1. (U) SUMMARY: On September 24, PolCouns, USAID Director, and PolOff (notetaker) attended the "Development Partners' Consultations on the Niger Delta" at the United Nations House in Abuja. Also present were the Dutch and Norwegian Ambassadors, European Commission Charge d'Affaires, and other representatives from the Canadian High Commission, Swiss, Japanese and French embassies, World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF),and UK Department for International Development (DFID). U.N. Resident Coordinator Dr. Alberic Kacou facilitated the discussion of a proposed development partner support package for the Niger Delta for submission to the Niger Delta Technical Committee during the week of October 6, 2008. Kacou also updated the group on the creation of the new Niger Delta Ministry and the work of the Niger Delta Technical Committee and Niger Delta Peace and Conflict Committee. There was consensus among the development partners present that it is not feasible to offer any additional large-scale assistance without, at the very least, a Delta-wide political settlement. In addition, there must be a better use of funds that already go into the Delta on a regular basis. END SUMMARY. Donor Support Package Scenarios -------------- ¶2. (U) Kacou shared a first draft of a proposal for donor support, which includes a holistic focus on political, security, social, and economic sectors and builds on "the consensus for the need for a multi-track national strategy." The proposal contains two options: 1) "Best Case Scenario," which includes both short and long-term approaches that assume security is effectively addressed; and 2) "Mid-Case Scenario," which proposes that Development Partners provide support in critical governance areas even if the security situation is not improved. Among the Best Case Scenario immediate-term priorities in the draft are disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of militia groups, generation of economic alternatives for youth militants, improved social services delivery, conflict management and prevention, budgeting and planning, and implementation and monitoring. The "Mid-Case Scenario" is predicated on the GON's commitment to broader structural change and regional leadership. ¶3. (C) The group was hesitant to discuss additional funding for the Niger Delta, particularly for service delivery and large infrastructure and agriculture investments, and overall agreed that the need for transparency is paramount. A long discussion ensued on addressing corruption in the region. The World Bank provided examples of its public expenditure and financial accountability projects, which could provide a starting point, but Dutch Ambassador Van Den Weil asserted that corruption is too endemic to have any practical solution at present and suggested that working with militants might be the only option--although it may be an "unpopular sell at home." Van Den Weil also questioned funding Niger Delta development projects in general, noting that perceptions of poverty in the Niger Delta region differ from reality in that it may not be the poorest region in Nigeria, compared to states like Katsina. EC Charge Theulin stressed the need to address the "militants vs. criminals issue" and in doing so, ensure that the "oil keeps flowing." He also questioned the commitment to reform at the highest levels of the GON. ¶4. (C) Both Norwegian Ambassador Nedrebo and DFID representative Emma Donnelly suggested inclusion of the Gulf of Guinea Energy Security Strategy (GGESS) partners as a key stakeholder in the process, despite the group's less than stellar accomplishments, because it involves key development partners as well as the GON, the security forces, the NDDC, NNPC, international oil companies and core Niger Delta States (Bayelsa, Rivers, Delta, and Akwa Ibom). Updates: Niger Delta Ministry and Other Working Committees -------------- -------------- ¶5. (U) Kacou gave updates on the new Niger Delta Ministry and described the pros and cons of the new Ministry as perceived by the people of the Niger Delta. Among the pros, Kacou told the group that the creation of the new ministry might be seen as a strong signal that the Yar'Adua administration is reinforcing its commitment to finding a solution to the conflict, mostly evidenced through its effort to establish a clear focus for the ministry, acquire donor support, regulatory oversight, and stakeholder empowerment. Among the cons, the creation of yet another ministry may be perceived as a diversion away from the real issues. The Ministry also runs the risk of being perceived as part of the problem rather than the solution if not run by people from the region. PolCouns noted our concern that the decision to have a Minister-of-State within the Ministry, but with an entirely separate portfolio (Youth Development),may lead to disputes over clear lines of responsibility. ¶6. (C) Kacou also informed the group that the Niger Delta Peace and Conflict Resolution Committee recently submitted its report to Nigerian Vice President Goodluck Jonathan. The report contains an overall assessment of the conflict as well as recommendations for securing peace in the future. (Note. Post obtained a "confidential" copy of the report and will send to AF/W via email. No cable on this report will follow. End note.) Kacou also informed the group that the Niger Delta Technical Committee will begin work on the recommendations of the report on October 15. Development Partner Consensus -------------- ¶7. (C) There was consensus among the development partners present that it is not feasible to offer any additional large-scale assistance without, at the very least, a Delta-wide political settlement. In addition, there must be a better use of existing funds in the Niger Delta region. Currently, the state governments and state assemblies lack the capacity to effectively utilize the resources already at their disposal. This makes it imperative that a political settlement should include the commitment to build capacity in key institutions to ensure civil society participation in decision making and end the disenfranchisement of the Niger Delta people, many of whom have legitimate grievances with their government. Until then, it was agreed that development partners can only play a limited, supplementary and mainly advisory role within a larger political effort. END COMMENT. ¶8. (U) This cable was coordinated with Consulate Lagos. Piascik