CROATIA: RESPONSE FOR INFORMATION ON HOST

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ZAGREB 001027 SIPDIS DEPT FOR S/CT KEN MCCUNE CIA FOR NCTC E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/22/2017 TAGS: KVPR PTER PREL PGOV PINR CVIS ASEC DHLS HR SUBJECT: CROATIA: RESPONSE FOR INFORMATION ON HOST GOVERNMENT PRACTICES - INFORMATION COLLECTION, SCREENING, AND SHARING REF: STATE 133921 Classified By: DCM Vivian S. Walker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (c) ¶1. (SBU) Embassy Zagreb provides the following responses to reftel request for information regarding Croatia's policies toward and capabilities for collection of biographic and biometric data for terrorist screening purposes. Responses are keyed to questions in reftel. The information provided presents the current understanding of post's country team, supplemented with what information we have been able to obtain since receipt of reftel request. Post's response does not answer every question contained in reftel, but presents the fullest information we have been able to obtain from our Croatian interlocutors. It should be noted that the information provided by the GoC officials sometimes presents a more optimistic representation of the country practices than Embassy officers have themselves noted. In such circumstances, post's response will note both perspectives. ¶2. Watchlisting: -- (SBU ) Border officials have access to watchlists, maintained by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which incorporate data from Interpol, Europol, Schengen and National Police indices, as well as names provided by other friendly governments. The watchlists include both terrorist and criminal names. The number of names included in these lists is not known, incorporating as they do other agencies' watchlists. In theory, this watchlist is accessible at all border crossing points, but in practice is readily accessible only at the three primary POE's. ¶2. Traveler Information Collection: -- (SBU) Host country policy is to collect traveler information from all foreigners arriving to Croatia. In practice, computerized collection of traveler data is fully function only at two POE's (at the Zagreb airport and the Bajakovo crossing point with Serbia),with installation of computerized collection underway at nine additional POE's. Installation at 25 more border crossing points is planned and awaiting EU funds. GoC policy is that all non-Croatian passports are swiped and the traveler information collected at the two fully computerized crossing points. However, post personnel have witnessed, and local interlocutors acknowledged, that at most border crossing points, particularly at land borders, incoming foreigners are "profiled" and certain nationalities and types of passports are waived through without inspection. -- (C) Traveler information is also collected through mandatory registration of tourists with local police, a function most frequently performed by hotels and other places of accommodation. Police and/or places of accommodation will sometimes provide traveler information to Croatian security services, but not on a regular basis. -- (C) Croatian Border Police receive advance Passenger Name Records (PNR) on incoming commercial flights. Names are checked against watchlists. Post knows of no existing agreements to share PNR data. ¶3. Border Control and Screening: -- (SBU) Computerized collection of traveler data is fully functional only at two POE's (at the Zagreb airport and the Bajakovo crossing point with Serbia),with installation of computerized collection underway at nine additional POE's. Installation at 25 more border crossing points is planned and awaiting EU funds. GoC policy is that all non-Croatian passports are swiped and the traveler information collected at the two fully computerized crossing points. However, post personnel have witnessed, and local interlocutors acknowledged, that at most border crossing points, particularly at land borders, incoming foreigners are "profiled" and certain nationalities and types of passports are waived through without inspection. Estimates of the total percentage of non-recorded crossings vary from negligible to 20 percent, and will also vary widely between harder border crossings in the north to more porous crossings in the south. -- (SBU) In determining whom to allow into Croatia, border officials rely on the information in the combined databases. They may also detain persons for perceived document discrepancies. Such persons may be held only four hours. If in this time the person is found to be of security interest, he may be detained further. Otherwise, the person is permitted to enter, or, if the travel document is determined to be fraudulent, turned around at the border. -- (SBU) In theory, information, including terrorist-related information, is shared between government agencies and such agencies would work cooperatively on any issues. ¶4. Biometric Collection: -- (SBU) Croatia has no biometric program at this time. No biometric information is collected at any border crossing point. ¶5. Passports: -- (SBU) Croatia does not issue a biometric passport. -- (SBU) Replacement passports are normal, full validity passports and bear no special notation indicating that the passport is a replacement for a lost or stolen travel document. Post knows of no special programs in place for dealing with "habitual" losers of passports. Post has not noted any increase in the number of "clean" passports used to apply for visas. ¶6. Fraud Detection: -- (SBU) Border Police take fraud detection seriously and will open investigations. Intercepted fraudulent documents are taken out of circulation and submitted to the investigating court. However, embassy officials hear little of the results of such investigations or of prosecutions of those perpetrating the fraud. Local officials advise that persons bearing fraudulent documents are generally deported in lieu of prosecution. ¶7. Privacy and Data Security: -- (SBU) Information relating to the questioning, detention, or removal of persons encountered at the border is included in the central database. -- (SBU) Restrictions on the collection or use of sensitive data are based on Croatian law, which is accessible to the public. Sharing of sensitive information is also governed by a restrictive law governing the protection of personal data, which prohibits transmission of any personal data, even basic biographic data, outside Croatia's borders, which also prohibits the sharing of such data with foreign government representatives inside Croatia outside of formal requests for mutual legal assistance. -- (SBU) Post does not know of a right for foreigners to sue the government to obtain personal data or information. BRADTKE