ELECTION HOMESTRETCH -- WITH SIXTEEN DAYS LEFT, WE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 YEREVAN 000522

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/25/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM KDEM AM
SUBJECT: ELECTION HOMESTRETCH -- WITH SIXTEEN DAYS LEFT, WE
TAKE SOME POINTS TO THE PRESIDENT

REF: A. A) YEREVAN 490


B. B) YEREVAN 396

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Classified By: CDA A.F. Godfrey, reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: We called on President Kocharian to deliver
some messages for the final stage of the pre-election
campaign. We urged him to galvanize prosecutors against
electon-related fraud. We also protested sharply the
apparent clandestine taping, and subsequent publishing, of a
British diplomat's conversation with opposition figure Artur
Baghdassarian (Ref A). The president fenced with us at some
length over these points, but did agree to make a public
statement that election fraud would not go unpunished.
Kocharian complained bitterly about both Baghdassarian and
the British DCM for their role in the conflict -- evading our
repeated point that the content of the recorded conversation
was irrelevant to us; it was the fact of clandestine
surveillance and seemingly politically-motivated release of
the sensitive material that greatly concerned us. We also
took the opportunity to explain to Kocharian, after we
deliberated so long with the GOAM to change the Human Rights
Report's characterization of Nagorno-Karabakh, why we had
abruptly changed in back again. In the wake of our tough
political conversation, Kocharian swallowed this last news
with reasonable humor. END SUMMARY

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PRE-ELECTION REPORT CARD
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2. (C) The CDA sought a meeting with the President April 26,
accompanied by Acting DCM/USAID Director and pol/econ chief,
to review the political situation, with roughly two weeks to
go until May 12 parliamentary elections. CDA shared with
Kocharian his impression of the pre-election period today,
which he assessed as a cautiously good news story. He
highlighted freedom of assembly, opposition media access, and
work on the voters' registry as areas that seem to us to have
shown a marked improvement since the 2003 elections. The
CDA noted that some areas require additional work for the
future, but that this must come after we get past the current
election cycle. Specifically, he mentioned the nearly
500,000 voters (presumably mostly emigrants) who appear on
the voters' registry but do not appear in other GOAM
databases. The CDA said that while the OSCE Election
Observer Mission (EOM) will undoubtedly mention this in its
assessments, we would not make any public mention of this
issue until after the election, for fear of unhelpfully
undermining public confidence in the polls. He noted that
fixing this problem would require some legislative and/or
regulatory modifications, and that discussions were ongoing
between our technical experts and GOAM officials about this.

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THE BLACK MARK: SECRET TAPING OF OPPOSITION/DIPLOMAT
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3. (C) CDA commented that the most troublesome thing to
arise so far on the election scene was this appalling case of
a private conversation, in February, between the British DCM
and Orinats Yerkir party leader Artur Baghdassarian
apparently being clandestinely recorded, and then published
in the newspaper April 21. This looked suspiciously like
intelligence service interference in the political campaign,
and would be seen as a black mark by all international
observers. CDA emphasized that the content of the
conversation was irrelevant to the principle that free
societies do not tolerate the secret eavesdropping on
politicians. CDA noted that he had spoken with PM Serzh
Sargsian about it, and urged the prime minister publicly to
condemn the episode. He also reminded the president of the
March incident (Ref B) in which the NSS had called in a
journalist for questioning about his political writings;
another worrisome example of improper security service
involvement in politics.


4. (S) Kocharian pushed back hard against this criticism.
He comlained about both Baghdassarian and the British DCM.
He said that the British DCM had held numerous meetings over
a period of months with various opposition figures, the
content of which was inappropriate for a diplomat and
amounted to "political intrigue." Spreading rumor and
inciting opposition to the authorities seemed more like the
work of intelligence operatives, not diplomats, Kocharian
said. The British DCM had been encouraging to opposition
leader in their efforts to band together and plot potential
uprisings. He mentioned specifically a conversation that the
same Briton had held with deputy parliament speaker Vahan
Hovhanessian (ARF-Dashnaksutyun party),that had so troubled

YEREVAN 00000522 002.2 OF 003


Hovhanessian he had felt the need immediately to report it to
the president. CDA pointed out that it is sometimes the job
of a diplomat to ask provocative questions, and this could be
misunderstood. He reiterated that in any case, we and the
international community did not care about the content of the
conversation, the fact of covert taping was a serious concern
and a blemish on Armenia's pre-election record.


