ARMENIA POLITICAL PARTY PRIMER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 YEREVAN 000559 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/CARC, DRL E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/02/2017 TAGS: PGOV KDEM AM SUBJECT: ARMENIA POLITICAL PARTY PRIMER REF: A) YEREVAN 490 B) YEREVAN 522 YEREVAN 00000559 001.2 OF 005 Classified By: Steve Banks, Pol/Econ chief, reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: This cable provides a basic reference to the political parties in the May 12 parliamentary race. Out of seventy-four registered political parties in Armenia only 24 parties and one bloc registered to participate in the parliamentary election, and two have since dropped out. END SUMMARY -------------- PRO-GOVERNMENT PARTIES IN THE RACE -------------- ¶2. (C) REPUBLICAN PARTY OF ARMENIA: The Republican Party of Armenia (RPA) is the dominant party in the current ruling coalition. The once-minor opposition party was transformed almost overnight into a vehicle of power-wielding elites after the abrupt 1998 fall from power of President Levon Ter-Petrossian. The RPA has gained a reputation as the party of entrenched special interests over its last eight years in power. Sargsian formally joined the party in July 2006, when he was still Defense Minister, triggering a new wave of wealthy elites to jump on board the RPA bandwagon. The Republicans have held 39 seats in the National Assembly since the 2003 elections. Predictions that the death of Prime Minister (and founding Republican) Andranik Margarian might lead to a rupture in the party have so far proved unfounded, despite occasional whispers of "old" and "new" factions within the organization. Margarian was both a respected elder statesman at the party's helm, and a bridge-builder among various competing interests. ¶3. (C) PROSPEROUS ARMENIA: Prosperous Armenia (PA),the political vehicle of oligarch Gagik Tsarukian, exploded onto the political scene in 2006, seemingly from nowhere. Tsarukian quickly attracted widespread popularity with SIPDIS high-profile commodity donations (e.g. potatos and wheat seeds) to the working poor. Tsarukian is at least a crony -- if not the created political and business instrument, as many allege -- of President Kocharian. The president has been very circumspect, however, about his political preferences, and has not shown any overt preference for either PA or the Republican Party. The key unanswered question of this election is to what extent the Republicans and Prosperous Armenia have coordinated their plans, and how vigorously they intend to compete with each other. The evidence has been mixed; but suggests that if any agreement exists at the top level, it has not been communicated down to the grassroots, where fistfights and more have been the norm. ¶4. (C) THE ARMENIAN REVOLUTIONARY FEDERATION-DASHNAKTSUTYUN (ARF): The ARF has 11 seats in the current Parliament, and has had a historically loyal following of 10 to 12 percent of the population, but probably has little chance to expand from that base. One of Armenia's oldest political parties, with roots dating back nearly a century, the ARF is one of the few political forces in Armenia which is based on ideology and not around one personality. ARF members trend to have a sharply nationalistic worldview, and are widely considered rather extremist on issues of national security and Armenia's relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan. The party's avowed Marxism has seemed more notional than operative in recent years. The ARF has strong ties with like-minded sister organizations among Armenian diaspora communities around the world. According to the ruling coalition's power-sharing agreement, the ARF now controls four ministerial portfolios, the National Assembly (NA) deputy chairman seat, and some of the NA Standing Committees. The ARF often seems something of an outsider in the ruling coalition, with its highly centralized and doctrinaire party control over what policies the ARF will support, and its willingness to skewer the government over corruption. However, on other occasions it can be very much a team player. Its ministers are, to a man, the most effective and least corrupt. ¶5. (C) UNITED LABOR PARTY (ULP): One of Armenia,s newer parties, the ULP was founded by influential businessman Gurgen Arsenyan in 2002 and has 6 seats in the Parliament. A small party without a nation-wide presence, it came to the NA after the 2003 elections thanks to the support of some wealthy industrialists, whose interests seem more mercenary than principled. The ULP has ostensibly a