BRIEFING THE PRESIDENCY ON EXIT POLLS, IFES/CEC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 YEREVAN 001439

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/16/2017
TAGS: PREL EAID PGOV PHUM KDEM KPAO OSCE AM
SUBJECT: BRIEFING THE PRESIDENCY ON EXIT POLLS, IFES/CEC
PROBLEMS, OSCE/ODIHR INVITATION


Classified By: CDA Joseph Pennington, reasons 1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: USAID briefed presidential aide Vigen
Sargsian, at government request, about plans for a
USAID/IRI-sponsored exit poll for the upcoming presidential
election. Sargsian pressed for more details about the
methods and partners involved, and expressed great skepticism
both personally and on President Kocharian's part. He
admitted that the PM's public embrace of the proposal
complicated the president's desire to block it. Polchief
took the opportunity to raise the CEC's chairman's refusal of
USAID/IFES training for pollworkers, as well as to ask about
when Armenia's election observation invitation to OSCE/ODIHR
would be forthcoming. END SUMMARY


2. (C) PRESIDENCY OUT OF THE LOOP AND ANNOYED: On the
margins of a meeting about Radio Liberty, presidential chief
of staff Armen Gevorkian complained to CDA that the Embassy
had approached the prime minister to float the idea of an
exit poll, before doing so with the presidency. He made
clear that the presidency was disgruntled to learn of the
idea from the media. President Kocharian was much less
inclined to support the idea than the Prime Minister --
though Gevorkian suggested that as a candidate himself, the
PM had little choice but to agree. Gevorkian demanded that
USAID return and brief presidency staffer Vigen Sargsian on
the details of the proposal by no later than COB December 13,
so that Kocharian would be prepared to discuss the matter at
his weekly Friday meeting with the PM.


3. (C) ...AND DISLIKES EXIT POLL IDEA: USAID Mission
Director, democracy programs director, and polchief called on
Vigen Sargsian December 13 to go over the exit polling
proposal in more detail. Sargsian asked probing questions
about who would conduct the surveys, how many interviewers
there would be, at how many polling places, and which local
partner(s) might be involved. He also asked where in the CIS
had exit polls been done before, and with what success. His
questions betrayed a deeply skeptical attitude toward the
concept. Eventually, he shared outright his "personal
opinion" that exit polling is an inappropriate political tool
for Armenia. He raised issues of voter confusion, voter
deception, nefarious bystanders over-hearing voters'
responses to polltakers and retaliating, and general concerns
about lack of confidentiality. At one point, Sargsian cast
vague aspersions on USAID, IRI, and Gallup's local partner,
the Armenian Sociological Association, for alleged political
bias. Later on, he insisted that local partners must be
used, because it would be unacceptable for foreign powers to
set themselves up as arbiter of Armenia's election. Sargsian
commented that OSCE/ODIHR -- despite flaws and failings that
he alleged on ODIHR's part -- was the internationally agreed
mechanism for the international community to review
elections. Adding that exit polling would be a new intrusion
of the international community into elections, Sargsian
mentioned that had we first approached the Presidency about
exit polls, the president would have said no. However, since
the PM had announced support for it, the Presidency was left
in a delicate position vis-a-vis the PM, and the two would
have to agree on how to proceed.


4. (C) TOOL FOR RABBLE-ROUSING?: Vigen Sargsian fretted
that in the event that the exit poll showed a different
outcome than the official results, that data would
immediately be used as a club by radical opposition elements
to whip up civil disorder against the government. We
inquired why the poll results should be different from the
outcome, pointing out that the whole point of the exercise
was to be able to validate the official tally and assure
Armenian voters that the outcome was correct. This should be
a tool for stability, disproving false allegations of fraud.
We pointed out that exit polling was a well-established
science, supported by reams of scholarly literature and
worldwide practice, and that Sargsian's concerns were
unfounded. Sargsian was unwilling to be persuaded that the
exit poll operation was sufficiently immune from manipulation
to assured of a valid result. Meanwhile, he said he still
did not have enough detail about the proposed methodology to
satisfy the president. He asked that the IRI/Gallup experts
come to brief him on their next Yerevan visit, which we
agreed could be arranged the week of December 17.


5. (C) WE DIDN'T ASK PERMISSION: Sargsian chided again that
the embassy had erred in going to the Prime Minister for
approval of the exit poll proposal, when the PM was himself a
candidate. He said we should have sought the president's
permission. Polchief clarified that we had not, in fact,
asked the PM for permission. After looking into it, our
analysis had concluded that there was no law or regulation

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governing exit polls in Armenia, and that we were free to
mount such an exercise without any kind of formal government
permission. Nonetheless, we also did not wish to keep
secrets or spring surprises on the political scene, so had

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begun raising our plan with key government and political
officials, starting with the prime minister. It had been the
PM's choice immediately to publicize our intention before we
had had the chance to raise it in other quarters. Sargsian
said he "took the point" and said nothing further on that
aspect.


6. (C) CEC NOT PLAYING WELL WITH IFES: We raised the
separate issue of CEC Chairman Garegin Azaryan's cavalier
dismissal (septel) of USAID implementer IFES' plans to
provide training for pollworkers, as had been done before the
May 2007 parliamentary election. Polchief noted that the CEC
was within its rights, of course, to refuse U.S.-funded
training. He said, however, that Azaryan's alternative plans
for training looked inadequate to our experts. He also
pointed out that if the CEC refused IFES training, we would
have to make clear that U.S.-funded assistance in this area
had terminated, and the CEC's programming was all its own.
Sargsian was unfamiliar with the issue, but promised to call
Azaryan to inquire about it.


7. (C) WHAT ABOUT THE ODIHR INVITATION?: We also pressed
Sargsian on when the GOAM would issue its official invitation
to OSCE/ODIHR to monitor the election. Sargsian insisted
that this would be done "at the normal time." We pointed out
that as far as we could tell the invitation was already
growing late. Sargsian disagreed, but said he was not
certain of the formal schedule. He assured us the invitation
would most probably go out within a week or at most two


8. (C) COMMENT: It was clear to us that no amount of
explanation, details, or persuasion was going to sway
Sargsian in favor of allowing an exit poll. Less clear was
whether the normally more easy-going Sargsian's resolve on
the point was a matter of personal conviction or simply of
faithfully hewing to his bosses' policy line. The question
of how the president and PM will square their different views
-- to say nothing of how to explain it to the public if the
president countermands the PM's public stance -- is a
delicate one for Armenia's top two leaders to resolve. We
were also struck by the strong implication that there had
been absolutely no direct communication between the
presidency and the prime minister's office on the issue. On
this, at least, the two institutions seem on completely
different pages, with the presidency's view steeped in
combative paranoia. END COMMENT.
PENNINGTON