ACTING A/S MCNERNEY MEETS WITH UAEG OFFICIALS

S E C R E T ABU DHABI 000326 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR T, ISN, NEA/ARP COMMERCE FOR BORMAN E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2018 TAGS: PARM PREL ETTC AE SUBJECT: ACTING A/S MCNERNEY MEETS WITH UAEG OFFICIALS REF: A. DUBAI 72 ¶B. ABU DHABI 222 Classified By: Martin Quinn, Charge d'Affaries a.i., for reasons 1.4 b and d. ¶1. (S) Summary: On February 25 and 26, UAEG officials asserted that the UAE's export control law was in force, but that it was being amended to make it easier to implement. The UAE would create an autonomous organization to implement the export control law. The UAE interlocutors raised concerns about the timeliness of USG-provided information with regard to interdicting shipments to Iran, especially requesting the provision of follow-up information to help the UAE make a legal case for actions. With regard to peaceful nuclear cooperation, the UAE reiterated its renunciation of any domestic reprocessing or enrichment capabilities. The International Affairs Advisor to the Abu Dhabi Crown Prince stated that the Prime Minister/Ruler of Dubai had carried clear messages of concern to both Iran and Syria, but that the recipients were "in denial." The UAE appeared receptive of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and asked for additional information. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) On February 25 and 26, Acting ISN Assistant Secretary Patricia McNerney held meetings with Abdulla SIPDIS Al-Saleh, Under Secretary of the Ministry of Economy; Yousef Al-Otaiba, International Affairs Director for Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed; Mohammed Al-Mehairi, Director General of the Federal Customs Authority; Yacoub Al-Hosani, International Organizations Director for the MFA; and Dubai Customs Director Ahmed Bin Butti. She was joined by USDOC/BIS DAS Matthew Borman and ISN/CPI Director Tony Foley for all meetings, except the one with Al-Otaiba. Ambassador Jackie Wolcott joined on the meeting with Al-Otaiba. Interdictions -------------- ¶3. (S) Several of the interlocutors raised the UAE's willingness to continue stopping transshipments based on USG-provided information, but expressed some concerns about the timeliness of resolving questions of disposition of the cargoes. Al-Otaiba, noting the focused nature of security officials, stated that "no one wants to" hold on to shipments longer than necessary. Without evidence that could be used to make a legal case for holding/redirecting shipments, UAEG officials were predisposed to return the goods to their countries of origin rather than continuing to detain them or allowing them through. In a separate meeting, Ahmed bin Butti expressed similar complaints about not being able to detain shipments indefinitely. Al-Otaiba said he would suggest to the security services and the MFA that they provide a specific time frame after which they would take action (not necessarily our desired action),absent further information from the USG. He noted that the process of making a law enforcement case from intelligence information took too long and referred to an interdiction that the UAEG took on behalf of the UK authorities -- after the UAEG held the shipment for a year, the UK admitted that it could not make a legal case and asked the UAE to allow the items to continue to Pakistan. Export Control Law -------------- ¶4. (C) Both Al-Hosani and Al-Saleh discussed the challenges of implementing the export control law. Al-Saleh said that the Ministry of Economy, which had championed the law's passage, no longer had a meaningful role in its implementation. He had not even been invited to the CTF meeting. He explained the UAEG's concerns that because of MinEcon's role with trade agreements and the WTO that any detailed involvement in implementing the law would conflict with its role as a trade advocate. Al-Saleh asserted that MFA, which is responsible for implementing the law, doesn't have the expertise needed. Despite the planned amendments, he stated that the law was in operation. ¶5. (C) Al-Hosani admitted that implementing the law had been difficult, citing federal-local jurisdictional issues as complicating the process. Both Minister of Foreign Affairs Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al-Nahyan and Minister of Presidential Affairs Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed Al-Nahyan had agreed to establish an independent authority or office to implement the law. The UAEG would also amend the law to link it explicitly to existing anti-money laundering and counter terror laws. The new implementing office would be autonomous, but report through Sheikh Abdullah to the cabinet. It would also incorporate the Chemical Weapons Convention national committee. ¶6. (C) Al-Hosani explained the current UAE export licensing process, which he described as confusing. A company submits an application to the customs departments and economic affairs departments in individual emirates. These organizations then send the paper work to the security services, which (after checking) pass it to the MFA for final approval. He added that the business community (especially the foreign business community) was unhappy with the law's implementation. For his part, Al-Saleh stated that UAE private sector antagonism towards the law has been minimal, mainly because the law relates to national security. Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Ambassador Jackie Walcott explained our support for the UAEG's renunciation of domestic enrichment and reprocessing in its plans for developing nuclear power. Al-Otaiba noted that the UAE was starting to build its nuclear infrastructure from scratch and wanted to learn from best practices. He stressed the need to keep U.S. - UAE agreements, whether the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, a Memorandum of Understanding, or a 1,2,3 agreement, on-track in order for the UAE to met its ambitious goal of having an operational nuclear power plant by 2017. He asked the UAE's head of peaceful nuclear cooperation, Hamad Al-Kaabi, to be sure that the Executive Affairs Authority (the body tasked with evaluating nuclear power) pursue negotiating agreements with the U.S. as a priority. With regard to the Global Initiative, Al-Otaiba asked for a more detailed assessment of the UAE's obligations as a member of the organization. A/S McNerney explained that the initiative was about building capacity and -- although there were not specific obligations -- there was an expectation that members would focus resources on meeting the G.I. principles. Iran -------------- ¶8. (C) Al-Otaiba stayed on message with regard to UAE Vice President/Prime Minister/Ruler of Dubai Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al-Maktoum's visit to Iran and Syria. He explained that the UAE had had modest expectations for the trip. The message to Iran, he said, was that the Iranian nuclear program had regional implications. The message to Syria was that it needed to be proactive and "work together" on Lebanon. A Lebanese civil war would harm the region. He stated that this message had been delivered to the highest levels in both countries, but admitted that the response had been one of "denial, lack of acknowledgement." The Iranian PR machine, he noted, had twisted the visit to one of economic cooperation and a "happy, happy" message. A/S McNerney asked for Al-Otaiba's assessment of Kish Island, which she noted was coming up increasingly on the USG's radar screen. Al-Otaiba replied that he was not too familiar with Kish Island, which he described as historically a sort of "Cayman Islands" with little control over activities taking place on it. Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism -------------- ¶9. (SBU) A/AS McNerney pressed Al Otaiba on the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and asked that the UAEG endorse the initiative. He indicated there were no political issues but that the UAE was interested in the level of commitment required. A/AS McNerney promised to provide him with a paper outlining GI commitments. ¶10. (U) This cable has been cleared by the U.S. visiting party. QUINN