Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08ABUDHABI983
2008-08-28 13:22:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Abu Dhabi
how-toVZCZCXRO0668 PP RUEHDE RUEHDIR DE RUEHAD #0983 2411322 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 281322Z AUG 08 FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1390 INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT 0086
C O N F I D E N T I A L ABU DHABI 000983
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/28/18
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM MR AE
SUBJECT: UAE MFA VIEW ON MAURITANIA
Classified by CDA Martin Quinn, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
REF: STATE 91116
C O N F I D E N T I A L ABU DHABI 000983
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/28/18
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM MR AE
SUBJECT: UAE MFA VIEW ON MAURITANIA
Classified by CDA Martin Quinn, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
REF: STATE 91116
1. (C) Post delivered reftel points on Mauritania via diplomatic
note, reinforced in an August 27 conversation with Assistant Under
Secretary for Political Affairs Tariq al-Haidan. The senior diplomat
on duty, al-Haidan told the Charge and A/DCM that MFA had been
visited by the Mauritanian Ambassador two days prior, apparently with
a request that the UAEG welcome an envoy from Nouakchott to discuss
the ongoing situation. MFA has not responded to that request (in the
absence of the Minister and Minister of State),and al-Haidan said
the UAEG would urge a return to normalcy.
2. (C) Al-Haidan lamented the discord in Nouakchott yet said the
UAEG had few options but to engage with those in power.
Acknowledging the optimum situation of power residing with
democratically-elected President Abdallahi, al-Haidan said that
Abdallahi had complicated his own position by dismissing his
antagonists too quickly and reinstating a prime minister that the
military opposed. A more gradual process of change would have been
much more prudent, he stressed. The president had thus placed
himself in an awkward position, lamented al-Haidan (contrasting
Abdallahi's haste with the more methodical consolidation of power by
Algerian President Bouteflika).
3. (C) Comment: While sympathetic to the need for calm in
Nouakchott, the UAEG is unlikely to come out with strong statements
one way or another on the leadership equation and will likely refer
to deliberations in the Arab League and GCC as it considers the way
forward. End comment.
QUINN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/28/18
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM MR AE
SUBJECT: UAE MFA VIEW ON MAURITANIA
Classified by CDA Martin Quinn, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
REF: STATE 91116
1. (C) Post delivered reftel points on Mauritania via diplomatic
note, reinforced in an August 27 conversation with Assistant Under
Secretary for Political Affairs Tariq al-Haidan. The senior diplomat
on duty, al-Haidan told the Charge and A/DCM that MFA had been
visited by the Mauritanian Ambassador two days prior, apparently with
a request that the UAEG welcome an envoy from Nouakchott to discuss
the ongoing situation. MFA has not responded to that request (in the
absence of the Minister and Minister of State),and al-Haidan said
the UAEG would urge a return to normalcy.
2. (C) Al-Haidan lamented the discord in Nouakchott yet said the
UAEG had few options but to engage with those in power.
Acknowledging the optimum situation of power residing with
democratically-elected President Abdallahi, al-Haidan said that
Abdallahi had complicated his own position by dismissing his
antagonists too quickly and reinstating a prime minister that the
military opposed. A more gradual process of change would have been
much more prudent, he stressed. The president had thus placed
himself in an awkward position, lamented al-Haidan (contrasting
Abdallahi's haste with the more methodical consolidation of power by
Algerian President Bouteflika).
3. (C) Comment: While sympathetic to the need for calm in
Nouakchott, the UAEG is unlikely to come out with strong statements
one way or another on the leadership equation and will likely refer
to deliberations in the Arab League and GCC as it considers the way
forward. End comment.
QUINN