UAEG WANTS TO DISCUSS PATRIOTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L ABU DHABI 001000

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ARP/BMASILKO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2018
TAGS: PREL MASS MCAP PINS AE

SUBJECT: UAEG WANTS TO DISCUSS PATRIOTS

Ref: STATE 92763

Classified by Charge d'Affaires Martin Quinn, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: On September 1, Post delivered reftel demarche on
the U.S. decision to offer Patriot deployment to the UAE. A basic
presentation to the Abu Dhabi Crown Prince's office soon brought the
issue to the attention of the Air Force leadership, with whom we
discussed the deployment in greater detail the following morning. In
both meetings it was clear that the UAEG welcomes the decision yet
seeks further clarity on the specifics of the proposal before the
UAEG could give a firm go ahead. UAE interlocutors viewed deployment
by October 31 as overly optimistic. The UAE seeks more detail on
costs and coordination before a formal decision can be made. End
summary.

Crown Prince's Court the First Night of Ramadan
-------------- --


2. (C) Acting DCM, Defense Attache, and U.S. Liaison Office Chief
made a coordinated approach to Mohamed al-Mazrouie, Under Secretary
of the Crown Prince's Court, late in the evening on September 1 to
seek the Crown Prince's views on reftel decision to deploy PATRIOT
assets to the UAE. Al-Mazrouie inquired about timelines, cost
sharing, basic technical parameters of the offer, and potential
"principles" of coordination (protocols of U.S.-UAE operational
coordination),agreeing that each of these issues needed to be
discussed in somewhat more detail before the UAEG could fully embrace
the offer. His initial sense was that full deployment by October 31
was rather optimistic.


3. (C) Embassy officers emphasized that we sought the UAEG's intent
regarding the deployment and welcomed further discussion to clarify
parameters. We asked that al-Mazrouie take the issue to Crown Prince
and Deputy Supreme Commander of the UAE Armed Forces Mohammed bin
Zayed (MbZ, who was entertaining Ramadan guests nearby) for
permission to initiate the needed discussions. Phone calls from UAE
Air Force officials -- within an hour -- confirmed that the UAE
wanted to pursue the dialogue quickly but sought greater clarity
before MbZ would give a final green light.

Air Force Commander the Following Morning
--------------


4. (C) The same Embassy officers, with additional U.S. Liaison
Office experts, met with Air Force Commander Mohammed al-Qamzi on the
morning of September 2 at the latter's request. Al-Qamzi focused on
the need for clarity, in writing, of just what the proposed
deployment might entail. He wanted to know how much it would cost
the UAE, both for infrastructure and for maintenance of U.S. troops
to man the systems. He was interested in how many batteries /
launchers were involved (we suggested one initial battery with
another potentially added some months later, each battery having
multiple launchers with certain restrictions as to how "remote" they
could be from the main radar site). He asked if the Patriots would
be linked to other U.S. systems or stand alone, whether UAE troops
might be able to train on the system (in anticipation of the UAE's
eventual purchase of Patriots),how many U.S. troops would be
involved (we estimated 300),what infrastructure requirements were
involved, and what sites would be our priority to protect. We noted
that all of these issues needed to be worked out by mutual
discussion, and that we sought to initiate that discussion quickly.
A meeting was set for September 4 in anticipation of the arrival of
ARCENT subject matter experts to help turn U.S. planning assumptions
into more realistic proposals.


5. (C) Al-Qamzi closed by reiterating his need for a clear (written)
proposal that he could staff up the chain of command. It is not as
simple as "we want it, bring it," he emphasized, asking that materiel
not be shipped to the UAE until the basic parameters were established
and approved by MbZ. Al-Qamzi also noted the legal issues that might
be involved and was adamant about pursuing the deployment
methodically -- "the right way."


6. (C) Comment: In both meetings it was clear that an October
timeline may be too optimistic/aggressive, although both
interlocutors sought to refine the details of the offer with some
urgency. Cost was discussed, but did not become an issue, with
al-Mazrouie; on the other hand, al-Qamzi was very concerned about
cost as he works with a finite budget. End comment.
QUINN