U/S NICHOLAS BURNS' MAY 10-11 MEETINGS WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 ZAGREB 000565 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR P, EUR, EUR/SCE E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV EAIR OSCE NATO HR YI BK SR SUBJECT: U/S NICHOLAS BURNS' MAY 10-11 MEETINGS WITH CROATIAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS Classified By: Amb Robert A. Bradtke for reasons 1.4 (B) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Undersecretary for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns visited Zagreb May 10-11 to consult with Croatian leaders and attend the Summit of the Southeast European Cooperation Process (septel). He met with PM Sanader, President Mesic, and FM Grabar-Kitarovic, and had several bilaterals with third-country leaders (septel). He told the Croatians that the USG strongly supported a NATO invitation for Croatia in 2008. The Prime Minister reiterated his "personal commitment" to continued reform. U/S Burns also discussed Kosovo status (the Croatians support Ahtisaari),Serbia, and Bosnia with the Croatian leadership. U/S Burns had numerous engagements with the press on both Croatian and regional issues. After U/S Burns had departed, PM Sanader told the Ambassador that he was extremely happy with the visit and the strengthening of U.S.-Croatian relations that it had marked. End summary. ¶2. (U) U/S Burns met May 10 with Croatian FM Kolinda Grabar-Kitarovic, accompanied by Ambassador, Polcouns (notetaker),and P staffer Maren Brooks. He met May 11 with President Stjepan Mesic and PM Ivo Sanader, accompanied by Ambassador, DCM (notetaker),and P staff. FM KOLINDA GRABAR-KITAROVIC NATO ¶3. (C) FM Grabar-Kitarovic expressed GOC appreciation for U.S. support of Croatia's Euro-Atlantic aspirations. She noted that public support for NATO membership had been rising slowly but steadily since the Riga Summit. She outlined for U/S Burns a number of GOC initiative to build support, including outreach to all political parties by Croatia's Ambassador to NATO and publicizing a large NATO exercise taking place in Croatia later in May. U/S Burns congratulated Croatia for playing a positive role as an example for the region, thanked the FM for Croatian contributions to NATO operations in Afghanistan and Kosovo, and underscored U.S. support for an invitation at the 2008 NATO Summit in Bucharest. He noted that U.S. Ambassador to NATO Nuland would visit the A-3 countries in the fall of 2007; in Macedonia and Albania, in particular, the U.S. delegation would assess progress and point out work still to be done. Kosovo ¶4. (C) U/S Burns informed FM Grabar-Kitarovic that the U.S. and EU countries would circulate a draft UNSC resolution on Kosovo on May 11. He noted that the U.S. could already count on eleven votes, was hopeful about Indonesian support, and asserted that China was unlikely to veto the resolution. He advised the FM that Secretary Rice would discuss the issue in Russia in the next few days. The U.S. was prepared to accept a Russian suggestion about appointing a special envoy for Serb refugee issues. Serbia ¶5. (C) Turning to the election of Radical party member Nikolic as speaker of the Serbian Parliament, FM Grabar-Kitarovic expressed concert about his harsh rhetoric, characterizing it as "not a security threat, but a step backward" for the Serbian people. U/S Burns agreed that Nikolic's election was disappointing, a view he and German Chancellor Merkel had already shared directly with Serbian PM Kostunica. Kostunica had indicated that he was still attempting to form a government without the Radicals. Supplemental SOFA ¶6. (C) FM Grabar-Kitarovic advised U/S Burns that she hoped negotiations were near conclusion on the Supplemental SOFA, noting that the GOC had made a new proposal on the issue of custody of soldiers pending trial. Ambassador Bradtke explained that the proposal had been relayed to Washington and a reply was expected shortly. Iraq ¶7. (C) FM Grabar-Kitarovic informed U/S Burns that the GOC had recently hosted an Iraqi parliamentary delegation which was examining the Croatian post-conflict model of ethnic reconciliation. The GOC has also assisted in building administrative capacity in the Iraqi Foreign Ministry by inviting Iraqi diplomats to attend the Diplomatic Academy in Zagreb. ZAGREB 00000565 002 OF 005 UN Security Council ¶8. (C) FM Grabar-Kitarovic noted that Croatia was a candidate for a non-permanent UNSC