centrist platform YEREVAN 00000559 002.2 OF 005 and is primarily pro-presidential. The ULP joined the ruling coalition after the Rule of Law (Orinats Yerkir) party left the government in May 2006. In exchange, the ULP received one ministerial portfolio and the chairmanship of the NA Social& Youth Issues Standing Committee. The party currently claims to have a better presence in the regions and a stronger structure than in 2003. -------------- THE FRACTURED OPPOSITION -------------- ¶6. (C) RULE OF LAW (ORINATS YERKIR)(OY): The party's Armenian name, Orinats Yerkir, can be translated a number of ways; among the most common are Rule of Law, Country of Laws, and Legal State. OY is led by its young and ambitious founder Artur Baghdassarian, who from 2003 to 2006 served as parliament speaker. The party currently has eight seats in the NA. A right- centrist party, OY emphasizes rule of law, legal values, and social justice, and a generally pro-Western foreign policy. The party left the governing coalition in May 2006, ostensibly over foreign policy differences. In fact Baghdassarian and his party were almost certainly pushed out of power because the brash Baghdassarian went too far in criticizing his coalition partners and for grabbing too much limelight with his frequent foreign trips. The party is widely alleged to have achieved much of its earlier electoral success with the secret backing and financing of Serzh Sargsian. Boasting a well-organized structure, OY is one of the few parties to have strong regional branches. The party has repeatedly complained of administrative pressure on its campaigning activities, and has been denounced as a traitor by the president. Baghdassarian retains a certain amount of genuine popular support, according to polls, but his opportunistic ways have left him mistrusted by almost all sides of the political scene. ¶7. (C) NATIONAL UNITY (OR 'NATIONAL ACCORD') PARTY: With seven seats in the outgoing National Assembly, the National Unity party of Soviet-era Yerevan mayor Artashes Geghamian, is one of the biggest opposition parties in Armenia and still retains a Soviet-type "leader-oriented" structure. Gehgamian placed third in the 2003 presidential elections and gained popularity through his anti-Kocharian populist speeches. National Unity is a populist, left-oriented party, with an election platform pitched strongly at low- wage and unemployed voters, though he also attracts support from Soviet nostalgists and cultural intelligentsia. Geghamian and his party have had a series of public disagreements with the opposition parties of the Justice Bloc during the past two years: when Orinats Yerkir moved to the opposition field in 2006, Geghamian harshly criticized them for alleged ties with then-Defense Minister Sargsian. Geghamian's behavior and relatively mild rhetoric in recent months seem consistent with local accusations that Geghamian has made some sort of bargain with pro-government forces. That said, National Unity is in any case widely considered a lock to win seats in parliament, based on its reliable constituency. ¶8. (C) PEOPLE,S PARTY OF ARMENIA (PPA): Among the strongest of the "traditional opposition" PPA was founded in 1999 by the late NA Speaker Karen Demirchian, a popular former first secretary of the Armenian Communist Party. Demirchian,s SIPDIS son, Stepan, "inherited" the party after the parliament shootings in 1999 that killed his father. The PPA once united the so-called "red directors" and former Soviet nomenclatura, but now is known mostly for its hostility to President Kocharian and the ruling Republicans. The PPA's repeated mantra is that the 2003 presidential elections were fraudulent and that President Kocharian was "illegitimately re-elected," and the party accuses Kocharian's administration of multiple abuses of presidential powers. PPA political ads during the campaign have featured 2004 footage of PPA protesters bleeding from wounds suffered when police broke up the rally. The party has 5 seats in the parliament and is considered to be a right centrist party. Though Demirchian might genuinely have rivaled, if not exceeded, Kocharian's support in the 2003 presidential race, his popularity since then has plummeted to a modest core of (mostly elderly) true believers, who still cherish Karen Demirchian's memory and remain outraged over the 2003 outcome; a residual group that probably remains large enough to pass the threshold and win seats. In our recent meetings, however, Demirchian has again focused more on plans to rally popular protest if the YEREVAN 00000559 003.2 OF 005 elections are stolen, as