US - UAE COUNTERPROLIFERATION TASK FORCE MEETING

S E C R E T ABU DHABI 000325

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR T, ISN, AND NEA/ARP
COMMERCE FOR BORMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2018
TAGS: PARM PREL ETTC AE
SUBJECT: US - UAE COUNTERPROLIFERATION TASK FORCE MEETING
IN ABU DHABI

REF: 07 ABU DHABI 1966

Classified By: Martin Quinn, Charge d'Affaires a.i., for reasons 1.4 b
and d.


1. (S/NF) Summary: During the February 25
Counterproliferation Task Force meeting, the UAEG asserted
that it was enforcing the 2007 export control law, but was in
the process of amending it to make it easier to implement and
enforce. The UAE pushed for better coordination and
follow-up from the USG on information related to
interdictions, noting that it had returned the cargo on the
M/V Iran Tabatabaei to Malaysia, but was still holding cargo
from four other interdictions. Acting A/S McNerney offered
training to the UAEG as it implemented its export control
law. The UAEG was receptive and asked for assistance in
training prosecutors and judges who were still unaware of the
law. On proliferation finance, the UAE Central Bank noted a
drop in Iranian financial transfers to the UAE and explained
that the Central Bank had authorized Bank Sepah payments to
five banks operating in the UAE after ensuring that the
payments were for contracts prior to the passage of UNSCRs
1737 and 1747 and were not going to designated entities. End
Summary.


2. (S) On February 25, Acting ISN Assistant Secretary
Patricia McNerney led an interagency delegation to a
Counterproliferation Task Force meeting with the UAEG.
McNerney also held bilateral meetings with several UAEG
officials (septel).

Export Control Law
--------------


3. (C) The UAEG provided a brief update on the status of
implementation of the 2007 export control law. According to
UAE Chair BG Mohammad Al-Qemzi, the UAE was enforcing the law
and was in the process of amending it to improve its
operation. The amendment, currently with the Ministry of
Justice, would create a national implementation "body"
(whether "authority" or office still TBD) rather than the two
implementation committees called for currently.
Implementation of the law would be placed under the authority
a new implementation body which would report through the
Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Cabinet, rather than the
Ministry of Economy. Al-Qemzi explained that the UAEG
realized it would be impossible for a committee to work on
day to day implementation. The amendment would "put someone
in control." Al-Qemzi hoped that the amendment would be
passed by summer.


4. (S) Al-Qemzi asserted that the UAEG was referring to the
law in cases where it detained or impounded shipments or
acted against companies. In response to a question by the
U.S. delegation, Al-Qemzi admitted that most of the
enforcement actions were based on U.S.-provided information.
USDOC/BIS DAS Borman asked about the procedures for updating
the control list, noting that the Government of Singapore
(which had served as the model for the UAE control list) had
revised its list in the beginning of 2008 to better reflect
the international control regimes. The UAE explained that
the list was designed to be updated and that the UAE was
evaluating it to ensure that it reflected the international
regimes.

Training
--------------


5. (SBU) A/S McNerney offered USG assistance and training for
the UAE to implement and enforce its export control law. She
briefly explained the USG's Export Control and Related Border
Security (EXBS) program. She noted that the USG had funds
allocated to training programs, but that it would need to
spend those funds relatively quickly. Al-Qemzi stated that
the UAEG's highest training priority would be training for
prosecutors and judges. For the UAEG to successfully make
cases, he noted, judges and prosecutors would need to
understand the seriousness of the crimes. He also expressed
some interest in outreach to the UAE Chambers of Commerce on
licensing issues. Federal Customs Authority Director general
Mohammed Al-Mehairi expressed interest in the same types of
training that the U.S. had provided Singapore.


UNSCR Implementation
--------------



6. (C) The Central Bank's Ahmed Al-Qamzi briefly discussed
UAE observations regarding proliferation finance. He stated
that the UAE had noted a drop in financial transfers from
Iran. The UAE had issued two circulars concerning the UNSCRs
and inspected financial institutions to ensure that no funds
were received by designated entities.