5. (S) Kocharian went on to blast Artur Baghdassarian.
Asking us to stop notetaking and abortively moving to send
his own staffers from the room, Kocharian said that
Baghdassarian had three times called on him at his residence
since the first of the year, asking about whether Kocharian
woudl be willing to allow Orinats Yerkir to rejoin the
governing coalition after the elections. Kocharian had said
that if Baghdassarian's public rhetoric during the campaign
stayed within reasonable limits, he was prepared to allow OY
back into the governing coalition. Believing he effectively
had a deal with the OY leader, Kocharian was angered to learn
that the very same month he had made this tentative
commitment to Baghdassarian (February 2007),Baghdassarian
was scheming with the British Embassy to blacken Armenia's
reputation over the conduct of elections, and urging European
states to condemn the elections as unfair. We renewed out
basic point, but the president was not taking it on board.

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GOING AFTER ELECTION FRAUD
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6. (C) CDA noted that President Kocharian had asked EUR/ACE
Coordinator Tom Adams, in November 2006, for prosecutorial
training on election fraud, and that we had provided an
excellent month-long program in early 2007 as a direct
response. He reported that the Prosecutor General's office
had seemingly been delighted with the training and U.S. study
tour, but now was giving us all kinds of excuses for why it
could not be more aggressive and forward-leaning on looking
into publicized complaints about fraud. CDA asked Kocharian
to speak to the PG's office about taking a more activist
posture. Kocharian temporized that this was a tricky issue.
The GOAM had been many times criticized in past years for an
over-active procuracy, which international observers felt was
over-aggressive and politically selective. The law specified
what conditions should be met before prosecutors could open
an election fraud case, and he could not ask the prosecutors
to do otherwise. He noted that the public associated the
procuracy and the police organs with the president, and if he
ordered them to go out and sniff around based only on media
reports, there would be an immediate backlash from opposition
parties and international human rights observers, accusing
the GOAM of politically-motivated abuse of the procuracy.
The CDA asked the president at least to make a strong public
statement that election fraud would not be tolerated. The
president agreed, while muttering that he did not like to
make statements that he could not or did not intend to back
up, and his powers vis-a-vis the procuracy on election fraud
were not robust.

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HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT CHANGES
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7. (C) The CDA explained that, while it was somewhat
embarassing to us after our many discussions with the GOAM
about revising the Nagorno Karabakh language in the 2006
human right report, that we had been forced to change the
language back to the original text, which had been
objectionable to Armenia. He explained that, upon
reflection, it had been determined that it was inappropriate
to make any revision to the HRR text after the report had
been formally submitted to Congress, and accordingly the
original published language had been restored. Kocharian
needled us briefly about this, but then laughed and seemed to
dismiss the matter.

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COMMENT
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8. (C) This was a challenging, though not hostile, meeting.
President Kocharian can be adept at verbal judo when he does
not want to take a message on board, and he showed his skill
during this meeting. The president's comments about
Baghdissarian reveal an aspect of his character we have
noticed in the past. When he believes he has made a deal
with someone, if he later believes that the other party has
betrayed the bargain, than all bets are off. He does not
easily forgive such a transgression.


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9. (C) The Human Rights Report language is an issue that
has exercised the foreign minister far more than the
president. Despite the president's mild initial reaction, we
expect stormier waters may lie ahead, especially if there is
conspicuous chest-thumping from Baku to the effect that they
"beat" Armenia in Washington on this issue.
GODFREY