Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07YEREVAN1347
2007-11-12 14:37:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Yerevan
Cable title:  

DELIVERING MCC SCORECARD TO PM, WITH A SIDE ORDER

Tags:  PGOV PREL PHUM EAID KDEM AM 
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VZCZCXRO4075
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHYE #1347/01 3161437
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 121437Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY YEREVAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6623
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 1366
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0447
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP WASHDC PRIORITY 0132
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 YEREVAN 001347 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/07/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM EAID KDEM AM
SUBJECT: DELIVERING MCC SCORECARD TO PM, WITH A SIDE ORDER
OF DEMOCRACY/HUMAN RIGHTS

REF: A)

YEREVAN 00001347 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: CDA Joseph Pennington, reasons 1.4 (b,d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 YEREVAN 001347 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/07/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM EAID KDEM AM SUBJECT: DELIVERING MCC SCORECARD TO PM, WITH A SIDE ORDER OF DEMOCRACY/HUMAN RIGHTS REF: A) YEREVAN 00001347 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: CDA Joseph Pennington, reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: CDA called on Prime Minister Sargsian to present the MCC FY08 scorecard, and discuss its implications. He acknowledged the message that Sargsian had heard in Washington from MCC CEO Danilovich, that Armenia should not be "punished" for having graduated to a higher national income category, but made clear that Armenia will have its work cut out to move its indicators back to green, which will be critical for the longer term. CDA also pointed out that Armenia's democracy/human rights performance during the presidential election season and throughout 2009 would be crucial to enabling the MCC Board to continue Armenia's eligibility in the face of technically failing indicators. Sargsian took the point, saying the government program to lift Armenians' overall well-being and democratic progress would inevitably get Armenia's scorecard where it needed to be. He made an oblique plea that the December Board meeting not/not cancel Armenia's eligibility, as this would be seen locally as a devastating political message against Sargsian's candidacy for the February 2008 presidential election. END SUMMARY ¶2. (C) CDA, A/DCM, and acting MCC country director called on PM Serzh Sargsian November 8 to deliver the Armenia FY08 MCC scorecard formally and discuss its implications. He noted that there were two sides to Armenia's MCC situation: the excellent work on implementation, of which the PM could be justly proud, and the more problematic issue of the eligibility indicators. The prime minister remarked on his excellent round of meetings in Washington, including with MCC CEO Ambassador Danilovich, who had expressed the point that while a majority of Armenia's indicators would be in the red, MCC recognized this was a direct effect of Armenia's "graduation" to a higher national income category, which meant it would be held to higher standards. Danilovich had told him there was no desire to penalize Armenia for having grown wealthier. CDA conceded this point, though he pointed out that the issue was not just one of category graduation. Armenia's Ruling Justly raw scores had been flat or slipping, and this would have been worrisome even in the context of Armenia's previous inco
me bracket. CDA asserted that the expectation underlying the MCC program was that a country's scores should steadily improve, not stagnate, and Armenia had important work to do to get moving in the right direction. He commented that while we cannot be certain what the MCC Board will decide in December all the signals we have from Washington suggest that Armenia will probably not lose its eligibility in December. He added, however, that this is no time for complacency. ¶3. (C) CDA observed that the PM and MCC CEO had spoken of the possibility of Armenia winning a second Compact, should Congress authorize that possibility, and he commented that there is no way that Armenia would be approved for a second Compact unless it fully qualified, based on the indicators, in its current competition category. He added that it would be harder for the MCC Board to continue to extend Armenia's eligibility for its current Compact in FY09 if Armenia's indicator scores had not considerably improved by a year from now, such that it compares favorably in the higher category in which it finds itself. The "excuse" of competing at a higher level will have worn thin by that point. ¶4. (C) CDA commented that, given Armenia's "technical failure" on the FY08 indicators (which are well known to be inherently somewhat "backward-looking"),the Board would doubtless pay closer "real-time" attention to Armenia's performance on ongoing democratic progress, the presidential election