Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08ABUDHABI148
2008-02-04 12:02:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Cable title:
U.S. ENGAGEMENT WITH MIDDLE EAST STATES ON NUCLEAR
VZCZCXRO8795 PP RUEHDE DE RUEHAD #0148 0351202 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 041202Z FEB 08 FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0364 INFO RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1337 RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA PRIORITY 1408 RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0421 RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY 1697 RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI PRIORITY 7575 RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0048
C O N F I D E N T I A L ABU DHABI 000148
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR ISN/NESS, ISN/RA, NEA/ARP
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2018
TAGS: KNNP ENRG PARM PREL AE
SUBJECT: U.S. ENGAGEMENT WITH MIDDLE EAST STATES ON NUCLEAR
ENERGY COOPERATION
REF: A. SECSTATE 8175
B. ABU DHABI 120
C. ABU DHABI 45
Classified By: Martin Quinn, Charge d'Affaires a.i., for reasons 1.4 (b
& d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L ABU DHABI 000148
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR ISN/NESS, ISN/RA, NEA/ARP
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2018
TAGS: KNNP ENRG PARM PREL AE
SUBJECT: U.S. ENGAGEMENT WITH MIDDLE EAST STATES ON NUCLEAR
ENERGY COOPERATION
REF: A. SECSTATE 8175
B. ABU DHABI 120
C. ABU DHABI 45
Classified By: Martin Quinn, Charge d'Affaires a.i., for reasons 1.4 (b
& d).
1. (C) Post appreciates the opportunity to provide input on
planned U.S. engagement with select countries in the Middle
East that have expressed a serious interest in developing a
peaceful nuclear power program. We agree that an early
positive engagement is key to both demonstrating that
countries can develop peaceful nuclear power in a way that
does not increase a proliferation risk and to opening the
door for U.S. companies to participate.
2. (C) In the specific case of the UAE, the leadership
appears to be committed to evaluating the need for nuclear
power then moving quickly to implement decisions. The
proposal to bring initial reactors on line by 2017 is
ambitious. Although the UAE has committed its participation
and support to the ongoing GCC initiatives toward peaceful
nuclear energy, it is clear that the UAE does not intend to
let the GCC slow it down. Rather, the UAE plans to have its
program serve as a model for the GCC. It appears, therefore,
that we will need to deal with the UAE on a bilateral basis,
whatever our interaction with the GCC as an organization.
3. (C) The key driver behind this program for the UAE is
clearly the Emirate of Abu Dhabi rather than the UAE federal
government. Specifically, Abu Dhabi Crown Prince (and Deputy
Supreme Commander of the UAE Armed Forces) Sheikh Mohammed
bin Zayed Al-Nahyan appears to be the driving force. The
organization pushing forward development of laws and
regulations and funding the studies is the Emirate of Abu
Dhabi's Executive Affairs Authority (EAA). The EAA is a kind
of think tank for the Chairman of the Abu Dhabi Executive
Council, the same Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al-Nahyan. The
Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Energy are being brought
into the process. Even so, the MFA's coordinator for
peaceful nuclear cooperation is Hamad Al-Kaabi, an EAA
employee. The General Counsel of the EAA is taking the lead
for drafting the UAE's nuclear regulatory law (ref b).
4. (C) Post proposes the following engagement process with
the UAE:
-- High Level Visits. Both POTUS and Secretary Bodman have
expressed general support for the UAE's proposed development
of nuclear power. Post believes that the high-level message
has been passed. The need is to follow through on expert
level discussions and practical issues. The upcoming
proposed Counter-proliferation Task Force (CTF) meeting in
late February will give us another opportunity to reiterate
the USG commitment.
-- Provide Comments on the UAE's draft white paper. In
accordance with ref A, post has informed the EAA that the
paper was very well received and that comments will be
provided. The UAE is eagerly awaiting these comments and has
promised to take timely suggestions into consideration. The
earlier, we can provide constructive comments, the better our
chance will be to shape the discussion. The UAE, after all,
wants to go public with its white paper in February.
-- The UAE has proposed sending a delegation to the U.S. in
the February 6-8 time frame. If at all possible, we should
accommodate this delegation. Ideally, post would have an
opportunity to provide comments to the white paper before
this visit to give the UAE delegation time to prepare for the
discussion. At a minimum, however, we should be prepared to
discuss the white paper in Washington.