7. (SBU) Ahmed Al-Qamzi noted that the UAE had notified the
UNSC 1737 committee of it intent to authorize payments from
Bank Sepah accounts to five banks operating in the UAE. He
confirmed that the Central Bank had authorized five banks
operating in the UAE to receive Sepah payments and reiterated
that the Central Bank had checked to ensure that the payments
were for contracts entered into prior to the relevant UNSCRs
and that they did not accrue to any designated entity.


8. (S/NF) AA/S McNerney raised the issue of Tanchon Bank
officials operating in the UAE and facilitating bank
transactions for Iran's Bank Sepah on the Iranian owned Kish
Island. She asked whether the UAE had uncovered any
information based on USG provided information. Ahmed
Al-Qamzi replied that Tanchon was not licensed to operate in
the UAE and that the Central Bank had frozen its accounts in
the UAE based on a U.S. request. He said he was not aware of
their presence in the UAE and asked AA/S McNerney for
additional information, which she agreed to provide. (Note:
Post raised this with MFA International Organizations
Director Yacoub Al-Hosani in December 2007, per reftel. End
Note.)


9. (S) AA/S McNerney briefed on the new draft UN Security
Council resolution that -- if adopted -- would call for
further scrutiny on two Iranian banks (Melli and Saderat).
The resolution would also call on states to inspect cargos
bound for Iran on Iran Air and IRSIL lines and increase the
number of goods to be scrutinized. The resolution would move
beyond current sanctions and should be seen in the context of
the current IAEA report. Although the IAEA report did show
some Iranian cooperation, it highlighted Iran's continuing
failure to comply with its UNSC obligation to suspend all
uranium enrichment-related, reprocessing, and heavy
water-related activities without delay. It also underscored
Iran's refusal to provide the necessary transparency and
cooperation to the IAEA to permit it to make credible
assurances as to the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's
nuclear program.


10. (S/NF) BG Al-Qemzi noted that the publication of the
unclassified version of the U.S. National Intelligence

SIPDIS
Estimate (NIE) had increased Iranian pressure on the UAE to
permit items to transit to Iran. He noted that the Iranians
appeared to be accelerating their shipments and had formally
approached the UAEG to ask: "Why are you stopping material,
when the CIA has cleared us?" Al-Qemzi further noted that
the UAE's information and analysis that the Iranians were
still working on nuclear weapons development, information
that it had shared with "friendly governments" did not appear
to have made it into the "CIA's analysis." The UAE continued
to assess that the Iranians were moving forward rapidly with
their nuclear weapons development program. AA/S McNerney
stated that neither the NIE nor the IAEA cleared Iran, and
many serious issues, including weaponization, were
outstanding. She noted that the Iranians were characterizing
reports for their own purposes.

Interdictions
--------------


11. (S) BG Al-Qemzi expressed concerns about the process of
coordination regarding interdictions, which he stated should
only be the beginning of the process not the end. Once the
USG had passed enough information to stop a shipment, it
needed to follow-through with more information to help the
UAEG make a case for continuing to detain the shipment. MFA
Director of International Cooperation Yacoub Al-Hosani
explained that intelligence sharing had improved in terms of
details although timeliness was still a concern. Short
notice/evening/weekend approaches for interdictions
logistical challenges for UAE officials. The earlier the
information was passed, the "better for all of us," he noted.


12. (S) The UAE stated that it needs USG support to work with
originator countries, especially China, which have proved
resistant to accepting cargo return. AA/S McNerney noted
that the USG has raised concerns about Iran to the highest

levels of the Chinese government and that the USG shares the
UAEG's impatience. Al-Hosani explained that the UAE had
invited the Chinese authorities to send a delegation to the
UAE to discuss the problem of transshipment. The GoC
accepted, but has not yet committed to a time.


