Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07ZAGREB999
2007-11-06 15:24:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Zagreb
Cable title:  

UNANNOUCED VISIT TO ZAGREB BY B-H PRESIDENCY

Tags:  PREL BK HR 
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VZCZCXRO9242
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHVB #0999 3101524
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 061524Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY ZAGREB
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8309
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L ZAGREB 000999 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR EUR/SCE
NSC FOR BRAUN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/06/2017
TAGS: PREL BK HR
SUBJECT: UNANNOUCED VISIT TO ZAGREB BY B-H PRESIDENCY
MEMBER KOMSIC

REF: BRADTKE-DICARLO/ENGLISH/HOH 10/5/07 EMAIL

Classified By: Rick Holtzapple, POL/ECON, Reasons 1.4 (B/D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L ZAGREB 000999 SIPDIS SIPDIS FOR EUR/SCE NSC FOR BRAUN E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/06/2017 TAGS: PREL BK HR SUBJECT: UNANNOUCED VISIT TO ZAGREB BY B-H PRESIDENCY MEMBER KOMSIC REF: BRADTKE-DICARLO/ENGLISH/HOH 10/5/07 EMAIL Classified By: Rick Holtzapple, POL/ECON, Reasons 1.4 (B/D) ¶1. (C) Presidential Advisor Budimir Loncar told the Ambassador on November 5 that B-H Presidency member Zeljko Komsic had made an unannounced visit to Zagreb on the previous day to meet with Croatian President Stjepan Mesic. Komsic came with only one aide and without even bodyguards, in hopes that neither Dodik nor fellow Presidency member Haris Silajdzic would be aware of his trip. According to Loncar, Komsic expressed deep concern about the current situation in Bosnia, and urged stronger support for Lajcak in dealing with Dodik. Komsic theorized that perhaps things needed to get worse before they could get better. Komsic also told Mesic that he was equally concerned with Silajdzic. Silajdzic had told him that the U.S. was no longer interested in or capable of dealing with Bosnia's problems, and therefore Bosnia needed to turn more to the Islamic world. Komsic told Mesic that all of this had convinced him the best course of action would be for Lajcak to remove both Dodik and Silajdzic. Komsic also asked Mesic to make a strong statement of support for Lajcak. ¶2. (C) Loncar said that he and Mesic were also worried about Silajdzic. Loncar said he agreed with Komsic that perhaps now was the time to remove both Dodik and Silajdzic. Mesic was also prepared to issue a further statement supporting Lajcak, depending on how the negotiations and discussions currently underway in Banja Luka between OHR and the RS progressed. Loncar inquired as to U.S. views on the issue. ¶3. (C) The Ambassador, after consulting with Washington and Embassy Sarajevo, responded to Loncar that removals would be an extreme option and a last resort that would need careful preparation and interim steps, and that we do not think we are yet at that point. The Ambassador did stress that strong public and private statements in support of Lajcak and the legitimacy of his announced measures would still be helpful, and need not await further developments in Sarajevo or in Banja Luka. ¶4. (C) COMMENT: Both Mesic and the GoC, under PM Sanader, are interested in helping where they can to keep the situation in Bosnia from disintegrating further. Given their own politics, Mesic and Sanader have influence and access with different segments of the Bosnian Croat community. We appreciate Embassy Sarajevo's efforts to help us keep the Croatians informed of developments in B-H, and to steer their engagement in useful directions. END COMMENT. BRADTKE

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