he suspects, than on legislative plans. (NOTE: The PPA must not be confused with the similarly named People's Party of Tigran Karapetyan. See paragraph 12. END NOTE) ¶9. (C) REPUBLIC PARTY: The Republic Party (RP) was founded in 2002 by ex-Prime Minister Aram Z. Sargsian, the most consistently outspoken and sharply critical opposition leaders. Like PPA, Republic was formed by a Kocharian political opponent after the split in the Republican Party. Aram is the younger brother of the late PM Vazgen Sargsian, who was also assassinated during the 1999 parliament attack. After the November 2005 constitutional referendum, Sargsyan attempted once again to mobilize public discontent but utterly failed to garner support. In the final weeks of campaigning, the Republic Party has formed a de facto alliance with the new "Impeachment Bloc" (see below) and the strident, but minuscule, New Times party of Aram Karapatyen; the three have begun to combine their public rallies. The party is avowedly pro-western and its platform is based on liberal values. Aram Sargsian's dour manner, impotently strident tactics, and bellicose rhetoric have left him a party which is much smaller even than the much-diminished PPA, whose leader is at least seen as likeable. Sargsian has told us that his protest rallies will begin May 13. Sargsian has cried wolf too often, however, to be likely to draw much support. He has many times over the past four years proclaimed "the revolution" was starting, only to turn out bare dozens of demonstrators to support the cause. (NOTE: Republic Party leader Aram Zavenovich Sargsian should not be confused with the unrelated Aram Gasparovich Sargsian, leader of the even more politically insignificant Democratic Party of Armenia, which is also a registered contender in the parliamentary race. END NOTE) 10 (C) DASHINK (ALLIANCE) PARTY: Dashink was created by former "Nagorno-Karabakh Republic Defense Minister" (and NK war hero) Samvel Babayan, and was registered in December ¶2005. (NOTE: Babayan was sentenced in the "NKR" for 14 years in prison in March 2000 for allegedly attempting the murder of Karabakh &President8 Arkady Ghukasyan. Babayan was released from prison in September 2004, when a court ruled that he was not healthy enough to serve out his sentence. END NOTE.) Babayan had registered to run as a majoritarian candidate against Serzh Sargsian's brother, but pulled out of the potentially tense district race shortly after. He claimed the election there could not be free and fair because of the Republican Party,s heavy reliance on its &administrative resources,8 and has contented himself with running as the head of his party's list. Press commentators pointed to Babayan,s brief detention by the National Security Service on illegal arms possession before his pull-out as possible government intimidation to drop out of the race. Babayan has been something of a cipher. Our read is that his war hero credentials were sufficient that it was embarrassing to let him continue rotting in jail, but that he does not have political backing from ruling party circles for his political enterprise. Dashink has joined with the tiny, but well-pedigreed and diaspora-connected political party Ramkavar. (NOTE: We commonly use the Armenian word Dashink for this party, to avoid confusion with the more generic term "alliance" which has its own legal meaning in Armenian political party/parliamentary law. END NOTE) ¶11. (C) IMPEACHMENT BLOC: The Impeachment Bloc is a new entity which arose in recent weeks, having first come into being briefly under the name the "Alternative Movement." Impeachment has drawn both notoriety and moderate participation in its rallies with its simple battle cry to throw out "the Karabakhis": specifically, Kocharian, Serzh Sargsian, and (technically non-Karabakhi) Gagik Tsarukian. The word "Impeachment"--borrowed intact from English--is the same in both Armenian and Russian, and the repeated chanting of the word features largely in Impeachment rallies, though in fact the bloc does not have the technical meaning of the word in mind. The leading figures in Impeachment came from a disaffected wing of the Armenian National Movement. Impeachment has found common cause with Aram Z. Sargsian's Republic Party and with the New Times party. The three together probably will not amount to much, although the three groups' combined rallies have probably drawn as much or more participation as anyone, of up to perhaps 1000 people. ¶12. (C) HERITAGE PARTY: Heritage Party is the political YEREVAN 00000559 004.2 OF 005 vehicle of former AmCit and former foreign minister Raffi Hovhanissian, who grew up in the United States. Hovhanissian himself enjoys high favorability ratings in U.S.