CSAF GEN SCHWARTZ MEETS MBZ IN ABU DHABI

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 001229 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/22/2018 TAGS: PREL EFIN MOPS MARR MCAP IR IZ AE SUBJECT: CSAF GEN SCHWARTZ MEETS MBZ IN ABU DHABI Classified by Ambassador Richard Olson, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S) Summary: Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ) shared his views on Iraq, Iran, and the financial crisis with Air Force Chief of Staff General Schwartz on October 21. He highlighted Iran's influence in Iraq and noted that while his own view of PM al-Maliki had improved, we need to be planning for a successor. Iraq knows that American troops are needed for the time being and might "blink" in SOFA negotiations if they truly feared our departure. MbZ assured his guest that the UAE would not "let down" financial and corporate institutions in the country in spite of market instability. In times of crisis Abu Dhabi will be a responsible steward of the emirate's resources, he insisted. He described a recent meeting with Iran's intelligence chief in which the latter exuded confidence in Iran's ability to dominate a post-capitalist financial system -- a frightening display of overconfidence in MbZ's view. MbZ was uncharacteristically downbeat in his assessment of the Iranian threat. End summary. DEALING WITH IRAQ ON ITS TERMS -------------- ¶2. (S) USAF Chief of Staff General Norton Schwartz began his initial courtesy call on Abu Dhabi Crown Prince (and Deputy Supreme Commander of the UAE Armed Forces) Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ) by expressing thanks to the UAE for enabling critical ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) and refueling operations from al-Dhafra Air Base. MbZ affirmed the UAE's warm welcome to U.S. forces. He quickly turned a question on Iraq (regarding SOFA negotiations) into an analysis of Iran's influence. Carefully collecting his thoughts, he said we must first acknowledge that "the Iranians are doing a fantastic job," working hard to influence Iraqis in ways that the U.S. cannot. They do not share our inhibitions in using underhanded tactics to exert influence. Speaking frankly "among friends," MbZ said the extensive U.S. experience in Iraq is too focused on Western modes of operation and analysis. Time is short and we must work together, he asserted. ¶3. (S) Having listened closely to both Americans and Iraqis in Baghdad during his visit earlier in the month, MbZ said in the final analysis Iraq cannot afford to have the U.S. depart. In spite of much pressure on Iraqi leaders to resist a prolonged U.S. presence, we should not underestimate how dire their situation could be in our 
absence. He said the GoI "might blink" in the negotiations if it truly believed we had a plan to pull out if the agreement was not favorable; of this he was "confident," while admitting a small chance that his analysis may be wrong. They deal, said MbZ, based on under the table bargaining without any price tag showing. ¶4. (S) Al-Maliki wants to stay in power but cannot "turn things around," especially as Iraqis try to outdo one another in proving their nationalist credentials (by standing up to Washington). Describing his change of heart about al-Maliki, whom he had previously judged by background and sectarian affiliation, MbZ said he now recognizes the PM's national leadership goals. It is nonetheless important to consider now who many eventually succeed al-Maliki. FINANCIAL CRISIS -------------- ¶5. (C) Asked how the UAE is coping with the financial crisis, MbZ said "everybody" needs to deal with it in unison. At Camp David in June the President had asked him why oil prices were high, said MbZ, and he responded that he had no clue. He was similarly unsure of the reasons behind the current crisis -- the world seemed upbeat as we watched the Olympics in China and suddenly (snapping his fingers) we find ourselves in a financial mess. While it is premature to judge how the crisis will end, he sensed a larger problem outside the U.S. than within it. In both percentage terms and in absolute numbers, Europe and elsewhere are hurting more, he asserted. The UAEG had made a clear decision to support its banks. The leadership would not let its banks or companies down. Abu Dhabi tries to invest wisely, he emphasized, and "in this time of crisis, it's our duty to use it well" to support our people and bolster confidence. Comparing the crisis to "two or three tsunamis" at once, he hoped another tidal wave was not on the horizon. He said the UAE would take the decisions necessary to make sure people who invest here are secure. AN OVERCONFIDENT IRAN -------------- ¶6. (S) Describing Iran's odd view of the market instability, MbZ said he had at long last accepted a meeting with Iran's Chief of the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS),Qolan Hosein Mohseni-Ejei, some days prior and he listened to an explanation that the world's financial system was outdated and unable to keep up with the times. Mohseni-Ejei said communism had collapsed in 1989, we were now watching the collapse of capitalism, only the Iranian way would be left. If Iran really believes its own propaganda on that ABU DHABI 00001229 002 OF 002 point, MbZ feared, "we are in trouble." Such thinking reverts back thousands of years to the confidence of the Persian Empire, said MbZ, as Iran tries to manipulate events from Lebanon to China. ¶7. (S) The Ambassador suggested Iran may be bargaining for advantage as it suffers from the pinch of financial sanctions. Even if sanctions are very effective, responded MbZ, it was still a problem for us all if Iran believes what it is saying -- as his self confident MOIS interlocutor was aggressively trying to convince him. Criticizing the nonsensical approach of Iran's leadership, as he often does, MbZ said at least one can talk to other countries, but not to Supreme Leader Khamenei. He worried aloud that Dubai and Abu Dhabi are within range of Iranian missiles. PILOT TALK -------------- ¶8. (C) Ever the pilot at heart, MbZ asked what air assets might be arrayed in Afghanistan in coming months as the U.S. conducts a mini-surge. Schwartz highlighted infrastructure limitations hindering more robust air operations. He also discussed changes in troop levels, noting the difficulty of adjusting support operations (and associated personnel numbers) as fast as combat troops. MbZ inquired about the utility of the A-10, which led to a discussion of stresses on older aircraft that the newer UAE fleet does not often worry about. MbZ joked that he would "pass a note" to his successor about the challenges of older aircraft. COMMENT -------------- ¶9. (S) MbZ turned every discussion back to Iran, which reflects his preoccupation with the threat from across the Gulf. Less characteristic was his somewhat gloomy take on the situation. He talked about the formidable nature of the opponent, the threat of missiles, and the fanaticism of the MOIS chief in a way that emphasized the challenge, rather than the response. This may have just been an off moment for MbZ, rather than an onset of defeatism, but it bears watching. OLSON