MARCH 11 GULF SECURITY DIALOGUE AND MARCH 12 JOINT

S E C R E T ABU DHABI 000296

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ARP, PM/FO
DOD FOR OSD/MARY BETH LONG, SUSAN HASMAN
CENTCOM FOR J5 RADM MILLER, LT COL REYES

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2018
TAGS: PREL PTER PARM MOPS MASS KNNP IR IZ LE AE
SUBJECT: MARCH 11 GULF SECURITY DIALOGUE AND MARCH 12 JOINT
MILITARY COMMITTEE WITH UAE

REF: A. REFS: A) ABU DHABI 2129

B. B) ABU DHABI 00160

C. C) ABU DHABI 00222

D. D) DUBAI 00072

E. E) DOHA 00136

F. F) IIR 6 931 0071 08

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Martin Quinn, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S) Summary: Embassy Abu Dhabi looks forward to the
March 11 Gulf Security Dialogue (GSD) and March 12 Joint
Military Commission (JMC) as opportunities to renew our
mutual commitment to shared strategic goals with the UAE, to
remind the UAE military of U.S. appreciation for its support
and interest in yet deeper engagement, and to bolster the
common defense through enhanced partnership. The six pillars
of the GSD will be addressed by a seasoned UAE team enjoying
proximity to the thinking of key UAE strategist (Abu Dhabi
Crown Prince and Deputy Supreme Commander of the UAE Armed
Forces) Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ) al-Nahyan. Air Vice
Marshall (Major General) Mohammed Sowaidan al-Gimzy, Chief of
the UAE Air Force and Air Defense, will be the UAE Chair for
both events. End summary.

Program
--------------


2. (C) GSD: The UAE has agreed to our proposed agenda for
the GSD plenary session (omitting Critical Infrastructure
Protection for unexplained reasons),which will take place in
one multi-hour session (0830-1330) on March 11, followed by
an hour-long lunch. The session will address in turn the six
GSD agenda topics. We anticipate the venue of the GSD (and
the JMC) to be the UAE Armed Forces Officers' Club (AFOC)
where we have reservations for most of the traveling
delegation. If past iterations of the GSD are a reliable
guide, we might anticipate an evening meeting with MbZ on
March 11, although that has not been confirmed (and is not
likely to be certain until the day of the event).


3. (C) JMC: Post anticipates the JMC taking place over the
course of one day on March 12 with an opening plenary
followed by parallel running sub-committees. The JMC will
follow the established agenda with a focus on military
cooperation and security assistance. Like the GSD, it will
likely be held at the UAE Armed Forces Officers' Club (AFOC).
Meetings will again start early in the morning on the 12th
and run until at least 17:00. Embassy plans to host a JMC
pre-meeting on the evening of March 11 per request.

Regional Security
--------------


4. (S) IRAN: The UAE military has long viewed Iran as its
top security threat in spite of the extensive economic
relationship the two countries share. As such, Iran will top
the agenda in terms of putting regional threats into
perspective. UAE military planners will continue to focus on
it as the primary driver of defense procurements. MbZ will
stress the continual concern that Iran poses to the UAE; he
will speak out in private with USG interlocutors against the
"superpower" ambitions of his Persian neighbors. Iranian
meddling in Iraq and Lebanon will be derided by UAEG
officials. That said, the UAE is a selectively cooperative
partner on Iran in the sense that it is unwilling to take a
public stance that could threaten its physical or economic
security vis-a-vis its much larger neighbor. The UAE will
act in accord with clearly defined UNSCR obligations to
disrupt the shipment of goods and funds to Tehran, yet fails
to fully grasp the international community's need for such a
pivotal player (given UAE's geographic location and economic
engagement) to take a much more proactive stance. While the
UAE feels it needs to take care not to embolden Iran, the UAE
Prime Minister's February 18 trip to Tehran had the effect of
sending a different message (refs C and D).


