ELECTIONS 2007: PROFILE OF THE MAIN CHALLENGER --

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ZAGREB 001021 SIPDIS SIPDIS FOR EUR/SCE, EUR/PPD AND EUR/RPM E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV HR POLITICAL PARTIES SUBJECT: ELECTIONS 2007: PROFILE OF THE MAIN CHALLENGER -- THE OPPOSITION SDP REF: A. ZAGREB 1014 AND PREVIOUS ¶B. ZAGREB 1011 Classified By: Rick Holtzapple, POL/ECON, Reasons 1.4 B/D ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: This cable, part of our series (ref A) leading up Croatia's November 25 parliamentary elections, looks at the prospects for the opposition Social Democratic Party, the only serious challenger to the ruling HDZ. Having entered the election season confident it would oust the HDZ, the SDP has watched its lead shrink to where the election is now very close. The SDP's campaign has been based largely on negative portrayals of the HDZ record, and relatively little substance in terms of new policies. The SDP's split leadership structure contrasts sharply with the Sanader-dominated HDZ, but has left many voters (and Post) somewhat confused about who would be making the decisions in an SDP-run government. Foreign policy issues have been absent from the campaign, although the prospect that the HDZ might win re-election on the votes of the Bosnian Croat diaspora sparks keen resentment among SDP activists and much of the domestic Croatian electorate. END SUMMARY. SDP'S KEY MESSAGE: THROW OUT THE HDZ -------------- ¶2. (U) This summer the SDP enjoyed a 3 to 4 percentage point advantage over the HDZ. Interest in the party was boosted by sympathy in the wake of long-time party leader and former Prime Minister Ivica Racan's death and a subsequent leadership contest that saw the youthful Zoran Milanovic chosen as SDP President. Since that peak, however, SDP's lead has narrowed, and with just five days to go to the vote, the election remains too close to call. ¶3. (SBU) Both in private conversations with party leaders and in the SDP's public campaign three main ideas are driving the SDP's campaign: a sense that the HDZ is an arrogant and corrupt party that has failed to produce economic benefits to the broader population; a resentment of the influence of certain groups such as the diaspora or the Catholic church over Croatian politics and policies; and a conviction that the Croatian people are ready for a change. STRONG TEAM, BUT WHO IS IN CHARGE? -------------- ¶4. (U) Complementing this essentially negative campaign about the HDZ, the SDP has been actively seeking to portray itself as "Team SDP": a party with a strong team of potential ministers who will work effectively together. This is offered as an alternative to the existing model of a super-strong Prime Minister and party president in the figure of Ivo Sanader. ¶5. (SBU) Many observers we have spoken with, however, have not been impressed by the SDP's campaign. The very symbol of the SDP,s team idea -) the separation of leadership between party President Zoran Milanovic and prime-ministerial candidate Ljubo Jurcic ) may in fact be the party's greatest weakness. The 41-year-old Milanovic does represent the new strength and energy in the SDP, although many voters feel he has appeared to shrill and aggressive in his campaign appearances. Jurcic, an economist who only recently joined the party, has by contrast lacked the charisma and stature of a statesman during the campaign so far. This contrast in styles has only sharpened voters' questions about who would really be making the decisions in an SDP government. Prime Minister Sanader has sought to turn the SDP's leadership structure into one of his main campaign punch-lines, as "two helmsmen without a rudder." ¶6. (C) A close advisor to President Mesic has told the Ambassador that Mesic is torn by the current election. Mesic is generally more sympathetic to the SDP's policies and positions, and enjoyed the SDP's support in his presidential campaigns against HDZ-nominated opponents. Yet our source said Mesic has gained a grudging respect for Sanader and his leadership style over the past four years, and might well prefer it to what the SDP has on offer. Our sense is many Croatian voters share Mesic's split opinion. ALL POLITICS IS LOCAL, EVEN FOREIGN POLITICS -------------- ¶7. (SBU) SDP attacks on alleged corruption within the HDZ and a sense that the HDZ's economic reforms (such as they are) have improved the living standards of only a thin layer of wealthier Croatians are tactics that have found some traction with the voting public. What increasingly gets SDP activists ZAGREB 00001021 002 OF 002 worked up, however, is not HDZ corruption, but the HDZ's virtual lock on the 2 to 6 seats the Croatian disapora will hold in the next Parliament. (Septel will discuss the politics of the diaspora voting in more detail). One of Milanovic's first announcements after becoming SDP President was that the SDP would seek to abolish these diaspora seats. The SDP presents this stance as a matter of principle, but it is also true the SDP had little chance of winning even one of these seats, and so had little to lose by alienating these voters. The SDP subsequently announced it would not even bother to run a slate of candidates for those seats. ¶8. (SBU) Other than objecting to the diaspora vote, the SDP campaign has been virtually devoid of any foreign policy content. Little or nothing is said about Croatian policy toward B-H. And in other areas of foreign policy, there is little to distinguish SDP and HDZ positions. Both parties in government have told us they would support independence for Kosovo, and both actively support Croatian membership in NATO and the EU. The SDP has called for Croatia's NATO accession to be put to a public referendum, but is confident it can win such a referendum easily (REF B). The HDZ insists no such referendum is required or should be held, but the SDP has done little to highlight this distinction in the campaign. COMMENT -------------- ¶9. (C) An SDP-led government would present us with some contrasts compared to the current government. Like many Croatian voters, we are uncertain how policy-making would work in an SDP government, and suspect that Jurcic's term as Prime Minister might prove short-lived. Milanovic, a former diplomat who speaks excellent English and spent three years at the Croatian Mission to NATO, may prove somewhat mercurial in his personality, but is unquestionably sincere in his desire to move Croatia further toward Euro-Atlantic integration and partnership. Jurcic is perhaps a somewhat less known quantity. But the overall cast of an SDP-led government, with a host of ministers returning from the SDP's 2000-2003 term in office, provides ample assurance that we could work smoothly with the new government should the SDP win. The bottom line is that both the HDZ and SDP are pro-Western, pro-NATO, and moderately pro-reform parties that would be good partners for the U.S. BRADTKE