VISIT OF COMMERCE UNDER SECRETARY MARIO MANCUSO JUNE 22-24,

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 000793 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ARP, T, ISN AND ISN/CPI CHERRINGTON COMMERCE FOR BIS U/S MANCUSO, DELLI-COLLI, LEE E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/08/2018 TAGS: ECON ETRD OTRA IR BEXB ETTC AE SUBJECT: VISIT OF COMMERCE UNDER SECRETARY MARIO MANCUSO JUNE 22-24, 2008 REF: A. ABU DHABI 00729 ¶B. DUBAI 167 ABU DHABI 00000793 001.2 OF 003 Classified by Charge d'Affaires Martin Quinn, reasons 1.4 (b,d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (SBU) Under Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Security Mario Mancuso visited the UAE from June 22-24, 2008 and met with key UAE government and commercial interlocuters to discuss export control, counterproliferation and foreign direct investment issues. During this visit U/S Mancuso met with the following officials: Sheikha Lubna Al Qasimi, Minister for Foreign Trade; Brigadier General Mohammad Al Qemzi, UAE Chair of the Counterproliferation Task Force; Oliver Owcza, Deputy Chief of Mission at the German Embassy; Hisham Al Sherawi, Vice Chairman at the Dubai Chamber and Dubai Chamber Director General Hamad Buamim. ¶2. (S) During visits with UAE officials, the UAE government emphasized the need for transparency and follow-up on information relating to interdiction cases in particular. They highlighted their strong preference to act multilaterally in counterproliferation efforts. They also expressed their concern as to why the U.S. did not try to stop shipments of concern prior to their arriving in the UAE, i.e. items originating in the U.S. itself or transiting other transshipment hubs. Regarding foreign direct investment in the United States, UAE officials counseled that it was important for the U.S. and global economy to guard against "protectionism." End summary. Undersecretary Mancuso's Message -------------- ¶3. (S) U/S Mancuso commended the UAE for its progress in passing an export control law and on its cooperation on sensitive enforcement efforts. At the same time, U/S Mancuso strongly urged his government counterparts to promptly develop an empowered body within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to coordinate export control issues and harmonize the UAE control lists with International/European Union standards. U/S Mancuso highlighted understandable congressional interest in Iran and the role of the UAE in transshipments/blocking transshipments to Iran. He informed UAE officials on developments in Congress regarding proposed legislation by influential members that could negatively highlight the UAE as a destination of concern for U.S. exports. U/S Mancuso emphasized the Administration's opposition to such proposed legislation which could place additional licensing restrictions on the UAE due to the perception that the UAE may not be serious in following through with its export control development. Regarding foreign direct investment in the United States, he stressed that the U.S. government policy is clear in that the USG welcomes "appropriate, commercially driven" foreign investment in the United States. U/S Mancuso explained that the CFIUS process and the new CFIUS law are more transparent and now more tightly focused on national security.(Note: U/S Mancuso repeated these messages during all the meetings hereinafter discussed. End Note.) Foreign Trade and Export Controls -------------- 4.(C) U/S Mancuso met with Sheikha Lubna Al Qasimi, Minister of Foreign Trade to discuss the US-UAE bilateral trade, investment and export control relationship. Regarding foreign direct investment in the United States, Sheikh Lubna counseled that it was important for the U.S. and global economy to guard against "protectionism." Sheikha Lubna expressed her appreciation for U.S. assistance in export control development. She explained that UAE work in the area of export controls was done to protect the UAE's reputation first and foremost as well as to honor the UAE's commitment to its international obligations. Lubna thanked U/S Mancuso for his appraisal of the situation in the U.S. Congress relative to potential legislative efforts to mandate a "country group C" designation. Lubna explained that it was in the UAE interest to do a better job in close coordination with the administration to educate the Congress on the breadth and full scope of the U.S.-UAE relationship. Lubna stated that in the newly appointed UAE Ambassador to the United States, Yousef Al-Otaiba, the UAE has the ideal advocate to deliver this message to Congress. ¶5. (S) Sheikha Lubna highlighted the UAE's strong preference to act multilaterally in counterproliferation efforts. She stated that the UAE does not want to be branded as the place where unilateral interdictions/inspections are conducted at the behest of the U.S. Government. She also expressed the UAE's concerns as to why the U.S. did not try and stop shipments of concern prior to their arriving in the UAE, i.e. items originating in the U.S. itself or transiting ABU DHABI 00000793 002.2 OF 003 other transshipment hubs where the U.S. has influence. Lubna explained that ships that are transiting or refueling in UAE ports do not enter UAE jurisdiction and as such they are not subject to inspection. In such cases, if inspections/interdictions are requested the U.S. should engage with the country of origin to handle any such inspection. German View of UAE Export Controls -------------- ¶6. (S) U/S Mancuso met with the outgoing German DCM Oliver Owcza to discuss the German perspective on UAE export controls. Owcza explained that he sees two main issues that affect the UAE's