seat in the fall of 2007 and would be seeking U.S. support. PM IVO SANADER ¶9. (C) Sanader opened the meeting by recalling fondly the "historic day" last fall when he met with President Bush, VP Cheney, and other USG officials during his visit to Washington. U/S Burns replied that he had come to demonstrate the President's support for Croatia as a future ally and member of NATO; he noted that at this point Croatia was still the only country the USG was supporting for NATO membership. He remarked on the many positive changes Croatia had undergone since his last visit ten years previously. Serbia ¶10. (C) Regarding the status of Serbian government formation, Sanader reported that he had heard the prior evening that President Tadic and PM Kostunica were trying to find a compromise to avoid new elections. The EU Commission has pushed strongly on both sides. Speaker Nikolic was a "disaster," Sanader continued, announcing that he wanted Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, and half of Croatia to become part of Serbia; he was more radical even than Milosevic had been. Sanader was concerned, but did not expect renewed violence between Croatia and Serbia. ¶11. (C) Sanader reviewed his own "courageous steps" to build a better relationship with Serbia. For example, he had invited Kostunica to visit Zagreb, and had traveled to Belgrade himself. He had called Kostunica the prior week to encourage him to attend the SEECP summit, describing it as a great opportunity to make his case before other European leaders; the latter had demurred due to the difficult political situation. ¶12. (C) U/S Burns replied that he had recently talked with Kostunica as well, and had told him that the USG would not support him in opening the door to Radical Party participation in government. Burns had said publicly that morning that Nikolic's statements on border issues were "outrageous." Kosovo ¶13. (C) U/S Burns noted that the U.S. and European countries would be introducing a UNSC resolution on Kosovo that day. He thought that there were eleven votes in favor of the resolution at that point; only Russia might oppose, but it had not yet threatened a veto. The resolution will not be complicated; it would undo the 1999 resolution and would provide for the EU to be the civil authority. The USG would recognize Kosovo's independence within hours after passage; it would support Kosovo's membership in the UN. The USG had 1500 troops there who would stay as long as necessary; the USG will also give Kosovo economic support. ¶14. (C) U/S Burns noted that PM Ceku and his colleagues had recently visited the UN in New York and had planned out the first 120 days of his government following independence. Ceku was doing a good job; President Bush and Chancellor Merkel support him. Kosovo will also need Croatia's friendship and support. ¶15. (C) Secretary Rice would meet President Putin on May 15, and Chancellor Merkel would see him two days later; both would discuss Kosovo with him. U/S Burns said the USG had attempted to incorporate some Russian ideas in its Kosovo plans, such as an envoy for Kosovar Serb refugees. Burns noted that the U.S. and Europe have troops in Kosovo, while Russia does not; if Russia vetoes the resolution, the West would still have to bear the cost for maintaining security there. ¶16. (C) U/S Burns said he had talked about Kosovo with Kostunica the day before, and they had disagreed about the issue. Still, the USG wants to have a good relationship with Serbia in the future despite such disagreements. ¶17. (C) Sanader agreed that Russia was unlikely to veto a UNSC Kosovo resolution. However, it would try to get as much as it could out of other UNSC members in the process. He noted that the GOC was working to support our efforts in Kosovo. President Mesic had received two Kosovo Serbian politicians the day before, in cooperation with Croatian Serb MP Milorad Pupovac. Sanader himself had also met with a ZAGREB 00000565 003 OF 005 Kosovar Serb delegation recently; he had encouraged Ceku to involve these politicians more in Kosovar political life to give them a better future in the country. ¶18. (C) Sanader said he planned to call Kostunica within a few days to brief him on the outcome of the SEECP Summit. He will tell the PM that Croatia will have a common line with the U.S. and EU on Kosovo's future status. EUC President Barroso had told Sanader he was trying to keep the EU united on Kosovo; disunity would