ADMIRAL FALLON'S UPCOMING VISIT TO ABU DHABI

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 ABU DHABI 000159 SIPDIS SIPDIS CENTCOM FOR ADMIRAL FALLON STATE FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ARP, PM/FO DOD/OSD FOR A/S LONG, DAS KIMMITT, KELSO, QUINN, ANDERSON CENTCOM ALSO FOR MAJ GEN FINDLEY, REYES, RODRIGUEZ E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2018 TAGS: PREL PTER PARM MOPS MARR KPAL IR IZ AF LE PK, AE SUBJECT: ADMIRAL FALLON'S UPCOMING VISIT TO ABU DHABI REFS: A) ABU DHABI 119 (NATO VISIT) B) ABU DHABI 65 (FRENCH VISIT ON MIL PRESENCE) C) ABU DHABI 62 (PA DONATIONS HELD UP) D) ABU DHABI 45 (EXPLORING NUCLEAR OPTIONS) E) 06 ABU DHABI 1939 (USMC COMMANDANT VISIT) F) 06 ABU DHABI 1595 (PRIOR CENTCOM VISIT) G) 06 ABU DHABI 1479 (PRIOR CENTCOM SCENE SETTER) Classified by Charge d'Affaires Martin Quinn, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S) Admiral Fallon, Embassy Abu Dhabi again welcomes you for a visit to the UAE, where we look forward to your engagement with U.S. personnel on the ground and your discussions with the nation's top strategic defense planner, Abu Dhabi Crown Prince and Deputy Supreme Commander of the UAE Armed Forces Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ). Nominal Minister of Defense (and Ruler of Dubai) Mohammed bin Rashid is less well versed on defense issues, yet carries the federal title while focusing on the economy of Dubai, Inc. Recent senior U.S. visitors include the President (Jan 13-14),Secretary of Energy Bodman (Jan 21-23),Secretary of the Air Force Wynne (Feb 3-5),and an anticipated visit by Chief of Staff of the Air Force Moseley (Feb 11-13). These consecutive visits serve as a reminder to the UAE of the value we place on our partnership, and MbZ hopes this engagement will speed the process of weapons releases sought by the UAE -- to build a common defense against the Iranian missile threat in particular. ¶2. (S) As with your prior visits, MbZ will be interested in current U.S. thinking on Iraq and Iran (MbZ stressed to SECAF Wynne February 3 his desire for advanced notice of U.S. plans in the region),continued participation in the mission in Afghanistan, and reminders that the USG values the UAE contribution in the AOR. Positive comments about the UAE role in Afghanistan, for example, will encourage MbZ's own oft-stated interest in sustaining that mission. Any reminders that we need to plan and exercise together in response to Iran's provocations will also help solidify coordination on that front. MbZ should also be reminded, however, that the stability of Iraq requires a more serious contribution from the UAE, including the reopening of an Embassy in Baghdad and facilitation of visas for Iraqi officials to visit the UAE in order to engage in training, development, and business conferences which are often held in Dubai and Abu Dhabi. Pol-Mil Fundamentals are Strong -------------- ¶3. (S) The U.S. continues to enjoy strong defense cooperation with the UAE, with a significant U.S. presence at Al Dhafra Air Base (1,500 USAF personnel and engagement through the Air Warfare Center),robust transport operations through Fujairah, significant transits through the port of Jebel Ali (over 400 ships per year),and UAE facilitation for over 24,000 U.S. military overflights/landings per year. This critical support enables U.S. transport requirements in the AOR, in addition to reconnaissance and refueling operations. It also helps us to maintain a presence on very welcome terms in a volatile region. In expressing appreciation for his partnership, you might also remind MbZ that the evolving nature of military requirements mandates continual review, joint planning, coordination, and strategic interoperability. ¶4. (S) Plans for a third round of the Gulf Security Dialogue (GSD) on March 11, followed immediately by the Joint Military Committee (JMC) on March 12-13, offer an opportunity to further solidify our partnership and work through some of the questions facing the relationship. One key question for the UAE is how quickly the U.S. will release weapons systems of particular interest to it -- MbZ may ask you about THAAD, SL-AMRAAM, and Patriot PAC 3 (see paragraphs 15-16). Another delicate issue is the precise status of the Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA),signed in 1994 for 12 years but without a recent review of its current status (the UAE sometimes notes that it was not fully ratified by the Supreme Council made up of the rulers of all seven emirates and suggests some uncertainty about the ongoing validity of the agreement after the initial 12 years passed in 2006). A current legal case involving three Marines being tried for ABU DHABI 00000159 002 OF 005 alleged abusive language highlights the need for reopening the DCA for scrutiny (see paragraph 17). Iran -------------- ¶5. (S) MbZ continues to insist that Iran is the UAE's most serious and long-term threat, while uncomfortably cognizant of the country's significant economic engagement with its much larger neighbor. President Bush was reminded of Abu Dhabi's strong views on Iran during his recent visit and agreed with the UAE leadership that the threat continues in spite of the results of the early December NIE. MbZ remains urgent about setting up a defense architecture against Iranian missiles. ¶6. (S) Iran is the large neighbor that will not go away, so the UAE feels a need to engage (particularly on the economic side and especially in Dubai) with a potential foe in this rough and unforgiving neighborhood. While assisting our mission in the region, the UAE leadership has consistently pursued a cautious, non-confrontational, public