ability to implement its export control law: (1) institutional capacity and lack of credible human resources; and (2) uncertain political will among all the Emirates to export controls. Owcza stated that institutional issues include the inability of the government to dedicate the credible human resources necessary to undertake the complicated task of formulating a body dedicated to export controls. Owcza went on to state that the UAE has treated the issue as somewhat of a "hot potato", where no one agency has stepped up to take the lead on the implementation of the law. He also stated that it is not clear how committed other Emirates (aside from Abu Dhabi) are to export controls or the implementation of the new law. Finally, Owcza stated that cooperation with the UAE on German interdictions and investigations of shipments of proliferation concern has been good. Counterproliferation Cooperation -------------- 7.(S) U/S Mancuso met with Brigadier General Mohammed Al Qemzi, Chair of the UAE Counter-Proliferation Task Force. Al Qemzi thanked U/S Mancuso for US assistance and asserted that UAE police and intelligence services were working hard to implement the provisions of the recently-enacted export control law. Even before the export law was formally passed, though, Al Qemzi stated the UAE was one of the first countries to join the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and has historically been very active in stemming the flow of illegal goods and closing companies with questionable business practices. 8.(S) Al Qemzi remarked that he was unsure why members of Congress continued to harbor unfavorable views of the UAE, especially since President Bush and other members of Congress have made high-profile trips to the region and have affirmed the strength of the bilateral relationship. He stressed that the UAE was fully committed to enforcing export controls within the bounds of international obligations and noted that such enforcement was not just in the interest of the international community but is conducted for the UAE's own national interests. Improving Information Exchange -------------- 9.(S) A member of Al Qemzi's staff interjected that the timeliness of shared intelligence in interdiction cases should be improved, noting that it often takes time to activate the requisite police/intelligence forces necessary to respond to specific, actionable intelligence. An updated listing of the prohibited companies and clarity on restricted materials would also improve the efficiency of counterproliferation efforts. ¶10. (S) Al Qemzi took the opportunity to raise the issue of Mayrow, complaining that the U.S. had not adequately responded to a number of questions raised by UAE authorities. (Note: Mayrow was a trading firm in Dubai that was involved in supplying electronic components that were being used to develop IEDs in Iraq. End note.) He also repeatedly emphasized that the Counterproliferation Task Force (CTF) was not the appropriate forum to discuss Mayrow issues since it has nothing to do with counterproliferation. Al Qemzi pointed to the repeated inquiries in which the UAE asked the USG for clarification but did not receive any response. Al Qemzi explained that the government can be held liable under UAE law for closing Mayrow related companies without any justifiable legal cause and that is why they were asking for answers to additional questions. He explained they wanted to protect themselves from a suit by the closed companies. Al Qemzi concluded by stating that cooperation is a two-way street and that he considers the Mayrow issue to be closed, a comment he also made at the most recent Counterproliferation Task Force meeting. U/S Mancuso stated that the U.S. had responded to the UAE's request for more information as fully as practicable. While he agreed that improvements in communication should be made, he urged the UAE to not rely exclusively on the U.S. for 3rd party information/tips. ABU DHABI 00000793 003.2 OF 003 Industry Outreach - The Dubai Chamber -------------- ¶11. (C) U/S Mancuso met with Hisham Al Sherawi, the Dubai Chamber's Second Vice Chairman and Dubai Chamber Director General Hamad Buamim. Both officials commented that they were heavily consulted by the UAE Ministry of Economy during the drafting of the export control law and they felt that the law provides sufficient legal authority to combat illicit activity. An issue brought up by Dubai Chamber officials was their perception of dual-use items. They felt that dual use is a vague concept and noted that many items considered to be dual-use are very difficult to control. They remarked that better guidance on what specifically constitutes a controlled item would improve the UAE's ability to deal with dual use controls. Al Sherawi stated that the UAE export law was operational and that coordination between the UAE customs, the intelligence services, and the Dubai Chamber has been excellent. They explained that a special intelligence unit has been established within the Chamber to address companies of concern. Specifically addressing Iranian activity, Buamim explained that all transactions involving Iranian companies and citizens are flagged and must be cleared with appropriate UAE intelligence agencies through this unit. Buamim added that Iranian companies and citizens also face many additional restrictions in the UAE, including supplementary banking requirements, restrictive business licensing, and additional immigration scrutiny. Al Sherawi added that the UAE is always ready to cooperate within the bounds of UAE law. (Comment: Buamim and Al Sherawi's remarks are consistent with earlier conversations with USG officials, see reftel B. End Comment). QUINN