help Russia. Sanader noted that it was vital for Croatia to maintain a good relationship with Serbia; it would therefore wait to recognize Kosovo's independence along with the EU; U/S Burns agreed with that timing due to Croatia's sensitive relationship with Serbia. Bosnia-Herzegovina ¶19. (C) Sanader remarked about the importance of preserving BiH as a unitary state. He objected to Republika Srpska PM Dodik's idea for a referendum on RS independence; that would be a huge disaster. The only factor linking BiH together today are the Croats; it is important to keep the BiH Croats strong and in BiH, and to maintain their strong ties to Croatia, Europe, and the U.S. That was why Sanader was working hard to get the two Croatian HDZ parties in BiH to reunite. It was also why, Sanader said, he asked U/S Burns not to insist on the U.S.-brokered constitutional reform package from April 2006. ¶20. (C) Sanader noted his fear that when Croatia joins the EU and NATO, the BiH Croats would leave their country and emigrate to Croatia; that would be a disaster; it is important to keep them in BiH. ¶21. (C) There are three important Croat entities in BiH, Sanader said; the two HDZ parties and the church, led by Cardinal Puljic. He suggested that U.S. Ambassador McElhaney spend more time trying to engage Puljic. Puljic is isolated sometimes, and he can overreact, but he is committed to a unitary BiH. ¶22. (C) U/S Burns replied that the USG values its partnership with Croatia on BiH. We all need to keep pushing BiH towards a European future. Unfortunately, things were not going well there, despite considerable effort. He noted that he had written to Dodik opposing a referendum; Dodik had assured Burns there would be none. Presidency member Silajdzic would be in Washington the following week; Burns would tell him that he needed to be more open to working with the Croats and others. He had recently told FM Alkalaj that BiH needed to work more towards a future in NATO. He promised to be in touch with Ambassador McElhaney about Puljic, and to discuss Puljic with Cardinal McCarrick as well. OSCE Mission ¶23. (C) Sanader noted that Croatia was a country on the verge of joining the EU and NATO, and was sending its own troops and experts to help other countries in conflict situations; an OSCE Mission in Croatia was no longer appropriate. He noted that the Spanish OSCE Chairmanship in Office wants to terminate the Mission this year. Finland, the upcoming chairman, agreed. Some EU ambassadors resident in Zagreb are the main problem; for example, EU Commission Ambassador Degert has said that the OSCE could continue to be helpful to the EU. But if the OSCE Ministerial conference in November decides to extend the mandate of the Mission, it would be a very bad signal, also to Serbia and BiH as well. Sanader asked for Burns's support with the Europeans on closing down the Mission. ¶24. (C) Ambassador Bradtke noted that it was vital to fulfill commitments on refugee return and rule of law issues GOC ministers had undertaken at an April 24 meeting with OSCE Ambassador Fuentes in order to maintain momentum for Mission closure. ¶25. (C) Sanader replied that the two remaining issues were minorities and war crimes monitoring. He reminded U/S Burns that the main Croatian Serb political party was a member of his governing coalition. He offered his "personal commitment" to implement the April 24 refugee and rule of law plan. On war crimes, he noted that the ICTY had transferred the Ademi-Norac war crimes case to Croatia, the best evidence of the maturity of the Croatian judicial system. He said the GOC could accept two to four expats to help with war crimes monitoring, but not under the current OSCE mission; but it was important to terminate the Mission. ¶26. (C) U/S Burns promised to work with the GOC on the issue, ZAGREB 00000565 004 OF 005 noting that he understood its importance to Sanader. NATO ¶27. (C) U/S Burns noted that Albania and Macedonia were not doing well on NATO preparations; there are still significant problems with their defense reform efforts, judicial reform, etc. The support did not exist in Brussels to get them into NATO at this point. He asked the GOC to assist those countries with their preparations. ¶28. (C) U/S Burns said the USG would make an up or down decision on NATO expansion by the end of autumn. Croatia may be the only country the USG supports. He was confident of support for Croatia's membership from the