posture towards Iran. In the past, the UAE has been hesitant to participate in certain military exercises designed to show a strong defensive front against Iran. The UAE did, however, send observers to Leading Edge 07 in October 2006, which had a Proliferation Security Initiative theme. The decision to host Eagle Resolve 2008, with a Theater Air and Missile Defense theme, is another praiseworthy step. The recent announcement during French President Sarkozy's visit of a French naval presence in Abu Dhabi is another indication of UAE willingness to send a strong signal to Iran. Nonetheless, with an estimated 400,000 Iranians in the UAE, MbZ will be cautious about a direct confrontation. Iran is an adversary to prepare defenses against, which the UAE is doing. Yet, it considers a certain level of engagement to be part of that defense. ¶7. (C) The UAE is studying the development of peaceful nuclear power, with the clear caveat that it will ensure top-notch safety standards and full transparency to the international community. The UAE faces skyrocketing electricity needs and sees the nuclear option as a potentially feasible answer. The Foreign Minister told us that it seeks to show the region "the right way" to pursue such a program, unlike the negative example of Iran. Iraq -------------- ¶8. (S) The UAE's (all-Sunni) leadership maintains a skeptical attitude towards the leadership of Iraqi PM al-Maliki. The PM has not pursued plans to visit the UAE since an aborted attempt in which Abu Dhabi asked that he come on a date more convenient to them -- he had asked for a weekend visit in mid-2007. The conversation has been somewhat stagnant since, in spite of UAE claims that it again extended an offer for al-Maliki to visit (an offer extended in New York at the UNGA). The UAE has also expressed skepticism of other Iraqi leaders (citing Sunni VP al-Hashemi as a "Muslim Brother" in one instance),and continues to presume that former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi is Iraq's most viable leadership candidate. ¶9. (S) The UAE has not moved to relieve Iraqi debt (of $3.5 billion) and may not do so while al-Maliki, perceived as too opportunistic in consolidating support for Shi'a causes, is in power. On the question of diplomatic representation, the UAE sent a team to Baghdad in August 2007 to explore options for reopening an Embassy, yet claims that the GoI (National Security Advisor Muwaffaq al-Rubai in particular) was not responsive to subsequent requests for assistance when the location shown to them was deemed unsafe. Al-Rubai had visited Abu Dhabi in late June and, according to the Emiratis, focused his efforts on urging the UAE not to support Iraqi Sunnis; the UAE found al-Rubai's approach somewhat hostile. Concerns about Shi'a influence hamper a more constructive dialogue on the part of the UAE, while they perceive the reverse to be true in Baghdad. That said, the UAE has engaged in reconciliation talks in the past and has made attempts to reach out to moderate Shi'a to encourage their engagement in the Iraqi political process independently of Iran. Iraq was discussed during President Bush's visit, ABU DHABI 00000159 003 OF 005 but no new ground was broken. Afghanistan -------------- ¶10. (S) UAE participation in security operations in Afghanistan was a confidential topic discussed during the January 24 visit of the NATO Secretary General to Abu Dhabi, while all public statements were vague and the press reported on the UAE's "humanitarian" contributions there. UAE schizophrenia about that mission was yet again in evidence -- MbZ wants his forces battle-hardened through actual conflict but shies away from public acknowledgment of the mission. MbZ did apparently confide in the SecGen that he often feels lonely fighting in Afghanistan without his Arab brothers contributing to the cause. The confidential setting of your meeting is a good opportunity to endorse the ongoing participation of UAE troops and even ask MbZ whether he thinks enhanced participation by other Arabs is a prospect worth pursuing. ¶11. (S) The UAE also aids Afghan reconstruction of roads, mosques, medical facilities and schools, has made efforts at political mediation between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and assists some military infrastructure projects (runways). In June 2007 MbZ also agreed to donate ten Mi-17 helicopters to Kabul and that effort is underway (six of these refurbished aircraft should be on the ground in Afghanistan by mid-February). Other delicate conflicts -------------- ¶12. (S) The UAE leadership staunchly supports Pakistani President Musharraf (MbZ told USMC Commandant Conway in November that if forced to decide between supporting U.S. policy and backing Musharraf, "I'll bet on Musharraf"). They see him as the only bulwark against instability, which sometimes runs at cross purposes with the ideal of credible elections based on an open, free and fair debate. You might wish to engage MbZ on his views of how the UAE can best encourage stability along the Afghan-Pakistani border, given the UAE's significant influence in Islamabad (President Khalifa made a private trip to Pakistan in late January). ¶13. (S) We continually engage the UAE on Lebanon, where the UAE provides significant humanitarian and security assistance and lends its political weight to Arab League efforts to calm the political situation. The UAE continues a long-standing de-mining operation, contributes resources for school and hospital construction, assists with the airlift of humanitarian supplies, has donated arms and ammunition to Lebanese security forces, and shares our desire to bolster