5. (S) In spite of the dichotomy of the UAE balancing its
interests -- toying with Tehran on the one hand and preparing
defenses against it on the other -- it is our interest to
keep the focus on defense preparations. MbZ consistently
emphasizes the need for contingency planning and uses the
looming threat from Tehran as the basis for U.S. weapons
sales to the UAE. He is eager to set up a credible defense
architecture against Iranian missiles, and often states the
need to U.S. officials -- as he did in February with Air
Force Secretary Wynne -- to prepare to "go across the border"

in self-defense if necessary (ref b). (Note: The GSD and
JMC will follow on the heels of the Missile Defense working
group meeting (5/6 March),and the DRAFT LoA for the Patriot
will be delivered to the UAE on 13 March. End note.)
Furthermore, Abu Dhabi and Tehran remain locked in a dispute
over three islands claimed by the UAE but long occupied by
Iran, albeit with rather mild rhetoric used by the UAE
regarding the issue. Iran is a known threat and we should
work methodically to bolster our mutual defenses without
expecting the UAE to show a more public antagonism towards
Tehran; it has long since decided that it cannot afford to do
so. Among the measures we should continue to pursue are a
robust joint exercise regime, missile defense planning, UAE
participation in PSI exercises, and UAE participation in
coalition activities at NAVCENT. VADM Cosgriff, Commander of
NAVCENT in Bahrain, and USLO have been socializing with the
UAE Navy and Coast Guard for several months, encouraging the
UAE to participate in the Combined Maritime Force (CMF).


6. (C) LEBANON: The UAE has continuously provided
significant humanitarian and security assistance to Lebanon
and has put its political weight behind Arab League efforts
to find a solution to Beirut's complex political impasse.
The UAE continues a longstanding de-mining operation in
southern Lebanon, contributes resources for school and
hospital construction, assists with the airlift of
humanitarian supplies, has donated arms and ammunition to
Lebanese security forces, and shares our desire to bolster
the Siniora government. While perhaps increasingly
recognizing Syria's troublesome interference in Lebanon, the
UAE remains reluctant to shun interaction with Syria, as
shown most recently by PM Mohammed bin Rashid's (MbR,s)
February 18-19 trip to Damascus. Here again the UAE has a
clear goal of supporting Lebanon, yet sees a measure of
engagement with Syria as helpful to that goal.


7. (S) ISRAELI/PALESTINIAN CONFLICT: The UAE laments the
lack of progress in Palestinian stability and eyes the
chaotic situation in Gaza with confusion as to how to best
deploy humanitarian resources to assist the Palestinians. A
strong backer of the Abbas-led Palestinian Authority (PA)
vice Hamas, Abu Dhabi has donated significant security
supplies to the PA and money to accounts controlled by
President Abbas ($80 million last summer and reports of $50
million in Paris).


8. (S) AFGHANISTAN: The UAE has been a quiet partner in
coalition efforts in Afghanistan and currently maintains a
force of 250 troops there (MbZ has said he wants his forces
battle-hardened through actual conflict),but prefers to keep
its public military profile down to avoid negative reactions
from Arab and Muslim nations. During meetings with the NATO
Secretary General on January 24, MbZ apparently confided that

SIPDIS
he often feels lonely contributing to Afghanistan without the
rest of his Arab brothers; discussions regarding UAE
participation in security operations were kept strictly
confidential and all public statements were vague, with the

SIPDIS
local press instead reporting on the UAE,s &humanitarian8
contributions in Afghanistan.


9. (S) In addition to its limited military presence in
Afghanistan, the UAE also aids reconstruction of the
country,s roads, mosques, medical facilities and schools,
has made efforts at political mediation between Afghanistan
and Pakistan, and has assisted in building military
infrastructure such as runways. In June 2007 MbZ furthermore
agreed to donate ten Mi-17 helicopters to Kabul, and that
effort is currently under way. Additionally, UAE Foreign
Minister (and younger full brother to MbZ) Abdullah bin Zayed
told Ambassador Khalilzad in early February the UAE intends
to double its troop presence in Afghanistan (ref E),and GSD
will provide a good opportunity to endorse the UAE,s ongoing
participation there.

