THE UAE'S YOUNG NEW AMBASSADOR -- MBZ'S RIGHT HAND MAN GETS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 000392

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ARP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/25/2018
TAGS: PREL OVIP AE
SUBJECT: THE UAE'S YOUNG NEW AMBASSADOR -- MBZ'S RIGHT HAND MAN GETS
READY TO TAKE ON WASHINGTON

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Classified by Charge d'Affaires Martin Quinn, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S) Summary: The UAE on 24 March nominated a new Ambassador to
the U.S. in the coming months. The choice of 34-year-old Yousef Mana
al-Otaiba -- the sharp, loyal, aide and right-hand man to Abu Dhabi
Crown Prince Muhammad bin Zayed (MbZ) -- reflects a desire to
heighten the UAE's visibility to U.S. politicians. The appointment
places a direct conduit to and from MbZ, Deputy Supreme Commander of
the Armed Forces, at Washington's doorstep at a time when the UAE
ambitiously seeks a global reputation. The following cable provides
bio and other information on Otaiba, based on Embassy interactions
with the young technocrat over the past several years. End summary.

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Biographical data: Emirati Son of Privilege
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2. (S) Yousef Mana al-Otaiba, born January 19, 1974 in Abu Dhabi,
hails from one of the emirate's wealthiest and better connected
non-royal clans. A merchant family intermarried with Abu Dhabi's
ruling al-Nahyan tribe, the al-Otaiba name has been and continues to
be represented in UAE government circles.


3. (S) Yousef is the son of the UAE's first Minister of Petroleum,
Mana Saeed al-Otaiba -- one of the country's key non-royal founding
members as well as a close confidant to the late UAE founder and
President Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan al-Nahyan. Yousef was raised in
Cairo by his Egyptian mother, from whom he is the only child (Mana
Saeed had 4 wives and at least 12 children). Although his studies at
the Cairo American College (at the time the premier American School
in Cairo) were likely funded by his father's wealth, Yousef likes to
reflect on his "modest upbringing" in Egypt as compared to the more
opulent life he enjoys as a member of MbZ's entourage. After
completing high school in Egypt in 1991, Yousef studied at Georgetown
University, where he obtained a degree in International Relations in

1995. He spent the next three years working as Deputy General
Manager for the automotive division of his family's firm, the Al
Otaiba Group. (Note: Yousef's views of the U.S. may be slightly
tarnished by his father's loss of the prestigious General
Motors/Cadillac agency in Abu Dhabi after a bitter 11-year dispute
over non-performance. End note.) He was then selected to attend the
Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) at National Defense
University in Washington, D.C., in preparation for an assignment to
join the immediate staff of then UAE Armed Forces Chief of Staff MbZ,
a position he assumed upon graduating from ICAF in 2000. Yousef's
prominence in MbZ's circles grew from that point; he quips that he
was the only civilian in a very military environment before the boss
himself became a civilian.


4. (S) The intimacy of Yousef's relationships with his father and
half-siblings is unclear. Yousef lives in his father's home in Abu
Dhabi, a palatial residence in which one might cross paths with a
sibling infrequently. He also maintains an apartment, or bachelor
pad, in the upscale Khalediya neighborhood. Embassy officers
observed an awkward encounter in February 2008 when Yousef ran into
one of his half-sisters while having dinner with a U.S. delegation.
They greeted one another very warmly, but Yousef commented to his
U.S. guests that he was the only child from his mother and that there
are so many children in his family, "we are more like cousins." He
once identified a half brother serving in the motorcade of another
visiting U.S. military delegation -- Yousef was part of the VIP
entourage, his brother a lesser military officer.

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Tackling Diplomacy and Representing the Boss
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5. (S) It is unclear how Yousef was initially selected to MbZ's
staff (i.e., by Yousef's own ambition, his father's intervention,
MbZ's personal selection); however, it seems clear that a combination
of loyalty, savvy, and smarts have propelled Yousef's quick ascension
once he got his foot in the door. Yousef is known to several
rotations of Embassy officials as MbZ's right hand man. An
all-purpose staffer, Yousef functions as advisor, coordinator, and
gatekeeper to the Crown Prince, simultaneously managing the security
issues most important to MbZ (such as military procurements and
national defense priorities) as well as paying increasing attention
to key international economic issues (e.g., Sovereign Wealth Funds,
regarding which he personally signed a 12 March 2008 letter to U.S.
Treasury Secretary Paulson spelling out Abu Dhabi's policy on
international investments; he also wrote a March 19 op-ed for the
Wall Street Journal on the same topic). Yousef has quickly
transitioned from an observer at MbZ meetings to chairing events as
MbZ's representative and becoming the conduit by which U.S. officials
often gain access to the Crown Prince.