-funded polls, but the same polls suggest few people plan to vote for him. It seems that Hovhanissian may be seen as too much of a "nice guy" for Armenian voters to believe he could succeed in the shark-filled political waters. Hovhanissian also has practically no organizational base or natural constituency, although his American-style campaign methods look as professional as any in the race. ¶13. (C). PEOPLE'S PARTY (PP): Tigran Karapetyan's People's Party (not to be confused with Stepan Demirchian's PPA, above) is much lower profile than the PPA. The populist Karapetyan may have some chance of squeaking into parliament with the support mostly of rural villagers and pensioners. ¶14. (C) THE UNITED LIBERAL NATIONAL PARTY: Known by its Armenian acronym, MIAK, which is a word play on the Armenian word for "only"; (slogan: "Your ONLY correct decision!"). MIAK is a brand-new party that barely constituted itself in time to register for the election. Its leaders and members are drawn mostly from young Armenian businessmen who have studied abroad, especially at British and American universities. The party leadership overlaps substantially with the membership of the British Embassy exchange program alumni association. Full of bright, idealistic (if perhaps nave),and pro-Western young people, the newborn party hopes only to build some name recognition during this cycle as a foundation for future growth. They have posted several prominent billboards around Yerevan, but seem to have little chance of getting anywhere this time around. -------------- NOT APPEARING IN THIS FILM -------------- ¶15. (C) Several moderately notable -- at least by name recognition or historical prominence -- parties and political figures have chosen not to participate. Former prime minister Vazgen Manukian's National Democratic Union was an early dropout, not even going though the motions to file its registration. Manukian proclaimed weeks ago (once he failed in his opposition coalition negotiations) that the conditions for the election were already unfair. We presume he recognized, correctly, that his party had practically no chance by itself of winning enough votes to make into parliament. The rump Armenian National Movement (ANM; sometimes rendered as Pan-Armenian National Movement) has likewise realized the futility of its race, without the political cover of a unified opposition bloc, and has dropped out. Up until the 1998 fall from power of President Levon Ter-Petrossian, the ANM had been by far the dominant party. However, Ter-Petrossian, the once-acclaimed leader of Armenia's massive popular independence uprising in 1990-91, amassed a deep and widespread public antipathy for himself and his party over his eight years of perceived misrule. The bitter hangover of this unpopularity has made the ANM party's brand identity among the most despised in Armenia--one which the party would have been wiser to abandon long since. ¶16. (U) KEEPING UP WITH WHO'S WHO: To avoid voter confusion, the proportional representation ballots will list not only the party name, but also the top three names on each party's list, to aid voters in remembering which party label goes with the politician whose name is better known to them. This also helps to distinguish the many similarly-named parties from each other, and would undermine any deliberate "dirty tricks" campaign to confuse voters over which party is which. ¶17. (U) The complete list of Central Election Commission registered political parties and the bloc: The National Democratic Party The National Solidarity party The National Unity party The Prosperous Armenia party The Dashink party The Heritage party The People's Party The Democratic Path party The Armenian Revolutionary Federation - Dashnaktsutyun The Progressive Party of Armenia (Officially Withdrawn) The Democratic Party of Armenia The Youth Party of Armenia YEREVAN 00000559 005.2 OF 005 The People's Party of Armenia The Communist Party of Armenia The Republican Party of Armenia The Marxist Party of Armenia The Armenian National Movement (Officially Withdrawn) The Republic party The United Labor Party The United National Liberal Party The New Times party The Hunchak Social Democratic Party of Armenia The Christian Democratic Revival party The Orinats Yerkir party The Impeachment bloc ¶18. (U) Additional reporting and reference resources may be found at Embassy Yerevan's classied intranet (SIPRNet) website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/yerevan/ GODFREY