Enhanced Defensive Capabilities and Cooperation
-------------- --


10. (S) SHARED EARLY WARNING (SEW): MbZ has been pressing
hard for SEW and will likely have tasked GSD participants to
continue that push. During his February 3 meeting with
Secretary Wynne (ref b),MbZ cited SEW as his "number one

SIPDIS
security need." He was concerned that the USG was still
waiting for other GCC states to sign on, when he would prefer
to move ahead now with those willing to run quickly; "in this
part of the world we don't get together," he reminded the
secretary, expressing impatience with Saudi Arabia and Qatar

SIPDIS

in particular. In a long conversation with CSAF Moseley on
the same topic, MbZ stressed his urgency yet again and has
since dispatched his International Affairs Director, Yousef
al-Otaiba, to Washington to pursue the issue yet further.
USLO delivered the LoA for SEW to the UAE in late February
and are awaiting signature. Offer Expiration Date is 25 May

2008.


11. (S) Predictably, MbZ posits the Iran threat as the
driving factor behind the UAE's need for immediate defense
readiness through SEW. GSD discussions may also reveal MbZ's
urgency about protecting the region from Islamic extremists,
a theme that to some degree complicates his willingness to
work closely with other GCC states on SEW (and other
projects). MbZ is energized about extremists who have
"hi-jacked" Islam and has staked his future on denying them
the upper hand in the region.


12. (S) UAE DEFENSE PROCUREMENT STATUS: The UAE has
committed billions to current and anticipated Foreign
Military Sales cases, in addition to over $8.5 billion in
direct commercial sales in the Block 60 F-16 program, one of
the premier security assistance portfolios in the region. At
the invitation of the Pentagon and State Department to deepen
the security relationship by cooperating on an integrated
missile defense shield, the UAE last year submitted Letters
of Request on the Patriot (nine PAC-3/GEM-T batteries),
Surface Launched Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile
(SL-AMRAAM) (8 fire units),and Theater High Altitude Air
Defense (THAAD) system (3 fire units),for an estimated total
value of $17 billion. It now wants the USG to make good on
our offer of enhanced engagement by pressing for expeditious
approval of these sales in the Congress, and will be looking
for specifics on where we are in that process, particularly
in regard to THAAD, which the UAE has articulated is
essential to a complete Air and Missile Defense architecture.
The UAE will see our posture as a critical measure of USG
willingness to stand by the UAE in a contingency involving
Iran.


13. (S) Other pending weapons sales include: High Mobility
Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS, case was signed and is being
implemented now, valued at $597M); short-term interest in
purchasing three E2-C Hawkeye AEW&C aircraft (in LOA
negotiations) as an interim solution until delivery of a more
permanent AEW&C platform (that down-select/decision expected
in mid-2008); 40 UH-60M Blackhawk helicopters for its Special
Operations Command (the UAE has already signed a case, which
is now being implemented and valued at $807M, for 26
Blackhawks, and an additional 14 are pending Congressional
notification); 20 additional Blackhawks via Direct Commercial
Sales from Sikorsky; ongoing upgrade of AH-64 Apache
helicopters to the "D" (LONGBOW) model; 1300 Hellfire
missiles (with the expectation of a request for an additional
1200 missiles); and additional weapons for their F-16s (three
Letters of Request have been received, valued at over $800M).
The total current FMS portfolio (signed cases and cases in
development) is valued at approximately $22 Billion.



14. (S) EAGLE RESOLVE: The UAE is preparing to host Eagle
Resolve 2008 (13 April to 7 May) with a Theater Air and
Missile Defense theme. This is an important and positive
step by the UAE that should be emphasized as such during GSD.
(Note: The UAE has requested that we NOT/NOT raise the
issue of the UAE potentially hosting EAGLE RESOVE 09 during
the GSD or JMC. End note.) The UAE has in the past been
hesitant to participate in military exercises designed to
show a strong defensive front against Iran -- although it did
send observers to Leading Edge 07 in October 2006 -- and
further partnership of this kind should be encouraged. While
we hope that the UAE will eventually agree to a more public
role in exercises, with a stronger message to Iran, for the
time being their active participation is a clear step in the
right direction. It is expected that CENTCOM will deploy a
Patriot battery for EAGLE RESOLVE 08. MbZ asked POTUS about
the possibility the battery could remain in place after the
exercise and again asked ADM Fallon the same during his
recent 20 February visit. No commitments have been made.
(Note: The UAE GHQ has not officially responded to CENTCOM's
request to include the Patriot deployment as part of the
exercise; however, we might assume based on the questions
about keeping it in place that the request has been agreed
to. End note). The EAGLE RESOLVE 08 Final Planning
Conference will be held the week after the GSD/JMC.