6. (S) Post has found Yousef generally efficient, approachable, and
willing to engage, and those who have worked with him note his talent

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for cultivating relationships. He has been responsive to e-mail and
text messages, for example, from the Ambassador and other U.S.
officers. Still, Yousef increasingly projects a noted air of
"wearing his boss' rank," and several U.S. officials have been put
off by his seeming self-aggrandizement that is perhaps a product of
his close relationship with one of the UAE's most powerful figures.
Moreover, upon becoming MbZ's Director for International Affairs in
2005, Yousef displayed a distinct preference for engaging with the
U.S. Ambassador or Charge directly when possible. U.S. officials
also note that Yousef has become more brazen during meetings,
unafraid to ruffle feathers with frank pronouncements, confident that
he carries the weight of his boss behind him.


7. (S) Indeed, Yousef is widely recognized within Emirati government
circles as MbZ's trusted emissary, and (non-royal) UAE officials give
his word the expected deference, understanding that it is not Yousef
but rather the Crown Prince delivering a message. Still, in a
country where protocol and deference to royal authority are of
central importance, Yousef clearly understands his limits. When
chairing meetings at the technocrat level, Yousef projects a studied
air of authority and rank. In settings where the Crown Prince is
present, however, Yousef rarely speaks unless MbZ defers to him for
details or clarification, or to assist in translating a word from the
Arabic; on rare occasions, Yousef will confidently jump in if MbZ is
not fully cognizant of the issue being addressed.


8. (S) Yousef is acutely aware that he has thus far represented MbZ
exclusively. In his current role, Yousef will never attempt, and if
asked he will refuse, to speak on behalf of another UAEG leader --
even another of MbZ's full brothers (the Bani Fatima) and certainly
not for UAE Prime Minister/Vice President and Dubai Ruler Muhammad
bin Rashid (MbR). How he balances the broader role of Ambassador
will be telling. Yousef's own power will ultimately be limited by an
Emirati glass ceiling. The Otaiba family name and Yousef's proximity
to the Crown Prince may afford him a position of some prominence,
perhaps ministerial, in the future. However, as one of the
"muwathafeen" (Arabic for "employee," the word Abu Dhabi's ruling
al-Nahyans often use to describe non-royal government functionaries),
Yousef is unlikely to attain a position of real or ultimate
authority. (The Bani Fatima hold the key Cabinet portfolios of
Intelligence and Foreign Affairs, for example). Moreover, Yousef's
partial Egyptian heritage and relationship with a Western woman (he
is currently single but has voiced an interest in marriage) may pose
a further handicap as his visibility and role in government grow in
Abu Dhabi.

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Loyal MbZ Mouthpiece...
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9. (S) A careful and loyal member of MbZ's staff, Yousef is
consistently on-point. A smart interlocutor with a firm grasp on the
issues he addresses, Yousef's portfolio has become increasingly broad
and includes some of the UAE's most pressing political, military,
security and economic issues. Typically straightforward and
authoritative in bilateral discussions, Yousef does not dance around
the issues or shy away from delivering a firm or unpleasant message
-- as he did during the 11 March Gulf Security Dialogue when he
stated that the UAEG has "no confidence" in the government of Iraqi
PM al-Maliki. Yousef is well aware of his boss' positions on the
issues within his portfolio, and no matter how candid a discussion,
he can be found reiterating the approved MbZ talking points. When
pressed to go off-message on an issue for which he does not have a
clear or at least general sense of his boss' position, Yousef has
been known to become visibly irritated and refuse to answer the
question. He is aggressively protective of the UAE's reputation when
he feels an interlocutor is being patronizing.

