DAS KENT PATTON DISCUSSES DEMOCRATIC REFORM IN UAE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ABU DHABI 000289 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ARP, NEA/PI, NEA/PPD ALSO FOR R, S/P, DRL, AND ECA E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM KDEM KMPI KPAO ELAB AE SUBJECT: DAS KENT PATTON DISCUSSES DEMOCRATIC REFORM IN UAE REF: ABU DHABI 273 (FNC Development) ABU DHABI 00000289 001.2 OF 004 Classified by Charge d'Affaires Martin Quinn, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: On a February 24-25 visit to Abu Dhabi and Dubai, DAS Kent Patton spoke with government leaders and civil society figures about expanding political space in the UAE. With MFA he focused on fall 2008 plans for Forum for the Future meetings in Abu Dhabi, stressing the importance the USG places on robust engagement with civil society at that event and encouraging the UAEG to take a next step on its democratic reform path ahead of hosting the Forum. Patton heard a defense of UAE press freedoms from the Director General of the National Media Council, and an explanation of the need for more power for the Federal National Council (FNC) )- but in slow, measured steps )- from the Speaker of the Federal National Council. In their meetings with DAS Patton, FNC members, academics, and activists discussed a broad range of ideas for advancing democracy in the UAE, but were uniform in their desire to see more progress. They reminded DAS Patton that while wealth and social liberty diminishes demand for change, that does not mean all Emiratis are content with the current level of political participation. End Summary. Tariq Al Haidan: MFA lead on FfF -------------- ¶2. (C) Patton thanked the UAEG for agreeing to co-chair with Japan the next Forum for the Future (FfF) ministerial to be held in Abu Dhabi this fall (dates uncertain, but some time after Ramadan ends in early October). He noted the planned March 5 visit to Abu Dhabi of the Japanese coordinator, Mr. Shin Sugiyama, and reminded al-Haidan that FfF is a top USG priority; President Bush was disappointed that last year's meeting in Sana'a did not materialize and that civil society was not able to present its ideas. Patton stated that the USG would carefully follow developments of the Abu Dhabi forum, and that Secretary Rice hoped Japan and UAE would pick a date soon. ¶3. (C) In keeping with past practice, Patton recommended one organizing meeting in Japan followed by two formal sub-ministerial meetings in the UAE. MFA Asst U/S Tariq al-Haidan suggested meetings in May and September and said the UAEG would contact Yemen to "learn from their experiences" with FfF. For the actual event, Patton suggested a dinner the first evening to break the ice and a breakfast the next morning to kick off a full and substantive day (involving possibly 25 ministers and 200 delegates). Al-Haidan said he was still selecting an organizing committee and would identify a UAE point person. ¶4. (C) Patton promised to share a list of 56 civil society representatives invited to the Sana'a Forum (the list was subsequently passed to al-Haidan),noting that Japan had asked the USG to interface between civil society and the G-8. Al-Haidan was concerned about the way civil society "interfered" with FfF in Bahrain by "speaking harshly" and singling out individual governments for criticism. "We want them to speak in general(ities) since they are guests in our country." He added that "we will not stop them" but guests need to "cooperate with governments and not go too far." Patton said civil society had matured since the Bahrain meeting and that the US preferred productive dialogue over finger-pointing. Patton did stress that as host of the forum the UAE would draw attention to its own democratic progress, and suggested that having a next democratic reform step to herald would be in the UAE's interest. He cited expanding press freedoms or increasing the number of elected representatives to the Federal National Council (FNC),or introducing Municipal Council elections, as apparent opportunities. Al-Haidan thanked him for the advice, and said the UAEG would examine what next step it might be in a position to consider. Ibrahim al-Abed: Press gate-keeper -------------- ¶5. (C) Commenting on the UAE press, Director General of the National Media Council Ibrahim al-Abed said: "We do not need reform because we have nothing wrong with our system." Press freedoms are in place and the UAE has no journalists in jail, he insisted, citing also an elected press association with a code of ethics as a good indicator. (Note: Al-Abed did not acknowledge the MEPI role in facilitating the code of ethics, ABU DHABI 00000289 002.2 OF 004 although he took the result as one sign of a healthy press. End