15. (C) MARITIME SECURITY COOPERATION OPPORTUNITIES:

One of NAVCENT Commander VADM Cosgriff's top priorities is to
get the UAE Navy and/or Coast Guard to join the Combined
Maritime Force (CMF),aka "the coalition." (Note: A point
of leverage for UAE participation in the coalition may be
found through VADM Cosgriff's critical infrastructure
protection focus within the Gulf region. See paras 23-26 for
greater detail on the UAE's infrastructure protection
initiatives. End note.) The issue was raised in recent
staff talks the second week of February and at the Maritime
Infrastructure Protection Symposium (MIPS) hosted by NAVCENT
26-28 February in Bahrain. It would be logical to continue
discussion of the concept, which need not constitute a large
commitment of personnel or resources to gain the advantage of
coordination and intelligence sharing. Another point on
which we request UAE assistance is the relocation of housing
as well as operational and administrative facilities for the
U.S. Coast Guard inshore boat unit at Fujairah, which
provides water-side and pier-side security for US contracted
cargo vessels in the port of Fujairah. This unit consists of
between 100-125 U.S. personnel who currently live in two
commercial apartment buildings in downtown Fujairah. USLO,s
number one priority is to move berthing and operations inside
a more secure perimeter within the new UAE Naval base
currently being constructed. We have raised this issue a
number of times and have had approval to start coordination
from GHQ, but need to emphasize the importance of a short
timeline, primarily for force protection concerns. An added
benefit of the move would be the ability to work closely with
the UAE Navy and Coast Guard, improving coordination and
interoperability.


16. (C) GULF AIR WARFARE CENTER: The GWC continues to be a
highlight of regional cooperation and joint planning, in
spite of the surprises inherent in a mixed coalition of Gulf
and Western allies trying to work from a common script.
Exercises do not always follow anticipated planning
trajectories, but they do invariably deepen our long term
engagement potential. There is currently an IRON FALCON
exercise taking place at the AWC that will continue during
the GSD and JMC.


17. (C) During the recent GCC Chief of Defense (CHoD)
conference hosted by ADM Fallon in Tampa, MG Sowaidan,
representing the UAE Chief of Staff, said the UAE might

consider hosting the next CHoD conference in the AOR.
However, after an informal request by USLO as to the
sincerity of the offer, the UAE GHQ has asked that we NOT/NOT
raise the possible hosting of CHoD in the UAE during the GSD
or JMC. USLO suggests that RADM Miller "delicately" broach
the subject un-officially in a side-bar discussion with MG
Sowaidan if appropriate.

Developing a Shared Assessment and Agenda on Iraq
-------------- --------------


18. (S) The UAE appreciates the fact that there have been
measured security gains on the ground in Iraq but remains
skeptical of the enduring strategic implications of those
gains. Still very skeptical of the Shi'a-dominated
government (and still coddling Iyad Allawi as Iraq's most
viable leadership candidate),the UAE's stance towards
Baghdad remains too passive. It should be pressed to play a
more active and facilitating role.


19. (S) A meeting with MbZ could provide a venue in which to
encourage the UAE's practical engagement in Iraq,
particularly with regard to re-opening its Embassy (there is
no substitute for being present in Baghdad),more proactively
facilitating a visit to the UAE by PM Nuri al-Maliki (the UAE
has been side-stepping the issue by noting that al-Maliki
tried to come on a weekend -- subsequent efforts by the UAE
to invite the PM have stalled largely due to poor Iraqi
coordination),moving forward on debt relief (a long-shot,
but still critical to long-term assistance to Iraq),and
granting visas (as well as waiving visa fees) to Iraqis
visiting the UAE for programs critical to Iraq's
reconstruction effort. (Note: Each delegation seems to
present a new exercise in pulling teeth. The proposed
U.S./MNF-I sponsored coalition conference in Abu Dhabi May
26-28 is yet another opportunity for extreme frustration if
the UAE does not facilitate visas more readily. End note.)