the legitimate government. While reluctant to shun interaction with Syria, the UAE increasingly recognizes that nation's unhelpful role in bringing calm to Beirut. ¶14. (S) The UAE laments the lack of progress in Palestine, and eyes the chaotic situation in Gaza with some confusion as to how to best deploy humanitarian resources to assist the Palestinians. It has donated significant security supplies to the Palestinian Authority and money to accounts controlled by President Abbas ($80 million last summer). One recent shipment of over 100 vehicles and arms for PA security forces is reportedly being held up by Tel Aviv, causing yet another frustration in the UAE's efforts to focus its substantial resources on building Palestinian security services. If MbZ raises this issue, you might point out that the shipment was not coordinated with the U.S. Special Coordinator's office, which might have had better success in getting the shipment through (and which is currently engaged in trying to break the logjam on the 100 vehicles). As for Hamas, the UAE is as allergic to that organization as are we. High expectations for weapons release -------------- ¶15. (S) The UAE has committed billions to current and anticipated Foreign Military Sales cases, in addition to over $8.5 billion in direct commercial sales in the Block 60 F-16 program, one of the premier security assistance portfolios in the region. At the invitation of the Pentagon and State Department to deepen the security relationship by cooperating ABU DHABI 00000159 004 OF 005 on an integrated missile defense shield, the UAE last year submitted Letters of Request on the Patriot (nine PAC-3/GEM-T batteries),Surface Launched Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (SL-AMRAAM),and Theater High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system (3 fire units),for an estimated total value of $17 billion. It now wants the USG to make good on our offer of enhanced engagement by pressing for expeditious approval of these sales in the Congress. The UAE will see our posture as a critical measure of USG willingness to truly stand by the UAE in a contingency involving Iran. ¶16. (S) Other pending weapons sales include: High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS, case was signed and is being implemented now, valued at $597M),short-term interest in purchasing three E2-C Hawkeye AEW&C aircraft (in LOA negotiations) as an interim solution until delivery of a more permanent AEW&C platform (decision expected in mid-2008),40 UH-60M Blackhawk helicopters for its Special Operations Command (UAE has signed and the case is being implemented, valued at $807M),10 Blackhawks via Direct Commercial Sales from Sikorsky, ongoing upgrade of AH-64 Apache helicopters to the "D" (LONGBOW) model, 1300 Hellfire missiles (with the expectation of a request for an additional 1200 missiles), and additional weapons for their F-16s (three Letters of Request have been received, valued at over $800M). Defense Cooperation Agreement -------------- ¶17. (S) In spite of differences on status of forces issues and the use of passports/visas versus military IDs/orders for UAE entry and exit, overall mil-to-mil cooperation with the UAE has been excellent, with consistently reliable support at Jebel Ali and Fujairah ports and at Al Dhafra Air Base. The case of three Marines undergoing court action as a result of a traffic altercation is an anomaly which we hope will be resolved before your visit through intensive diplomatic efforts. This case does highlight the need for a careful review of the status of the Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA). The Embassy still believes the timing is right to discuss the DCA with the UAE and suggests this be done at the Joint Military Commission (JMC) working group meetings scheduled in March 12-13 (following right after the March 11 Gulf Security Dialogue). Keeping an eye on the horizon -------------- ¶18. (S) As the UAE prepares to face potential threats over the horizon, and as our military partnership continues to build mutual confidence that will pay off well beyond the foreseeable time horizon, engagement visits like yours are helpful to ensure that we have a clear understanding of what each side expects out of the relationship. We welcome your engagement with MbZ in particular and look forward to an opportunity to deepen the USG dialogue with him still further. ¶19. (S) We offer a final summation of a few points you may wish to make during your meetings: -- Appreciate UAE contribution to our mutual defense; recent high level USG visits attest to the importance Washington places on the UAE's role; -- Ask MbZ's views about the President's visit; -- Acknowledge that we continue to see Iran in similar terms, a strong argument to continue joint exercises and efforts toward interoperability; -- Note security progress in Iraq and the timeliness of Abu Dhabi playing a more aggressive engagement role (opening an Embassy, helping Iraqis get visits to UAE for official programs, facilitating a PM al-Maliki visit, debt relief); -- Commend UAE's long-term military commitment to Afghanistan and inquire how other Arab states might be drawn into the GWOT there; -- Comment on helpful UAE contributions to Lebanon and the Palestinian Authority yet remind that coordination with USG can smooth delivery of goods to PA; ABU DHABI 00000159 005 OF 005 -- Consult on best approach to pursue stability in Pakistan; -- Commit to examine the Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) as the UAE has requested; and, -- Emphasize the ongoing strength of our political-military partnership as key to our mutual defense. QUINN