note.) He commended journalists who do not violate personal liberties or agitate on sensitive issues of religion, race, or domestic violence. He also preferred to isolate children, terrorism, religious factionalism, and national leaders from critical treatment. That said, he claimed the Arabic press is filled with criticism of the government, citing poor ambulance service, improper use of the Arabic language, and women's rights as recent targets of editorial criticism. (He said local culture permitted criticism if it did not impugn an official personally.) He said Sheikha Lubna's recent shift in portfolios (from Ministry of Economy to Ministry of Foreign Trade) was partially due to media criticism of her. ¶6. (C) His initial assertion that there is "no censorship" in the UAE notwithstanding, al-Abed noted that the Media Council recently came to the aid of a jailed blogger in Ras Al-Khaimah, and raised PM Mohammed Bin Rashid's decree that journalists would no longer be jailed following the arrest of another journalist in Dubai. Al-Abed also asserted the need to differentiate between theory and political reality when it comes to press freedom, citing as an example the UAEG's acting on complaints from Pakistani President Pervez Musharef to close down two Pakistani TV stations operating from Dubai's Media "free zone." (Note: Service was resumed shortly thereafter. End note.) As for blogs and web sites, al-Abed said that, with the exception of pornography, he was against censorship. Patton stressed the dangers of closing off "public space" for expression and urged a more open environment. Al-Abed said he encouraged UAE nationals to enter the press corps in hopes that they would speak more openly than foreign reporters (who fear for their visa status if caught pushing the envelope). Citing the USG Human Rights Report -- which offers a forthright portrayal of challenges facing an open press in the UAE -- al-Abed stated that "no one has a right to classify us." Abdelazeez Al Ghurair: Speaker without a legislature -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) Patton took the opportunity of a meeting with the FNC Speaker to challenge him to consider ways to expand political space in the UAE in advance of the FfF later this year; he offered broadening the electoral base, extending the FNC term, or creating more constituent offices as possible scenarios. Both Speaker al-Ghurair and FNC member Saqr al-Suwaidi said the UAE has a plan for political development but chooses "to go slowly because we can't afford to fumble." Al-Ghurair said UAE leaders seek excellence in government institutions, which in the case of the FNC is best ensured by "small, sure steps." As for near-term changes he deemed necessary for the FNC, al-Ghurair )- like three FNC members who met DAS Patton the previous evening )- suggested that the FNC should independently determine its agenda (rather than the current practice of getting UAEG approval.) ¶8. (C) Patton recommended a more representative government in which citizens have a voice through elected officials. Al-Ghurair said the FNC should eventually double or triple its electoral college, but for the time being citizens had the traditional outlet of the "majlis" through which to speak directly with their leaders. He acknowledged that it was difficult for leaders to keep up with constituent demands in the age of laptops and blackberries. ¶9. (C) Reminded that political parties allow ideological conflicts to be channeled purposefully rather than boil beneath the surface, al-Ghurair was keenly interested on DAS Patton's perspectives on political parties, but himself focused nonetheless on the importance of each FNC member maintaining an individual voice -- without the influence of a collective party. Patton said the creation of parties can also encourage youth participation. Al-Ghurair said he planned to draft a parliamentary code of ethics and stated that he does not want "professional FNC members" (serving for 10 or 20 years) who grow "out of touch" with the people. ¶10. (SBU) Note: DAS Patton also met rank-and-file members of the FNC, including three whom he invited to dinner, and heard of their simultaneous arguments for change within the FNC (particularly their interest in greater authority for the institution) and their sense that meaningful change would take time. See also ref A for comments on evolution of the FNC. End note. Meeting the Activists: Varying degrees of angst ABU DHABI 00000289 003.2 OF 004 -------------- -- ¶11. (C) In a lunch with Secretary General of the Emirates Human Rights Association Mohammad Ghubash, Patton was told that "we are all new recruits to human rights; it is not natural to our tribal culture." Political expression is not easily permitted