campaign environment, and human rights issues that will arise, both between now and the December Board meeting, and throughout CY2008. He enumerated a handful of examples that, taken together, could be seen as a troubling trend. He noted Armenia's active cheerleading for Russia's proposals to severely curtail and undermine the ability of OSCE's Office of Democratic Insitutions and Human Rights to carry out its election observation work properly. He also mentioned growing international concerns about a poor media freedom environment in Armenia. He noted in particular the state tax and law enforcement authorities' swift measures to audit and intimidate the Gyumri-based Gala TV station immediately after Gala TV was the only channel to broadcast in full oppostion presidential candidate Levon Ter-Petrossian's recent political speech. CDA said these were only a few of a longer list of examples that had come to Washington's attention and were worrisome to us. The CDA closed by expressing the USG's "absolute commitment" to do our best with our assistance YEREVAN 00001347 002.2 OF 002 programs to support and help the GOAM in its efforts to accelerate its political and economic reforms. ¶5. (C) The prime minister commented that the indicators were not mere numbers; the numbers represented the lives and livelihoods of real people, whose well-being was his real concern. He considered the MCC indicators as like a medical thermometer, whose purpose was to assess the health of the patient. He intended to devote his government's intensive work toward "improving the health of the patient" and he was confident that with this approach the indicators would take care of themselves. He also expected that, given the backward-looking nature of the indicators, Armenia probably was already well on its way to improved Ruling Justly scores, given its successful parliamentary election and other achievements that had not yet been captured by the indicators. ¶6. (C) The PM claimed unfamiliarity with the Gala TV issue, but said the issue was certainly a minor one that would be addressed. He said it was not worthy of Washington's notice. He said it was in his government's interest to have a strong, healthy media sector, and he would do whatever he could toward that goal. The PM pushed back on OSCE/ODIHR. While the CDA had commented that Armenia aligned itself with a problematic group of countries (e.g. Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan) on the issue, the PM commented that France, Germany, and other West European states do not undergo election monitoring, and perhaps we should consider Armenia to be in that category. He said that OSCE procedures should not be insulting to countries' dignity. Shifting gears, he said that there are many other positive achievements and areas of agreement; we need not dwell on this disagreement. He noted he had had a good meeting with the NDI President in Washington, which seemed to put the GOAM/NDI relationship on a better track. Other joint efforts were evidence of mutual good faith. The PM noted obliquely that it would be very problematic politically in Armenia if the December MCC Board meeting were to declare Armenia ineligible for its MCC program. ¶7. (C) A/DCM had met with one of the prime minister's key staff assistants, Levon Martirosyan, the evening of November 7, and had a lengthy discussion of the scorecard and its implications, along the lines outlined above. Following the PM meeting, we provided Martirosyan detailed information from the mcc.gov website explaining the indicators and their relationship to MCC eligibility. Martirosyan is smart, British-educated, and speaks excellent English. This meeting offered a less formal opportunity to talk out all of the issues associated with Armenia's MCC eligibility and its democracy and human rights performance. Meanwhile, in compliance with reftel instructions (while awaiting the November 8 meeting with PM Sargsian),A/DCM e-mailed the FY 08 scorecard to Deputy Finance Minister David Avetissian and MFA Americas Director Armen Yeganian/Americas deputy Karine Afrikian November 2. ¶8. (C) COMMENT: Sargsian and his team clearly heard in Washington the message that Armenia should not be penalized for jumping up to the next income category (with the consequence that nine of its 17 indicators are now in the red). Our concern is that he may have heard this message too well. This echoes our longer-standing perception that the Armenian government is too contented with international evaluations of the May 2007 parliamentary election; it earned a "C" grade but seems to feel it passed with flying colors. Accordingly, we felt some judiciously tougher medicine was called for to wake the government from its complacency, particularly given the run of troubling episodes this year that reflect more poorly on Armenia's democratic environment. The PM took the message well, and we were encouraged (OSCE and Gala TV issues aside) by his profession of commitment to the right goals. With the presidential election date now set for February 19, there will be ample opportunity in coming months to see whether authorities here can put the PM's words into actions. PENNINGTON

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