SCENESETTER FOR YOUR VISIT

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 001318 SIPDIS NOFORN FOR GENERAL PETRAEUS FROM AMBASSADOR OLSON E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2018 TAGS: PREL PTER PARM MOPS MASS KNNP IR IZ PK AE SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR YOUR VISIT ABU DHABI 00001318 001.4 OF 002 Classified by Ambassador Richard Olson, reasons 1.4 (b,d). ¶1. (C) General: we look forward to your first visit to the UAE in your capacity as CENTCOM Commander. -------------- Punching above its Weight -------------- ¶2. (C) Over the past five years, the UAE has emerged as a regional powerhouse, using its financial clout and reputation for impartiality to expand its influence from North Africa through the Levant to the Sub-Continent, and indeed globally in financial circles. The bilateral relationship has been carefully nurtured from a strong mil-mil base into a much broader relationship in which the full range of USG Agencies work closely with Emirati counterparts. We consult extensively with the Emiratis and seek their advice, especially on tricky regional issues. -------------- UAE and the Region -------------- ¶3. (S) Within your AOR, the UAE has generally played a helpful role in a number of areas: Iraq: -- First GCC Country to cancel Saddam era debt and to re-establish an embassy; -- Supportive of the Iraqi participation in the GCC+3; -- MbZ came away from his recent meeting with Maliki convinced he is an Iraqi nationalist, and also convinced about the importance of the US SOFA. Afghanistan: -- UAE SOF has been quietly deployed as part of OEF since 2002, and has recently come out of the closet by becoming an ISAF troop contributor (UAE is permitting press coverage emphasizing a humanitarian mission); -- MbZ sees the Afghan deployment as a way of transforming and hardening his forces, but also recognizes that political imperative for moderate Arabs to publicly support the fight against Al-Qaida and the Taliban. Pakistan: -- UAE has taken a leading role in the Friends of Pakistan initiative, and is signaling that it will contribute financial support, provided multilateral arrangements are put in place; -- The Nahyan family has a long-standing relationship with the Bhuttos, and this is transitioning, not without some trepidation, into support for Zardari. Iran: -- For the Emiratis, Iran is a primordial obsession, and all security conversations soon turn to the Iranian threat (Iran is 46 seconds from the UAE, as measured by the flight of a ballistic missile); -- Abu Dhabi leadership believes the international community is seized with the nuclear issue, but insufficiently focused on Iran's efforts to destabilize the region; -- Lately we have detected a strain of fatalism with regard to the Iranian threat. Important to convince Emiratis that we will consult closely with them, back them up, and reassure them that the Iranians are not ten feet tall. -------------- Mil-Mil Relations -------------- ¶4. (S/NF) As you know, the UAE provides critical (if very low-key) support for several of your component commands. -- Al-Dhafra air force base is the ISR hub for the AOR, and supports 50 percent of aerial refueling in the AOR. -- Dubai and other ports in the Northern Emirates are the logistics backbone for the Fifth Fleet, and Jebel Ali is the major liberty port in your AOR. -- Minhad Air Base is a critical hub for Coalition/ISAF partners in Afghanistan, including the Australians, Dutch, Canadians, Brits and Kiwis. ¶5. (C) Security Assistance is a cornerstone of our relationship. -- The commercial sale of Block 60 F-16s is now well into the implementation phase. -- We are currently close to finalizing LOAs for the UAE purchase of Patriots, and expect to move forward on sale of THAAD soon, with the aim of supporting the UAE's desire for an integrated air defense system. UAE will be the first country outside the US to purchase the THAAD system. ABU DHABI 00001318 002 OF 002 -------------- Challenges: -------------- ¶6. (C) One of the main challenges that the USG faces in the UAE is dealing with rapid growth, both Emirati and our own. It can be virtually impossible to get a hotel room in Abu Dhabi, housing our people in a (still!) overheated market is a real challenge, and our new (2004) state of the art Embassy is already too small for everyone who wants in. As we start the integrated air defense program (all FMS),and as we move from supplemental to regular budgetary funding, there will inevitably be pressure from DOD/CENTCOM (and other agencies) to put more people on the ground here. We need to look at new and creative ways of addressing this legitimate demand. I have my own ideas, and look forward to sharing them with you. I will be interested in hearing how you think the UAE fits in your regional plans over the medium term. I would also like to hear about your plans for the regional engagement cell. ¶7. (S/NF) The biggest constraint to further mil-mil cooperation, in my view, is the lack of implementation of the DCA. We have been at an impasse with the UAE on this issue since 1994, and while we have developed a variety of risk-laden work-arounds for existing deployments, it is difficult for me to see any great expansion of our combatant forces here absent some movement on this issue. I think this is another area where we need to think creatively. ¶8. (C) I also look forward to discussing the JSAT with you. I welcome your initiative to synchronize USG efforts, and my team will work with your team, bearing in mind that the US Mission's mandate covers a much broader range of issues. OLSON