NATO ROAD SHOW VISIT TO CROATIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L ZAGREB 001011

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR EUR/SCE, EUR/RPM AND EUR/PPD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MASS NATO HR
SUBJECT: NATO ROAD SHOW VISIT TO CROATIA

REF: SARAJEVO 2415

Classified By: Rick Holtzapple, POL/ECON, Reasons 1.4 B/D


1. (C) SUMMARY: USNATO PermRep Victoria Nuland led an
inter-agency "NATO Road Show" visit to Zagreb on November 9.
President Mesic, Prime Minister Sanader, Foreign Minister
Kitarovic and Defense Minister Roncevic all expressed
confidence to the U.S. delegation that Croatia was
well-prepared for NATO membership. They emphasized that the
GoC would continue efforts to prepare for NATO after the
upcoming November 25 elections. Key foci would be the
continued campaign to educate the public about NATO and raise
pubic support for membership above the current 50% level;
further increases in the Croatian defense budget to 1.83% of
GDP in 2008 and 2% by 2010; and continued reductions in the
share of the defense budget spent on personnel below the
current 60%.


2. (C) Ambassador Nuland said Croatia was on track for an
invitation at Bucharest, and that the only risks were
complacency and letting up before the finish line. Two
leading opposition officials, Neven Mimica and Tonino Picula
of the SDP, assured the delegation that the upcoming
elections would not jeopardize support for NATO membership,
and expressed confidence that an SDP-led government would win
a proposed public referendum on NATO accession. Nuland
replied that this was a decision for Croatians and officially
we would be neutral. Speaking personally, she noted that a
successful referendum would be a good thing for Croatia as a
NATO partner, but that the SDP should be absolutely sure it
would prevail, since a defeat in the referendum would be a
tragedy. President Mesic said he did not expect even an
SDP-led government to actually follow through on holding a
referendum.


3. (C) Discussion in several sessions quickly turned to
regional political developments, with GoC officials noting
their concerns about developments in Bosnia-Herzegovina and
Serbia. All officials confirmed that Croatia would follow
the U.S. and the majority of EU states in recognizing an
independent Kosovo, but were determined to minimize any
potential backlash from Belgrade. PM Sanader, in particular,
noted concerns about rising radicalism in both B-H and
Serbia, which was provoking an increase in radical rhetoric
among Bosniak leaders such as Silajdzic as well, with some of
this directed at Croats as well as Serbs. END SUMMARY.

NATO ISSUES
--------------


4. (U) USNATO Ambassador Nuland led an inter-agency team to
Zagreb November 9 to discuss the criteria on which Croatia's
NATO accession bid would be judged by Allies. Other members
of the team including D/AS for Defense Daniel Fata, NSC NATO
Director Toby Bradley, EUR/SCE Director Christopher Hoh, JCS
J5 Col. Mike Shields, USNATO Enlargement Officer Thomas
Underwood, and Enlargement Officer Matthew Thompson.


5. (SBU) Ambassador Nuland opened all meetings with a
positive message that Croatia was on track for an invitation
at Bucharest, but that progress to date needed to continue to
assure this outcome. All GoC officials assured the U.S.
delegation that reforms were, in the FM's words,
"irreversible," and would continue. President Mesic and
DefMin Roncevic both stressed that defense reforms had
produced a much more mobile, capable, and professional
Croatian military (with conscription due to end on 1/1/2008).
FM Kitarovic and DefMin Roncevic both noted that the
Croatian Parliament had approved the GoC's entire requested
defense budget, set to rise to 1.83% of GDP in 2008 and 2% by

2010. Roncevic added that personnel costs within the defense
budget were declining, from 75-77% in the past to 60% this
year, and would decline further. He argued this was good
performance for a military in transition from a socialist
economy and a wartime footing to a modern, expeditionary,
stand-by force.


6. (C) DASD Dan Fata praised Croatia's efforts to acquire
more rotary wing aircraft for transportation needs, but
pressed the DefMin on Croatia's plans to acquire fixed-wing
fighters such as the F-16, and the serious burden this could
represent on Croatia's defense budget. Fata offered to send
a technical team to Zagreb to discuss in more details the
costs associated with acquiring and maintaining F16s.
Roncevic replied that Croatia's Long Term Development Plan
lays out a priority for Croatia to acquire transport capacity
to be able to deploy troops. The MI-171S helos that Croatia
was acquiring were part of a program to clear Russia's debt,
but the craft would be fully NATO compatible and
inter-operable. Regarding the fixed wing component, Roncevic
stressed that Croatia remained in an unstable region with the
Serb Radical Party still the largest vote-winner in Serbia.
He said he did not think fixed wing aircraft would be too
expensive for Croatia, and that Croatia firmly believed in
the need for its own air policing capacity. He agreed to
keep discussing the issue with the USG, particularly
concerning the real costs of any fixed wing package.


7. (SBU) GOC officials noted that public support for joining
NATO had risen sharply in the past few months, and now
consistently showed approximately half of the population
backing NATO membership. PM Sanader and others committed to
continue the GoC's public relations campaign. Roncevic noted
that media contacts and coverage of Croatia's troops with
ISAF in Afghanistan had produced positive public reaction and
helped maintain support for that deployment. Popular support
for NATO was expected to continue rising. GoC officials
noted ironically that political instability in B-H, Serbia
and elsewhere in the region would boost to public support for
NATO. The worse the political situation in the neighborhood,
the more eager Croatians would be to join.


