IRANIAN FM VISIT PROMPTS WEAK DEFENSE FROM FM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 YEREVAN 000939 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/23/2017 TAGS: PREL KMDR IR AM SUBJECT: IRANIAN FM VISIT PROMPTS WEAK DEFENSE FROM FM OSKANIAN REF: A. YEREVAN 914 ¶B. YEREVAN 935 Classified By: CDA R.V. Perina, reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Iranian FM Mottaki was received by Armenia's president, prime minister, and foreign minister, and energy minister during his July 20 visit to Yerevan to take part in the 7th annual Armenian-Iranian inter-governmental economic commission. Armenian leaders were unhelpfully positive during the visit, with the PM and energy minister reportedly affirming Iran's "right" to a peaceful nuclear program. The two sides announced plans for President Ahmadinejad to visit Yerevan before the end of this year, while Armenia's PM and parliament speaker are to visit Tehran as well. CDA asked to meet with FM Oskanian July 23 to express our deep concern at the seeming acceleration of Armenia's relationship with Iran. Oskanian tried to downplay the visit as routine diplomatic politeness between neighbors. CDA said the GOAM should correct the public record if the quotes endorsing Iran's nuclear program are inaccurate and warned that the apparent "lovefest" with Iran will be hard for Washington to understand. END SUMMARY FM MOTTAKI'S VISIT PLAYS WELL IN ARMENIAN MEDIA -------------- -- ¶2. (C) INTERGOVERNMENTAL ECONOMIC COMMISSION: Armenian media widely covered Iranian Foreign Minister Manuchehr Mottaki's July 20 Yerevan visit. The major press availability came in connection with the inter-governmental economic commission meeting, which was chaired by Energy Minister Armen Movsisisan for the Armenian side. The two ministers cited a laundry list of joint priorities, and announced the headline goal of increasing bilateral annual trade turnover to 500 million USD by the end of 2007. (the 2006 figure amounted to just 200 million USD). Bilateral trade is reportedly running 20 percent higher for the first six months of 2007 compared to 2006. They reported that construction is to start within two months on a third high voltage power line between Iran and Armenia, while preparations are on track to begin construction in 2008 of proposed joint hydropower projects along the Araxes River that defines the boundary between Armenia and Iran. There was also an agreement on Armenian cargo access to Iran's Caspian Sea port of Enzeli as an export outlet to Russia and Kazakhstan. Looking further ahead, the ministers reportedly discussed plans for a free trade agreement, an oil refinery (with Russian investment),a new, second highway, a new railroad line linking the two countries, and the possibility of an Armenian bank opening in Tehran. Iran promised to allow Armenians to apply for Iranian visas at the border checkpoint rather than requiring a trip to the Iranian Embassy in Yerevan. ¶3. (C) THE POLITICAL EMBRACE: Equally disconcerting was the announcement that President Ahmadinejad will visit Yerevan before the end of 2007, while Armenian PM Sargsian and National Assembly Chairman Torossian will each visit Tehran as well. Further, Energy Minister Movsisian was widely quoted saying "We have many times repeated that Yerevan respects the Iranian people's right to have access to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Armenia's position in that respect has remained unchanged." We were unable immediately to verify an Iranian press service report quoting PM Sargsian saying that Iran had an "inalienable right" to develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Armenian media do not report any such statement, but rather that the two sides expressed the hope that Iran's nuclear controversy would be quickly resolved through peaceful negotiations under the auspices of the IAEA. CDA DEMARCHES FM OSKANIAN -------------- ¶4. (C) BEYOND BUSINESS AS USUAL: CDA requested a meeting July 23 with FM Oskanian to express our concern at what he called the "lovefest" that Yerevan orchestrated for the Mottaki visit. CDA noted to Oskanian that key Washington leaders were greatly concerned by reports that PM Sargsian and other government ministers had explicitly spoken out in support of Iran's nuclear program. CDA had made the point to Oskanian only last week (Ref A) that this was no time for "business as usual," but Armenian leaders' reported statements appeared to signal a blanket endorsement of Iran's nuclear program. CDA asked Oskanian to verify whether PM Sargsian had indeed made such statements. (NOTE: At COB July 24, Oskanian's executive assistant contacted us with news that Oskanian had spoken with the PM, who said he had indeed been misquoted, and would look for a suitable opportunity to correct the record. What the PM actually said was not immediately available. END NOTE) YEREVAN 00000939 002 OF 003 ¶5. (C) DID HE REALLY SAY THAT?: FM Oskanian was surprised and dubious of the reported Sargsian quote, but said he was not present at the meeting and did not know exactly what was said. He said he would try to find out, however. Oskanian commented that Sargsian