IMPLEMENTING PEACE AGREEMENT INCREASES TENSION IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABIDJAN 000008 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR AF/W-EPLUMB AND INR/AA-BGRAVES E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/04/2017 TAGS: MARR MCAP PGOV EAID IV SUBJECT: IMPLEMENTING PEACE AGREEMENT INCREASES TENSION IN SOME AREAS Classified By: POL/ECON SECTION CHIEF SILVIA EIRIZ FOR REASONS 1.4 (b/d ). ¶1. (C) Summary: As the government of Cote d'Ivoire takes action to implement DDR-related provisions of the Ouagadougou Political Agreement (OPA),deep lying fissures are surfacing. Violent confrontations in the north over the past few weeks have exposed rifts within the Forces Nouvelles between elements loyal to Prime Minister Soro and those loyal to one of the masterminds of the rebellion, Sergeant Ibrahim Coulibaly (aka IB) who is currently in exile. The return of government authorities to the north coupled with movement to restore government control over financial resources has engendered resentment among those who were benefiting from the status quo. There is also great concern that the underlying issue of identification has still not been fully resolved. Further incidents are likely as implementation of the OPA proceeds. End Summary. DDR - LOTS OF MOVEMENT BUT NOT NECESSARILY PROGRESS -------------- -------------- ¶2. (SBU) The third complementary agreement to the OPA provided for the Integrated Command Center (ICC) to begin operations to re-group ex-combatants, stockpile weapons, and disband militias no later than December 22, 2007. The Government went to great lengths to demonstrate publicly that it was meeting this deadline by holding ceremonies on December 22 at the 2 locations where the government and the New Forces (Forces Nouvelles - FN) have each deployed troops since 2003. Government troops stationed in Tiebissou were moved to the political capital, Yamoussoukro, and the FN troops stationed in Djebonoua were moved to the FN stronghold, Bouake. ¶3. (C) The United Nations Mission in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI) issued a statement describing the December 22 events as an important stage in the disarmament, demobilization, and reinsertion (DDR) process and welcoming respect for the December 22 deadline. There is confusion, however, about whether the ceremonies were just a show. UNOCI and French Embassy officials told the Ambassador that both the government and FN troops who were moved to regroupment centers on December 22 subsequently returned to their units. DAO sources later reported, however, that new, smaller contingents were subsequently deployed to the same locations and that the local populace may have mistaken these new units for the old one. Embassy attempts to determine exactly what may or may not have happened have revealed a remarkable degree of confusion, including within the government, about what is supposed to happen at the regroupment centers, i.e, what services are to be provided and how long forces are expected to stay at them. PROGRESS ON OPA LEADING TO FRACTURE IN NEW FORCES -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) Incidents in the last few weeks indicate growing discontent and strain among the FN. On December 18, FN troops in Bouake demonstrated and fired their weapons into the air because they had not received a monthly salary stipend. Several days later, on December 24, traditional hunter soldiers ("dozos") blocked the Bouake-Kateola route demanding payment for their services. Prime Minister Soro subsequently met with them in Abidjan. On December 27, FN troops in Bouake reportedly exchanged fire with a group of men, killing one or more of them. Media reports about the incident initially indicated that there was an attack by 22 men on Bouake "Zone Commander" Wattao's residence which was repulsed in heavy fighting. In the melee, the ringleader was killed. He was subsequently identified as a supporter of exiled Sergeant Ibrahim Coulibaly, who is known to be a prime rival of Prime Minister Guillaume Soro. Subsequent media and other reports have raised questions, however, about what actually happened. ¶5. (C) DATT sources from both the French Licorne stabilization force and an FN soldier residing in Bouake during the December 27 incident indicate there was no battle or attempted coup. More recent media reports quote unidentified sources from the FN in Bouake corroborating Licorne and claiming that FN elements under the command of FN commanders Wattao and Morou engaged in roundups and summary executions of IB supporters. UNOCI on January 2 issued a statement of concern about respect for human rights related to the attacks in Bouake. ABIDJAN 00000008 002 OF 002 ¶6. (C) Pro-government militias appear to be beset by similar internal tensions as the FN. On December 29, members of two militias, the Front for the Liberation of the Greater West (Front de Liberation du Grand Ouest - FLGO) and the Movement for the Liberation of Western Cote d'Ivoire (Mouvement Ivoirien de Liberation Ouest de Cote d'Ivoire - MILOCI) clashed in Guiglo. While the confrontation between the two groups was reportedly the result of traditional rivalry, MILOCI had allegedly been demonstrating because its members had not received payments they felt were due from the government. The leader of a pro-Gbagbo youth group seeking a meeting at the Presidence with Gbagbo, was badly beaten by presidential guards on December 31. The President has promised an immediate investigation but this may be yet another sign that established alliances are fracturing. ¶7. (C) Comment: While many details are unknown and some of the facts surrounding recent events remain sketchy (especially regarding the December 27 incident in Bouake), Embassy believes these are signs that alliances forged during the crisis are beginning to fracture. President Gbagbo and PM Soro appear to be intent on implementing -- or at least appearing to implement the OPA in order to permit elections to be held. There appears to be significant frustration among some elements of the FN over the fact that the issue they care most about, identification, has still not been fully resolved. In addition, most of the FN troops and members of the militia face an uncertain and economically bleak future. That future looms closer every day that OPA implementation moves forward and the Gbagbo government expands its control over the entire country. NESBITT