8. (C) On a possible referendum on NATO membership, Sanader,
Kitarovic and Roncevic were emphatic that an HDZ government
had no intention of going that route, since there was no
legal requirement to hold one and there was political
consensus in favor of accession. Roncevic was scathing about
SDP calls to hold
a referendum, noting that when an SDP-led government in
October 2002 first made the application for Croatia to join
NATO, there had been no discussion of the need for that. SDP
officials Neven Mimica and Tonino Picula (potential FM and
DefMin, respectively, if the SDP wins the elections)
acknowledged that there is no requirement to put NATO
membership to referendum. The SDP felt, however, it has a
"political responsibility" to have an open discussion, and
that a positive vote would make Croatia a better ally. They
stressed that SDP had a long record in favor of NATO
membership, noting that it was the SDP that had made the
original application, and signed on to the Adriatic Charter
with Albania and Macedonia. President Mesic noted that the
SDP, during the lead up to the election, had announced it
favored a referendum on NATO, but he was certain that, once
the elections are over, no one would be arguing for a
referendum, even if the SDP wins.

REGIONAL ISSUES
--------------


9. (C) Ambassador Nuland urged that as Croatia joins the UNSC
in January, it reach out to Moscow to urge it to make the
tough decisions to play a more constructive role on Kosovo.
Sanader said Croatia had nothing against Russia, but none of
the officials indicated that they saw much prospect for
improvements in Russian attitudes. EUR/SCE Director Chris
Hoh noted that Croatian outreach to wavering EU states would
also be helpful.


10. (C) PM Sanader and President Mesic, among others, raised
concerns about regional political developments. They said
that Croatia would recognize a unilateral declaration of
independence by Kosovo, but only after the U.S. and at least
some EU states had done so. Both expressed concern about a
likely Serbian retaliation. Mesic asked for U.S. help to try
and ensure that Serbia not break relations with Croatia after
recognition. Mesic added that he was promoting a "German
solution" along the lines of how West Germany had relations
with East Germany even as it refused to accept that it was a
separate country. Sanader indicated that Croatia, while
supporting Kosovo, would also be trying to work closely with
Belgrade. "The Kosovars might expect us to do more," Sanader
said, "but Ceku has told me he understands our position."
Mimica and Picula also said the SDP would recognize Kosovo.
Sanader noted that in
his opinion there was no real difference between Tadic and
Kostunica; "they just play good cop and bad cop."


11. (C) On Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Croatians indicated they

are watching the situation closely; Sanader, Mesic, the
military and the Ministry of Interior had met to ensure that
Croatian authorities are prepared for any possible spill-over
of instability. Sanader and Mesic expressed their support
for Lajcak. Mesic warned that ousting just Dodik would not
make things better, as it would only stir up resentment and
resistance among the Bosnian Serbs. He urged the
international community to consider "cutting the Gordian
knot" and replacing both Dodik and Silajdzic. Sanader
expressed concern that Belgrade was constructing post-Kosovo
scenarios that would involve some sort of "reward" for the
RS. He also expressed concerns about Silajdzic's recent
behavior, and asked for U.S. help to keep Silajdzic and other
Bosniak politicians from radicalizing the situation. Sanader
also noted that he would be going to Mostar on November 10
for an event with HDZ 1990, an affiliated party in B-H.
Sanader claimed he was representing the European Christian
Democrats (EPP) in an effort to reunite the two main HDZ
parties in B-H. He noted that Croatia firmly supported the
territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but said that it
was also very important to give the Bosnian Croat parties a
feeling that they were part of the process.


12. (SBU) Noting these many regional problems, PM Sanader
asked Nuland for a "guarantee that, if we meet the
conditions, NATO will send an invitation no matter what
happens in Kosovo or in the region." Nuland responded that
she could provide assurances we would support countries that
are prepared for membership and would be making those
decisions on an individual basis.

PUBLIC OUTREACH
--------------


13. (U) Nuland spoke to some 150 students, journalists, and
NGO activists (both pro- and anti-NATO) following her
official meetings. Her remarks and the subsequent question
and answer session helped inform the audience about the
transformation of NATO into an organization that is actively
promoting stability and democratic values thousands of miles
from the edge of its member states' borders. The event
generated extensive positive press coverage. At the core of
the audience was a group of students that Post is assisting
in preparing themselves to serve as advocates for NATO
membership in the public debate.

COMMENT
--------------


14. (C) The Croatians, well aware of the tougher messages
delivered in the Road Show's previous stops in Tirana and
Skopje, appreciated the positive message for Zagreb, and
acknowledged their remaining tasks, particularly completing
defense reforms and continuing to build public support so
that it can match the remarkable degree of consensus among
the political elites about the value of NATO membership. As
one mark of that consensus, there was absolutely no
spill-over from the Road Show visit into the current election
campaign. Not even the differences between the HDZ and the
SDP over a referendum have featured to any noticeable degree
in either party's campaign. On regional issues, we note that
Sanader's visit to Mostar appears somewhat different when
viewed from Sarajevo (REFTEL) than when he describes it
himself in Zagreb. For better or worse, Croatia's
Constitution and electoral laws compel him and the HDZ to
campaign in B-H, but make it very delicate for the GoC to
speak out clearly on the current crisis there. It is
probably better, then, that regional issues have also not
featured much in the current electoral debates. END COMMENT.


15. (U) Ambassador Nuland has cleared this cable.
BRADTKE