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...But Who to Represent?
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10. (S) Yousef's transition to a position nominally reporting
through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs may present a protocol
challenge for the young technocrat. Yousef has spent his government
career navigating one office and reporting to one very senior Abu
Dhabi royal personality. As an ambassador, however, he will
technically become a voice for the broader UAEG, officially falling
under the purview of UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed (AbZ) --
the youngest Bani Fatima brother and himself an MbZ protg -- and
also representing MbR, a UAE head of government whose objectives are
often Dubai rather than federally focused. It is likely, however,
that Yousef will continue to report ultimately to MbZ -- as the Crown
Prince's Man in Washington.


11. (S) Yousef told Embassy Officials recently that although he had
been replaced by Muhammad al-Mazrouie on MbZ's staff in terms of
logistics and scheduling functions (while Yousef prepares for his

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departure to Washington),al-Mazrouie would not assume the
substantive portfolios Yousef has juggled. Yousef will presumably
maintain control over some substantive issues (in essence pushing the
traditional MbZ issues while simultaneously performing ambassadorial
duties). Moreover, the U.S. portfolio has long been the Crown
Prince's bailiwick, and he wields significant influence over UAE
foreign affairs in general via his close, mentoring relationship with
AbZ and by the nature of his status as a senior al-Nahyan. (Note:
MbZ has shown his interest in the foreign policy arena recently by
naming 10 UAE military retirees as ambassadors-in-training. End
note.) Still, it remains to be seen whether or how much Yousef will
also report to other UAEG leaders and how he will juggle various
royal personalities should the need arise.


12. (S) Moreover, it is unclear at this point whether Yousef will
even attempt to effectively integrate into the MFA team at the
Embassy, or, as is more likely, recruit his own staff to form the
core of a new UAE mission. Yousef has indicated to Embassy staff
that he is facing some difficulty assembling a core team; he clearly
prefers not to rely on MFA personnel. (According to a reliable
source, he is not on good personal terms with another member of the
country team -- the current UAE military attach, Brigadier General
Mahfooz Muhammad Ahmed al-Sheihi. The two may have clashed during a
recent visit by Yousef to the U.S.) He has also brought consultants
from the Harbour Group into recent communications on various
bilateral (U.S.-UAE) topics, suggesting reliance on professional
advice from outside the UAEG altogether. It would not be out of
character for private lobbyists to represent the UAE Embassy to USG
officials at various junctures.

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Dealing with Yousef in the U.S.
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13. (S) As the product of an American education and a graduate of
both Georgetown and ICAF, Yousef is very much in tune with American
culture and politics, impressing and relating well to U.S.
interlocutors with his near-native English language capability and
his very American demeanor. He rarely misses a nuance in idiomatic
English conversation. Despite his U.S. background and physical
projections of Americanization (including daily workouts at the gym,
a preferred meeting place),Yousef ultimately identifies as an
Emirati, loyal to Abu Dhabi and its mentality. While friendly with
USG officials, Yousef reflects his own government's cautious, at
times impatient and cynical attitude towards Washington. Letting him
grumble about the frustrations of bureaucracy, as he is prone to do,
can build trust in a relationship, although one should not let
cynicism become the focus of the conversation. Steering the
discussion smartly back to the point of the meeting is important to
maintaining rapport with Yousef.


14. (S) Yousef can be put off quickly and become testy if he feels
an interlocutor is patronizing the UAE by suggesting the U.S. would
like to "assess" UAE capabilities in a certain area or if he senses
Washington preaching to a policy pupil. He shares the confidence of
his boss that the UAE is a maturing state quite capable of
understanding regional policy and national interest. That said,
Yousef appreciates a frank, blunt message in an honest conversation,
and he is not unwilling to carry such messages back to UAE
authorities.


15. (S) Finally, on key topics critical to the bilateral
relationship, Yousef ultimately represents Abu Dhabi first and
foremost. To the extent that UAE policy is a product of balancing
between Abu Dhabi and Dubai and the smaller emirates, one must assume
that Yousef leans toward the Abu Dhabi side of that equation.
Whether the topic is sovereign wealth funds, military procurements,
or Iran, Yousef delivers careful talking points on federal positions
with an Abu Dhabi flair. His forceful and at times aggressive
statements on Iran, for example, might well be taken with a grain of
salt, as they are reiterations of the traditional (but private) MbZ
and Abu Dhabi talking points on the UAE's larger neighbor, not
necessarily corroborated with the much more robust economic
relationship that country has with Dubai and the northern emirates.

QUINN