20. (S) The UAE's (all-Sunni) leadership maintains a
skeptical attitude towards the leadership of Iraqi PM
al-Maliki, and has expressed skepticism of other Iraqi
leaders as well (citing Sunni VP al-Hashemi as a "Muslim

Brother" in one instance). The UAE has not moved to relieve
Iraqi debt (of $3.5 billion) and may not do so while
al-Maliki, perceived as dangerously close to Tehran and too
opportunistic in consolidating support for Shi'a causes, is
in power. On the question of diplomatic representation, the
UAE sent a team to Baghdad in August 2007 to explore options
for reopening an Embassy, yet claims that the GoI (National
Security Advisor Muwaffaq al-Rubaie in particular) was not
responsive to subsequent requests for assistance when the
location shown to them was deemed unsafe. Foreign Minister
Abdullah bin Zayed told USUN Ambassador Khalilzad February 8
that the UAE Embassy could be open soon (ref E). Concerns
about Shi'a influence in Baghdad hamper a more constructive
dialogue on the part of the UAE. That said, the UAE has
engaged in reconciliation talks in the past and has made
attempts to reach out to moderate Shi'a to encourage their
engagement in the Iraqi political process independently of
Iran.

Counter-Proliferation
--------------


21. (S) The UAE and the USG held our third annual
Counterproliferation Task Force (CTF) meeting on February 25.
During that meeting, we discussed current cooperation on
interdictions of Iran-bound shipments, which improves
considerably when the UAE is able to use UNSCR cover. The
UAE side raised concerns about the timeliness of information
sharing and follow-up, noting that it returned one shipment
(from the M/V Iran Tabatabaei) to Malaysia when the USG
offered no follow-on information. The UAE said it was still
holding four other shipments. The UAE export control law is
operational, but is in the process of amendment to streamline
official mechanisms defining UAEG export control authority.
The CTF has served as a good way to coordinate our
non-proliferation efforts with the UAEG. We keep a close eye
on coordination, yet often find that resource limitations
(including thin staff in the UAEG and in the Embassy) limit
the depth of our engagement.


22. (C) IMPLEMENTATION OF UNSCRs: Although the UAE has
traditionally been reluctant to either block trade or offend
its powerful neighbor Iran, it has fully implemented the
successive UNSCRs on Iran and North Korea. The passage of
its export control law has also given the UAE more tools to
enforce an effective non-proliferation regime. We have seen
the UAE increasingly willing to take action when alerted to
offending shipments of proliferation concern. At the
February 25 CTF, UAE Chair BG Mohammad al-Qemzi did note that
the unclassified release of Washington's December NIE had
emboldened Tehran to press the UAE harder on transshipments,
making it more difficult for the UAE to combat the
proliferation without more precise and timely information.
The UAE needs clear "legal" grounds for returning shipments
that too often languish on the docks for some time after they
are seized at U.S. request.

Critical Energy Infrastructure
--------------


23. (S) The UAE regards protection of its critical
infrastructure as vital to national security, is very focused
on articulating and addressing threats, and is reluctant to
permit too much USG visibility into its planning. That said,
the UAE is developing the organizational structures necessary
to secure key facilities such as oil and gas platforms, as
well as power and desalination plants.


24. (S) Abu Dhabi ruler (and UAE President) Khalifa bin
Zayed al-Nahyan established the Critical National
Infrastructure Authority (CNIA) with the mandate of
safeguarding Abu Dhabi's key infrastructure. CNIA is at
present an Abu Dhabi, vice federal UAE, body, and is now
separate from the UAE military. CNIA authorities (ref F)
note that the ultimate goal is to extend its reach and become
a federal entity protecting critical infrastructure
throughout the UAE. Abu Dhabi and CNIA authorities have
identified interagency coordination (integrating CNIA with
other government organs) and limited manpower as two related
issues that could hobble its efforts.


25. (S) We approached the CNIA in mid-2006 about conducting
an assessment of Abu Dhabi's critical energy infrastructure
prior to developing cooperation on protecting these assets.
The UAE's position was that it was conducting its own
assessments (and has paid several contractors to provide

critical infrastructure data). The CNIA has recently reached
out to post to discuss cooperation. Without re-raising the
"assessment issue" which is likely to be unproductive, we
should look at coordinated ways for various USG agencies to
offer assistance to the UAEG in protecting critical energy
infrastructure. Use of the word "assessment" will signify
unwanted intrusiveness.


