WELCOMING GENERAL MOSELEY BACK TO ABU DHABI

S E C R E T ABU DHABI 000174

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

CSAF FOR GENERAL MOSELEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2018
TAGS: PREL PTER MCAP MOPS MASS IR AE
SUBJECT: WELCOMING GENERAL MOSELEY BACK TO ABU DHABI

REFS: A) ABU DHABI 160 (SECRETARY WYNNE WITH MBZ)
B) ABU DHABI 159 (SCENE SETTER FOR ADMIRAL FALLON)

Classified by Charge d'Affaires Martin Quinn, reasons 1.4 (B)
and (D).


1. (S) General Moseley, your return visit to Abu Dhabi
February 11-13 is most welcome, and we look forward to your
conversation with Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ) in particular.
Your visit continues a series of senior level consultations
with the UAE leadership, beginning with President Bush
January 13-14 and followed up with Secretary of Energy Bodman
(January 21-22),and SECAF Wynne (Feb 3-5). We anticipate a
visit from Admiral Fallon February 20-21 and look forward to
two important Pol-Mil events in early March -- the Gulf
Security Dialogue (GSD) March 11 and the Joint Military
Commission (JMC) March 12-13. Each of these visits is an
opportunity to renew our sense of mutual commitment and
reinforce our collaboration.

Urgency on SEW
--------------


2. (S) In MbZ's February 3 meeting with Secretary Wynne, he
pressed hard for progress on Shared Early Warning (SEW),
citing it as his top priority. He was concerned that the USG
was still waiting for other GCC states to sign on, when he
would prefer to move ahead now with those willing to run
quickly; he expressed impatience with Saudi Arabia and Qatar
specifically. Underlying his sense of urgency was MbZ's
characteristically energetic argument that he had to be ready
to defend the UAE against Iran immediately. He also pressed
for advance warning of U.S. intentions vis-a-vis Iran.


3. (S) The other chord MbZ struck with Secretary Wynne was
his strong distaste for the extremists who have "hi-jacked"
Islam for their unholy purposes. He insisted that they would
not gain the upper hand in the region. MbZ's hate for those
seeking to do the world (and the region) harm underpins his
urgency about SEW and other aspects of close bilateral
cooperation with the U.S. He will appreciate your thoughts
on how to move SEW forward in urgent and practical steps.

Military ties focus somewhat on weapons releases
-------------- ---


4. (S) You may wish to refer to our review of the status of
overall military relations in a scene setter to Admiral
Fallon (ref B),in which we characterize the strong
fundamentals of cooperation. We also offer a current
perspective on MbZ's views on Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan,
issues on which he will certainly hope to engage you to some
degree. In addition, MbZ will be urgent about the release to
the UAE of key weapons systems, primarily those he hopes to
field as part of a missile defense architecture with Iran in
mind: THAAD, SL-AMRAAM, and Patriot PAC 3. The UAE submitted
Letters of Request for these systems last year (with a total
value reaching into the $17 billion range). The UAE will see
the speed of approval and delivery as a measure of USG
willingness to stand by the UAE as a long term ally.


5. (S) The GSD talks on March 11 will be yet another
opportunity for MbZ to press for progress on the weapons
release front. Those talks were originally viewed on the
U.S. side as evolving into something more regional in nature,
yet to date their character remains bilateral in the case of
the UAE. MbZ prefers the bilateral format because he sees
other regional players as having slightly different needs,
rather different policy approaches, and very different levels
of enthusiasm to move quickly. He also sees potential delays
in weapons releases to Saudi Arabia (potentially politicized
in Congress) and wishes to keep the UAE package on a separate
track.


6. (S) Other pending weapons sales include: High Mobility
Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS, case was signed and is being
implemented now, valued at $597M),short-term interest in
purchasing three E2-C Hawkeye AEW&C aircraft (in LOA
negotiations) as an interim solution until delivery of a more
permanent AEW&C platform (decision expected in mid-2008),40
UH-60M Blackhawk helicopters for its Special Operations
Command (UAE has signed and the case is being implemented,
valued at $807M),10 Blackhawks via Direct Commercial Sales
from Sikorsky, ongoing upgrade of AH-64 Apache helicopters to
the "D" (LONGBOW) model, 1300 Hellfire missiles (with the
expectation of a request for an additional 1200 missiles),
and additional weapons for their F-16s (three Letters of
Request have been received, valued at over $800M).

MbZ appreciates engagement
--------------


7. (S) With his Air Force background, MbZ enjoys talking
shop with you, one of his favored interlocutors, and we
encourage you to pursue the conversation frankly. He seeks
greater understanding of U.S. defense planning for an Iran
contingency, a much quicker pace for SEW, and affirmation
that his weapons needs will be fulfilled by his favored (but
certainly not his only) military ally. You might also press
him frankly on the fact that Iraq is showing promise on the
security side and that we have not seen the UAE step in to
help solidify those gains with more aggressive engagement.
(Iraqis getting visas to the UAE is much too cumbersome, for
example, and the UAE is taking a passive posture to
facilitating a visit by PM al-Maliki.) Your relationship
with MbZ is such that we encourage you to build upon prior
conversations and draw him out somewhat on how Abu Dhabi
views its regional role. You might also inquire about Abu
Dhabi's recent agreement with the French to position naval
assets and personnel here.
QUINN