UK, Germany, and France as well. "Croatia Summit" in Dubrovnik July 6-7 ¶29. (C) Sanader invited U/S Burns to attend the Croatia Summit in Dubrovnik July 6-7; he noted that Italian PM Prodi and several other prime ministers and presidents from the region had already committed to coming. The focus of the Summit will be on Southeastern Europe and NATO. U/S Burns replied that he had another commitment for that time period, but promised that the USG would send a senior-level representative. Other Issues ¶30. (C) Sanader told U/S Burns that Croatia was ready to move forward on an "Open Skies" civil aviation agreement with the U.S. ¶31. (C) U/S Burns noted that we were close to reaching a new Status of Forces agreement; it was important to get this done. PRESIDENT STJEPAN MESIC ¶32. (C) President Mesic said that Croatia's two most important strategic goals were membership in the European Union and in NATO. Regarding NATO, there is still some skepticism among Croats; however, the GOC is better explaining to the people what NATO means, so this skepticism will be overcome. ¶33. (C) The two most significant regional issues are the consolidation of BiH and the future of Kosovo. Regarding BiH, Mesic expressed concern about Dodik's threat to hold a referendum on RS independence. The consequences of such an event would be disastrous; if the RS became independent and later joined Serbia, it could cause the Bosnian Croats to decamp to Croatia, leaving behind only the Bosniaks and creating a rump Islamic state in the heart of Europe, a "new Palestine" that could become a center of terror. ¶34. (C) On Kosovo, Mesic praised the Ahtisaari plan as the path towards final resolution of the status issue. He noted that Europe must find the strength to remain united in support of Ahtisaari. Mesic also expressed concern about Nikolic's statements on Serbia's borders. ¶35. (C) U/S Burns noted that relations between the U.S. and Croatia were excellent; the U.S. strongly supports Croatian membership in the EU and NATO (although we only have a decision-making role in the latter). He said that President Bush would make a strong case for Croatia's NATO membership at the Bucharest summit in 2008. On the other hand, Macedonia and Albania were not making sufficient progress on reforms; the US will continue to encourage them, but may not be prepared to support them for NATO at this time. ¶36. (C) Burns thanked Mesic for Croatia's contributions to peace-support operations in Afghanistan and political support in Kosovo. He noted that we are close to concluding a new Status of Forces Agreement with Croatia. Bosnia ¶37. (C) U/S Burns said that the USG wants to be a partner with Croatia in the region. Regarding BiH, the U.S. strongly supports Dayton, but recognizes that it must be modernized, and that the BiH constitution must be reformed. The USG will continue to work with Croatia to encourage the constitutional reform process, especially vis a vis Silajdzic. Regarding Dodik, the USG agrees that there can be no referendum on RS independence and has told Dodik that. Kosovo ZAGREB 00000565 005 OF 005 ¶38. (C) On Kosovo, the USG strongly supports independence, and thinks that PM Ceku and President Sejdiu will do a good job. He noted that the whole Kosovar government had recently visited the UN in New York where they had planned their first 120 days. The U.S. and EU planned to introduce a UNSC resolution that day supporting the Ahtisaari plan; a vote would probably come at the end of May. Following a successful vote, the USG planned to recognize Kosovo's independence immediately, and would provide economic and political support. There is great unity between the U.S. and EU on this issue; Russia is harder to predict, but we do not think Russia will veto the resolution. The U.S. will continue to work with Russia on its proposals; Secretary Rice would see Putin May 15, and Chancellor Merkel will see him May 17. It is important that Kosovo's status is decided quickly; further delays will only cause harm. Serbia ¶39. (C) U/S Burns noted that he had called Kostunica the prior day and said the U.S. wanted to maintain a good relationship with Serbia. The USG wanted to help Serbia join NATO, but it must be a full democracy, and the Radicals must not be in government. He noted that in his public remarks he had denounced Nikolic's statements regarding Croatia's borders. Burns reassured Mesic that no other countries would support Nikolic's views. BRADTKE