26. (S) Current U.S. engagement with CNIA is focused on
maritime critical infrastructure protection. At the late
February MIPS conference VADM Cosgriff met separately with
the UAE delegates -- including UAE coast guard commander BG
Muhammad Rashid Al Rumaithi, CNIA operations officer Major
Abdullah Farag Al Muhirbi, and senior UAE Navy staff members
-- to discuss U.S.-UAE cooperation on critical infrastructure
protection. NAVCENT is following up on these efforts and is
currently pursuing a UAE and Coalition solution to critical
infrastructure protection.

Counter-Terrorism
--------------


27. (S) The UAE maintains an impressive array of technical
capabilities to bring to bear on the fight against terror,
but suffers from lack of manpower and poor interagency
coordination. The UAE leadership generally understands the
threat and seeks to counter it with a combination of active
police work, up-to-date technical tools, and intervention in
schools and mosques. We often hear MbZ express dismay with
the influence of Islamists and "Muslim brothers" in
education, for example, a reminder that extremism is high on
his mind and that he sees the classroom as one place to
combat the problem. The UAEG also scripts Friday mosque
sermons to discourage freelancing or incendiary rhetoric from
preachers and imams.


28. (S) The UAE is cooperative in pursuing information
offered by the USG and we enjoy reasonable working relations
on counterterrorism in general. Cases of interest at the
senior levels get particular attention. Formal information
exchanges requested on an ongoing basis, on the other hand,
which should help grease our CT coordination, are very
limited. Our inability to negotiate a Mutual Legal
Assistance Treaty (MLAT),largely due to the USG's
unwillingness to also address an extradition treaty,
handicaps our daily interaction with law enforcement agencies.


29. (S) The UAE does not approach countering terrorism or
extremism in a sufficiently transnational context, but rather
arrests and deports suspicious foreign individuals while
sometimes not sufficiently cognizant of the fact that a
danger to Emirati society is also a danger to others. The
UAE is a transit point for troublesome activity and
financing, often involving Iran, and the USG puts great
energy into slowing that process down. Treasury U/S Stuart
Levey was in the UAE February 27-28 making yet another strong
pitch for putting a financial squeeze on Iran. A more
thorough and rigorous invesigative posture -- combined with
a broader defintion of the transnational threat -- might
lead t more prosecutable cases and more effective shut dwn
of terrorist networks. Recognizing that the SG is the key
global player in the CT arena, the est approach for the UAE
would be to materially nhance its cooperation with the U.S.

Reminder o key data in the military relationship
-------------- ---


30. (S) The U.S. enjoys strong defense cooperation with the
UAE, working together in key aspects of the war on terror;
the UAE has special operations troops on the ground in
Afghanistan, has been a source of security assistance for
Lebanon and the Palestinian Authority, and is assisting
virtually every trouble spot in the region in need of
reconstruction support. The nation provides critical basing
and over-flight for U.S. reconnaissance and refueling assets,
extensive naval logistics support, and is the U.S. Navy's
liberty port of choice in the region (425 ships annually).
We suggest that you thank the UAE delegation (and MbZ at the
possible dinner on Thursday evening) for the country's strong
support for the U.S. Air Force and Navy in the UAE and
encourage continued partnership. A few quantitative measures
of bilateral cooperation include:

--- 1,800 USAF personnel at Al Dhafra Air Base;
--- a vigorous training schedule at the Air Warfare Center
at Al Dhafra;

--- the F-16 Block 60 program;
--- over 400 naval port visits last year;
--- over 24,000 US military overflights/landings in
2006;
--- more than 150,000 U.S. servicemen and women
enjoying liberty annually in the UAE; and
--- approximately 250 UAE Special Operations forces serving
with the Coalition in Afghanistan.


31. (S) These contributions are significant in scope but
also enduring in their continuity over many years. The ports
of Jebel Ali and Fujairah are vital to U.S. Navy interdiction
operations, re-supply and sustainment, and combat support
efforts across the region. Jebel Ali in Dubai has hosted
more port visits for each of the past three years than any
other port outside the United States. In expressing
appreciation for this outstanding partnership, we also like
to remind the UAE that the evolving nature of military
requirements mandates an ongoing focus on joint planning,
coordination, and strategic interoperability.

QUINN