typically sticks close to his prepared talking points when discussing political subjects with foreign delegations, and the alleged quotes went well beyond his talking points. He said Armenia's policy on the issue was as follows: Armenia is concerned about regional developments, and favors a non-nuclear (weapons) region in the Caucasus. Iranian development of a nuclear weapons capability would create great anxiety in Armenia. Armenia opposes Iran's unilateral insistence on its nuclear program, but also opposes an externally-imposed ultimatum on Iran that could results in a military confrontation. Oskanian promised to check with the PM to verify whether his words were accurately reported. Oskanian noted that he himself had many times been misquoted by Iranian news agencies for Iran's political purposes, and speculated that this might have happened in this case. CDA asked if the GOAM would issue a clarification, if it emerged that Sargsian had been misquoted. Oskanian was unable to commit, but promised to consult with the PM about the possibility. CDA urged that the GOAM must set the record straight, or the world will believe that the PM said what the Iranian press reports claimed. ¶6. (C) ARMENIA'S GEOPOLITICAL PROBLEM: Oskanian defended the GOAM on CDA's criticism of the flurry of bilateral visits that Iran and Armenia had just announced. Oskanian characterized the visits as diplomatic and routine. He said that in 15 years of independence, Armenia had only once hosted an Iranian president (Khatami) for an official visit, while President Kocharian's visit to Tehran in July 2006 was only Armenia's second presidential visit there. The upcoming Ahmadinejad visit to Yerevan was simply the reciprocal visit in response to Kocharian's trip. This might seem like an acceleration of ties, but it is not so. There was certainly no intention to signal a policy change. CDA rejoindered that the timing was terrible, and Iran surely -- as Oskanian acknowledged -- sought to exploit these reciprocal visits for its own political ends. Oskanian said that the United States must understand Armenia's strategic necessity to cultivate a lifeline through Iran. With the continued closure of the Turkish border, and the unreliability of Georgia's relations with Russia, Armenia had no alternatives. CDA took the point of the problem of closed borders, but emphasized that Armenia's current posture seemed much more forthcoming to Tehran than necessary and would be deeply disturbing to Washington, and not just Washington. Iran's defiance flouted the will of the international community as a whole, as expressed in UNSC Resolutions. ¶7. (C) MOTTAKI READOUT: Oskanian offered a readout of his own meeting with Mottaki, which he said was brief. Mottaki had reiterated that Iran has no intention of embarking on a nuclear weapons program, but was committed to peaceful use. Mottaki said Iran was intensifying its cooperation with the IAEA, and was encouraged that these negotiations could bring about a diplomatic solution to the dispute. Oskanian had asked Mottaki if Iran would agree to direct talks with the United States on the nuclear issue. Mottaki responded that Iran would be receptive to such an overture by the U.S. Mottaki had spoken positively of Iranian-U.S. talks on Iraq, and said Iran looked forward to the next round. Mottaki had also asked Oskanian for an update on the status of the Nagorno Karabakh negotiations, and Oskanian had provided a broad outline. Oskanian was not present in Mottaki's meetings with the president or prime minister, and was unable to give details of those meetings beyond press reports. ¶8. (C) PHILOSOPHICAL DIFFERENCES: FM Oskanian shared his view that the international community's approach to Iran was a mistaken one, which had not worked in changing Iranian behavior. Iran's national pride would not allow it to give up what it saw as its "right" because of international pressure. Oskanian argued that the international community should offer a more constructive dialogue that embraces Iran's NPT rights to peaceful nuclear development, and win assurances and rigorous monitoring controls through negotiation which would prevent Iran from developing an illicit weapons program. CDA countered that such negotiating tracks had been explored repeatedly, through the IAEA and in particular by our European partners, but these negotiating efforts had been fruitless. Meanwhile, Iran seemed to be successfully drawing Armenia into "a camp you don't want to be in" in the context of the nuclear controversy. FM Oskanian took the CDA's point, and promised to convey U.S. concerns to the Prime Minister. ¶9. (C) COMMENT: Whatever the veracity of the Iranian press reports about Sargsian's alleged remark, the overall optics YEREVAN 00000939 003 OF 003 of the visit -- and especially the announcement of more high-level visits later in the year -- played right into Iran's hands. We will continue to look for ways -- including during next week's visit by DAS Bryza -- to convince the GOAM that Armenia's apparent deepening relationship with Iran will be viewed with great concern in Washington and the rest of the international community. END COMMENT. PERINA