in UAE culture, he said, and human rights are clearly political. He cited a certain degree of paranoia among Emiratis and foreigners alike, few raising their voices because "the walls will hear us." Conflicts between disputing members of the Human Rights Association were nonetheless aired quite publicly, he said, and involved personal attacks on him. Ghubash urged the USG to press the FNC for "real" elections next time. ¶12. (C) Mohammad al-Naqbi, Director of the Gulf Negotiation Center in Abu Dhabi, told Patton of the challenges of opening an NGO. He said he finally had to register his organization as a "business," in spite of his focus on conflict resolution. "The UAE has two faces and is showing you the best. There is also a nasty side," he said, and asked for protection and support from the USG. He suggested that the FNC is a joke. When asked if he and other activists could make a united appeal to the government, he said "no one will listen to us, they will paint us as troublemakers." Al-Naqbi agreed to work with MEPI to create an updated list of civil society organizations to be invited to the upcoming FfF, noting that most Emiratis are suspicious and unaware of programs like MEPI. He recommended that the USG continue to push for the creation of more NGOs, press freedoms, and an elected parliament. ¶13. (C) One of the first to agitate for a human rights association who was later sidelined by the UAEG from political activism, Dr. Mohammad al-Roken criticized the UAE leadership for "saying they want to be number one while failing to be pioneers." He advocated a more transparent system of government yet saw civil society "sleeping" in an environment in which those caught speaking out get punished. Penalties included being forced into "early retirement," refused a business license, or sudden dismissal from a list of high-achieving students being considered for government scholarships to study abroad (the final point apparently referring to what happened to his own son). ¶14. (C) UAE University Professor Abdul-khaleq Abdallah discussed political freedoms briefly with DAS Patton, citing potential negative affects that full democracy might have on a tribal society. Elections could create a divided parliament as was seen elsewhere in the Gulf, while a non-partisan, homogenous FNC avoided tribal fault lines. That said, he acknowledged that a more open political system (and a more meaningful legislature) would be attractive to Emiratis, including some from the ruling elite. The UAE is extremely tolerant with social liberties, he emphasized, which gives citizens the feeling of freedom and masks their latent desire for political expression. Social liberty is not a direct catalyst for political liberty; on the contrary, many Emiratis fear that political change could limit social freedoms (particularly if Islamist forces gained influence). ¶15. (C) Dr. Fatima al-Sayegh, professor of history at UAE University, was sad to find in a recent class that her students (who represent the better educated class of Emiratis) did not understand the concept of civil society. If the outside world wants greater political participation within the UAE, she said, the local population has a long learning curve ahead. She said that prior to the discovery of oil society depended on civil-society-like mechanisms instead of a central government. Issues of even greater urgency than political reform include illiteracy, said al-Sayegh, with societal reforms following naturally behind. She expressed her frustration that the UAE was pouring great sums of money into UAE universities but giving key posts to foreigners ("white men") instead of competent Emiratis who were clearly capable of the job. She said Emiratis were forced into retirement at a certain age when even older foreigners were hired to run the schools. She also lamented the irony of a UAE professor teaching UAE history to UAE nationals in English. Gender segregation in colleges degrades the quality and efficiency of teaching, she complained. She said the UAE University student council is a male-only organization. Comment: Glass always half -------------- ABU DHABI 00000289 004.2 OF 004 ¶16. (C) Even in a society whose citizens are prosperous and comfortable, people seek greater participation in decision making. While the demand for change is neither widespread nor publicly vocal in the UAE, the seeds of evolutionary change are finding root. Nonetheless, comfort and prosperity in the UAE will continue to be cited by the leadership as cause for taking things slowly, and many Emiratis would probably agree. MEPI programming offers an ongoing opportunity to help those with a sense of the future prepare the UAE for a time when broader participation is the norm. End comment. QUINN