-- Pursue GNEP and other bilateral agreements. This dialogue
appears to be compatible with the UAE's objectives and could
forward our goals as well.
-- Use the U.S. Embassy as the primary point of engagement
with the UAE, especially until the UAE's policy is agreed on
and adopted. This eases the logistical burden on the UAE and
limits any potential confusion.
QUINN
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR ISN/NESS, ISN/RA, NEA/ARP
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2018
TAGS: KNNP ENRG PARM PREL AE
SUBJECT: U.S. ENGAGEMENT WITH MIDDLE EAST STATES ON NUCLEAR
ENERGY COOPERATION
REF: A. SECSTATE 8175
B. ABU DHABI 120
C. ABU DHABI 45
Classified By: Martin Quinn, Charge d'Affaires a.i., for reasons 1.4 (b
& d).
1. (C) Post appreciates the opportunity to provide input on
planned U.S. engagement with select countries in the Middle
East that have expressed a serious interest in developing a
peaceful nuclear power program. We agree that an early
positive engagement is key to both demonstrating that
countries can develop peaceful nuclear power in a way that
does not increase a proliferation risk and to opening the
door for U.S. companies to participate.
2. (C) In the specific case of the UAE, the leadership
appears to be committed to evaluating the need for nuclear
power then moving quickly to implement decisions. The
proposal to bring initial reactors on line by 2017 is
ambitious. Although the UAE has committed its participation
and support to the ongoing GCC initiatives toward peaceful
nuclear energy, it is clear that the UAE does not intend to
let the GCC slow it down. Rather, the UAE plans to have its
program serve as a model for the GCC. It appears, therefore,
that we will need to deal with the UAE on a bilateral basis,
whatever our interaction with the GCC as an organization.
3. (C) The key driver behind this program for the UAE is
clearly the Emirate of Abu Dhabi rather than the UAE federal
government. Specifically, Abu Dhabi Crown Prince (and Deputy
Supreme Commander of the UAE Armed Forces) Sheikh Mohammed
bin Zayed Al-Nahyan appears to be the driving force. The
organization pushing forward development of laws and
regulations and funding the studies is the Emirate of Abu
Dhabi's Executive Affairs Authority (EAA). The EAA is a kind
of think tank for the Chairman of the Abu Dhabi Executive
Council, the same Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al-Nahyan. The
Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Energy are being brought
into the process. Even so, the MFA's coordinator for
peaceful nuclear cooperation is Hamad Al-Kaabi, an EAA
employee. The General Counsel of the EAA is taking the lead
for drafting the UAE's nuclear regulatory law (ref b).
4. (C) Post proposes the following engagement process with
the UAE:
-- High Level Visits. Both POTUS and Secretary Bodman have
expressed general support for the UAE's proposed development
of nuclear power. Post believes that the high-level message
has been passed. The need is to follow through on expert
level discussions and practical issues. The upcoming
proposed Counter-proliferation Task Force (CTF) meeting in
late February will give us another opportunity to reiterate
the USG commitment.
-- Provide Comments on the UAE's draft white paper. In
accordance with ref A, post has informed the EAA that the
paper was very well received and that comments will be
provided. The UAE is eagerly awaiting these comments and has
promised to take timely suggestions into consideration. The
earlier, we can provide constructive comments, the better our
chance will be to shape the discussion. The UAE, after all,
wants to go public with its white paper in February.
-- The UAE has proposed sending a delegation to the U.S. in
the February 6-8 time frame. If at all possible, we should
accommodate this delegation. Ideally, post would have an
opportunity to provide comments to the white paper before
this visit to give the UAE delegation time to prepare for the
discussion. At a minimum, however, we should be prepared to
discuss the white paper in Washington.
-- Pursue GNEP and other bilateral agreements. This dialogue
appears to be compatible with the UAE's objectives and could
forward our goals as well.
-- Use the U.S. Embassy as the primary point of engagement
with the UAE, especially until the UAE's policy is agreed on
and adopted. This eases the logistical burden on the UAE and
limits any potential confusion.
QUINN