13. (S) The UAEG side complained that USG follow-up is slow,
once shipments are stopped by the UAE. In each case, the UAE
had requested further information to determine whether to
prosecute or to return the cargo to its country of origin.
DHS/ICE attach explained the process that U.S. law
enforcement uses to conduct parallel investigations when it
receives intelligence information. Al-Mehari expressed
interest in receiving information on parallel investigations
as the UAE's Federal Customs Authority tries to build its
capacity, especially to develop an intelligence analysis
capability.


14. (S/NF) In the case of the aluminum tubes and plates
carried on the M/V Iran Tabatabaei, UAEG officials stated
that the cargo had been returned some weeks ago to Malaysia.
BG Al-Qemzi explained that the UAE had come under pressure to
resolve the interdiction and "had to act." Note: Yousef Al
Otaiba indicated later to AA/S McNerney that he had told UAE
officials after the meeting that the UAE would make sure to
provide advance notice in the future of such disposition
actions. (end note) The UAE had requested further information
from the USG, which had not been forthcoming. Since the UAEG
was not prepared to have the shipment continue to Iran, it
was returned to Malaysia.

PSI
---


15. (C) The U.S. informed the UAE side about two upcoming
PSI-related events, a Regional Workshop in Budapest and the
5th Anniversary Senior Level Meeting (May 28-29, Washington,
DC) and noted that invitations would be coming shortly. The
UAE delegation raised concerns about the confidentiality of
information shared during the PSI process, noting that in
some cases confidentiality had not been respected.

Mayrow
--------------


16. (C) BG Al-Qemzi reacted strongly to the inclusion of
Mayrow General Trading in the agenda. The UAEG had closed
Mayrow, he stated, despite the lack of information from the
USG needed to complete the investigation. The UAEG had
submitted a paper on Mayrow with specific requests for
evidence needed to further its investigation and never
received any answers. Despite that, the UAEG took
administrative action to deport individuals involved,
including Ali Yahya, and to close Mayrow and its affiliate
Atlinx. In response, DAS Borman noted that we were providing
new information on Mayrow, specifically, that we have reason
to believe that Ali Akbar Yahya continues to operate Atlinx
Electronics and that Hamid Al Fahid Company has taken over
the Mayrow operations at the Ahmed Ali Building in Deira,
Dubai. DAS Borman asked Al-Qemzi to resubmit the requests.
A/AS McNerney also emphasized that this issue should remain
in the CTF as it involved issues related to Iran,s
proliferation activities.

Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism
--------------


17. (SBU) The UAE asked for more information on the Global
Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, including the list of
participants and the commitments to which countries would
subscribe. AA/S McNerney explained that there was a set of
principles laid out in the global initiative and a plan of
work was being developed to meet those principles. Countries
could join by sending a diplomatic note to either the U.S. or
the Russian Embassy.

(SBU) UAE Delegation
--------------


18. (SBU) UAE Delegation Members

-- Brigadier General Mohammad bin Dhaen al Qemzi, Director of
Dubai's General Department of State Security (GDSS)
-- Brigadier General Abdul Aziz Maktoum Al Sharifi,
Protective Security Administration, Ministry of Interior (MoI)
-- Yousef Al Otaiba, Director of International Affairs,

Office of the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi
-- Yacoub Al Hosani, Director for International Affairs,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
-- Mohammed Al-Mehari, Director General Federal Customs
Authority
-- Awad Al-Niyadi, UAE Armed Forces
-- Major Mansour Al-Bastaki, GDSS
-- Riyadh Al-Balhool, Dubai Police
Seif Al-Muhairy, State Security
-- Abdullah Al-Nuwaimi, State Security
-- Ahmed Saeed Al Qamzi, Anti Money Laundering Suspicious
Cases Unit (AMLSCU),Central Bank
-- Mohammad Khalifa Al Kitbi, Protective Security
Administration, MoI.
-- Khalifa Al-Mazroui, MFA
QUINN